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Abstract 
This thesis concentrates upon a largely neglected subject 
wi thin contemporary poli tical history, that is the transi tion 
in London government from the London County Council (L.C.C.) to 
the Greater London Council (G.L.C.). It is a study of the 
actions and reactions of poli tical parties at central 
government, county council, and district council level, and 
incorporates the role of non-political party pressure groups. 
The bulk of the thesis is concerned with the L.C.C. area. 
Consideration is, however, given to the non-L.C.C. area 
incorporated into the larger C.L.C. This work demonstrates that 
there was no consensus regarding the need for reform. I t is 
argued that the lack of consensus led to compromises that 
failed to satisfy many interested groups and thus the C.L.C. 
was often perceived to be flawed. 
This thesis derives from an exhaustive literature search and 
extensive reading. The records of political parties were very 
useful. Newspapers and journals aided research, as did a series 
of interviews with key surviving individuals. A further source 
of information were the minutes of various local authori ties 
and connected bodies. Previously unavailable records have been 
used, for example, Conservative Party and Government records. 
With the aid of these new sources this work uniquely 
concentrates on exposing the political constraints and biases 
that caused a flawed local government system to be introduced. 
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Introduction 

I 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the abolition of the 
London County Council (L.C.C.) and the creation of the Greater 
London Council (G.L.C.). Because the G.L.C. incorporated a 
very much larger area than the L.C.C. it is also important to 
examine the non-L.C.C. authorities which were merged into the 
new local government system within the G.L.C. area (this 
consisted of Middlesex and parts of Essex. Kent, Surrey and 
Hertfordshire) . 
The main events around which this thesis is constructed are 
as follows: the appointment of, the evidence given to, and the 
report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater 
London 1957-1960; the Government's white paper London 
GQvernment: Government Proposals for Reorganization of 1961; 
The London Government Bill of 1962 and the London Government 
Act, 1963; the election to the G.L.C. and new London Boroughs 
in April and May 1964; the abolition of the old local 
government system and the assumption of power by the new 
authorities on the 1 April 1965; and the election and 
subsequent first few months of power of the first Conservative 
administration at County Hall in April 1967. Although the few 
years around the creation of the new local government system 
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form the main focus of this work it is important to provide a 
detailed account of the history and unique nature of local 
government in London. Thus the first chapters considerably 
pre-date the main chronological period of this work. This is 
necessary in order to allow a full understanding of the 
complex nature of the transition of London government in the 
mid-1960s. 
It is not possible, nor is it necessary, to fully detail and 
analyse the whole topic of London government in transi tion. 
S.K Ruck and Gerald Rhodes, The Government of Greater London 
(1970) detail the transition in London government and W.E. 
Jackson Achievement, A Short History of the London County 
Council (1965) provides a history of the L.C.C. 's last years. 
However , extensive research among a wide range of secondary 
sources led to the discovery of a very important lacunae which 
has not been adequately researched. It is difficult to 
understand the nature of the G.L.C. without analysing the role 
of politics, primarily party politics, in the shaping of the 
G.L.C. It was created by politicians, through a process of 
negotiation and compromise. I t was a poli tical process in 
which vested interests, such as the Metropolitan Water Board 
anxious to avoid abolition, played an important part. Some 
could be accommodated, some could be ignored, some pressure 
groups could be bullied but others had to be allowed their 
own way_ Once the new system was in place it remained firmly 
in political hands. The G.L.C. was dominated by party politics 
- 2 ­
as were the new London boroughs. The two dominant political 
parties did have ideological views on how best to structure 
local government. However, in the day to day running of local 
government in Greater London the nature of individual local 
authorities often influenced the views of the controlling 
political group more than did the local government philosophy 
of that groups national political party. The majority of 
Conservatives in London held very different views to the 
majority of Conservatives in Surrey. Similarly, the majority 
of Labour in London and the majority of Labour in Essex held 
different views. Yet it is not just the role of politicians, 
national or local, but also the politics of the many pressure 
groups and associations from doctors and nurses to teachers 
that matter. These organizations tended to be those that 
administered or used local government services. These bodies 
influenced and shaped the new local government structure for 
Greater London, and they continued to influence and shape the 
way the new system developed once it became operational. 
II 
This thesis, then, concentrates on the politics behind the 
transition in London government. There are some important 
secondary sources that touch on this topic. Among these, David 
Donnison and David Eversley London Urban Patterns, Problems 
and Policies (1973) deals with social problems such as 
housing, employment policy and finance. Such problems affected 
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local and national politics. Donald Foley Governing the London 
Region: Reorganization and Planning in the 1960s (1972), 
Edward Carter The Future of London (1962) and Peter Hall 
London 2000 (1963) are concerned with Town and Country 
Planning. This topic also affected politics, both national and 
local. There are many general works of political history, such 
as Andrew Saint (ed.) Politics and the People of London, the 
London County Council 1889 - 1965 (1989) and Ken Young and 
Patricia Garside Metropolitan London; Politics and Urban 
Change 1837 - 1981 (1982), but these studies, by their very 
nature, cover far too wide a period to do full justice to the 
events of the mid-1960s. There are works that look at 
individual political parties such as Ken Young Local Politics 
and the Rise of Party; the London Municipal Society and the 
Conservative Intervention in Local Elections 1894 1963 
(1975) . There are also several biographies of leading 
characters involved in London politics such as Bernard 
Donoughue and G.W. Jones's Herbert Morrison; Portrait of a 
Poli tician ( 1973). Once again these works, while of great 
interest, do not deal in any detail with the politics behind 
the transition in London government. 
There are two useful works which deal wi th the changes in 
London government of the mid-1960s and do give attention to 
the politics behind the process. One book was written and the 
other edited by Gerald Rhodes, Senior Research Officer of the 
Greater London Group, at the London School of Economics and 
- 4 ­
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Political Science, on behalf of that group. They are The 
Government of London; the Struggle for Reform (1970) and The 
New Government of London; the First Five Years (1972). These 
two works, both wri tten shortly after the creation of the 
G.L.C. in 1965, chronicle the period leading up to the 
transition in London government and the following few years. 
Rhodes also gives a great deal of space to analysing the 
nature of the changes, the reasons for the changes and the 
effect of the changes. Rhodes' two volumes, however, are not 
beyond criticism. In the twenty-two years since the last was 
published many relevant official records have become available 
at the Public Records Office and there is greater access to 
the London Labour Party Records, now fully indexed. at the 
Greater London Records Office, the Conservative Party Central 
Office records at the Bodleian Library and the London 
Municipal Society's records at the Guildhall Library, City of 
London. I t is now possible to identi fy the flaws in Rhodes' 
arguments and the missing details in both his narrative and 
analysis. 
Rhodes does attempt to narrate the political struggles leading 
up to and throughout the process of transition in London 
government. His account is not complete, however. Although he 
gives a brief history of the Conservative organization, the 
London Municipal Society (L.M.S.), and the London Labour Party 
(L.L.P.), he does not fully explain their attitudes and 
actions. nor the conflicts between London wide political 
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organizations and the national political parties. An example 
of this is the L.L.P. 's various attempts to persuade the 
Labour Party's National Executive Committee to commit the 
na tional party to retaining, or returning to, the old local 
government system if Labour formed a government. Disagreements 
between the National Executive Committee's Local Government 
Sub-Committee and the L.L.P. are not discussed. This is also 
the case regarding the di fferences of opinion between the 
Labour controlled Metropolitan Boroughs Standing Joint 
Commi ttee (a non-statutory body which represented the 
collective view of the twenty-eight Metropolitan Boroughs) and 
the L.L.P. Rhodes also fails to give much attention to the 
tensions that existed between the London wide organizations 
and the constituency and borough groups. 
As mentioned above Rhodes was the Senior Research Officer for 
the Greater London Group, based at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. The Group had been founded by 
Professor William Robson in 1958. Robson, Professor of Public 
Administration at the London School of Economics, had long 
argued that the structure of local government in Greater 
London needed radical reform. In 1939 Robson had published The 
Government and Misgovernment of London. In it he argued that 
all the existing local government units in the continuous 
urban area that, in his view, made up Greater London, needed 
to be replaced by a single regional authority dealing wi th 
strategic matters, complemented by a series of local 
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authorities capable of dealing with the majority of local 
government issues. I t was a view Robson cont inued to argue, 
and he formed the Greater London Group in 1958 in order to 
provide the newly established Royal Commission on Local 
Government in Greater London with well researched evidence in 
support of such a view. l The Royal Commission acknowledged it 
was impressed with the arguments of the Greater London Group 
and incorporated much of its advice into the report of that 
Commission. 2 Because he was an Officer of the Greater London 
Group, Rhodes' two works must be seen as representing the view 
of the Group on whose behalf they were produced. Thus, to an 
extent at least, they should be seen as polemical works. The 
two works are not completely separated from the subject they 
examine. However, Rhodes details all the minutia of the 
administrative changes engendered by the transition in London 
government. 
There is no evidence to demonstrate that local government in 
London was beyond improvement in the 1950s. Traffic congestion 
was severe, co-operation between the many planning authorities 
in Greater London was not good, the provision of good quality 
housing for all was not keeping up wi th demand. These were 
just a few of the very many problems facing Greater London. It 
has been argued, for example by Hugh Clout and Peter Wood in 
London: Problems of Change (1986) , that the size and 
complexi ties of London meant that there were no answers to 
these problems, and although piecemeal ad hoc measures could 
- 7 ­
have improved the situation, there was no complete solution 
available. 
Some commentators have gone further and argued that not only 
was a reformed system of local government unlikely to solve a 
great many of London's problems, but that this was recognized 
by most individuals involved with the process of transition, 
and many had other reasons for their actions. Among these 
motives were the needs to defend entrenched positions or to 
enhance status. One such text adhering to this type of view is 
London: Aspects of Change produced by the Centre for Urban 
Studies in 1964, particularly the introduction by Ruth Glass. 
Two long quotes from Glass explain her view. She was writing 
of the proposed transition in London government: 
... the prospects are not encouraging. For London, 
in particular, is also subject to the new fashion of 
putting the cart before the horse in matters of 
social policy of preparing an administrative 
blueprint as a substitute for a policy programme. 
This is done on the assumption that shortcomings of 
national policies (or of resources for implementing 
such policies) can be a priori attributed to defects 
in the machinery of government, and especially to 
that of local government. Responsibility is thus 
shifted from central to local authorities; a new 
machine is constructed, rather strangely, without 
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knowing (or saying) exactly what it should produce, 
other than the magic word 'reform'. The history of 
the London Government Act, according to which the 
administrative structure of London will be recast, 
is an outstanding example of that kind of 
engineering - so laborious, so involved with tedious 
technicalities, that it is by no means easy to see 
the conservative intentions behind the deceptively 
radical operation. 3 
This extract suggests the poli tics behind the reforms were 
more important than the technicali ties of the change. This 
thesis will demonstrate that Glass' view contains an element 
of truth. The second quote casts doubt on the need for change. 
It suggests that London was too complex for a change in the 
local government system by itself to solve many problems: 
Nowadays it is the centre of London with its pull, 
its influences in other ways, which is the maker of 
a 'Greater London' that neither had, nor can have a 
fixed frontier. Hence the current pastime of re­
drawing local government boundaries - in the belief 
that London can be contained by authorizing it to be 
a 'region' - is liable to be futile. It is based on 
a misunderstanding of the nature of the metropolis 
and its interdependence with the rest of Britain. 
Any administrative line is bound to be an arbitrary 
one, already out of date even before it is 
- 9 ­
established; and so a new line is not necessarily 
preferable to an old one, nor is a bigger 
administrative authori ty for London necessarily a 
better one. 4 
This view is not completely accepted in this thesis, but the 
theme that the old system did work, albei t imperfectly, and 
that the replacement system was far from perfect runs through 
this work. It will explain why certain groups and individuals 
demanded radical change and why others were as determined to 
defend the status quo. It will also explain the effects of the 
necessary compromises. Rhodes has provided a detailed analysis 
of the actual changes, thus allowing this work to concentrate 
on analysing the effects of the politics of the transition in 
London government. 
A few of the most important secondary sources are recorded 
above. These, and many others, have enabled the basic structure 
of local government in London, the nature of party politics in 
London, and the nature of the majority of London's most 
intractable problems to be set out in the following chapters. 
Yet the detailed evidence presented in this thesis has, in the 
main, derived from a wide range of primary sources. 
~ 10 ­
III 

The Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London 
published its report in November 1960. The basic 
recommendations of the Royal Commission were for a new system 
of local government in Greater London whereby the existing 
system would be replaced by fifty-four London boroughs with 
populations ranging between 100,000 and 250,000. These were to 
be the primary uni ts of local government. responsible for all 
services apart from a few that had to be provided on a regional 
basis by a new Greater London Authority. This Council for 
Greater London (as named in the Royal Commission's report) was 
to have an equal status with the boroughs. After a period of 
consultation the Government's white paper of 1961, London 
Government; Government Proposals for Reorganization, accepted 
most of the recommendations of the Royal Commission, apart from 
a reduction in the number of boroughs to thirty- two wi th an 
increase in the minimum population for these boroughs to 
200,000 and a change in the recommended arrangements for the 
provision of education, which continued to be a contentious 
issue. A further brief period of consultation took place and in 
late 1962 the London Government Bill was introduced into the 
House of Commons, which subsequently became the London 
Government Act, 1963. This put into law most of the proposals 
in the 1961 white paper, although opposition from various 
quarters to the reforms continued. In April 1964 elections took 
place for the new G.L.C. and a month later for the new 
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boroughs. The following year, with the exception of Harrow and 
the City of London, all the old authorities were abolished and 
the new authorities that had been in place for a year assumed 
full responsibility for local government in Greater London. 
Much newspaper coverage and Parliamentary debate suggests that 
during the entire process the Conservative Government and the 
Conservatives in the L.C.C. area supported the changes, and the 
Labour Party at all levels and most of the Conservatives in 
Greater London, but excluding the County of London, opposed 
the changes. However, research shows that at vi rtually every 
level in both main political groupings there was dissent. For 
example, two separate Conservative Ministers in the Department 
of Education did not approve of the original plans for 
education in Greater London, and this dissent was one of the 
primary reasons for the retention of the L.C.C.'s education 
service as the Inner London Educa t ion Authority. A further 
example: Labour Party archives show that the national Labour 
party was only half-hearted in its opposition to the reforms. 
It would have been very difficult for the new Labour 
Government, elected in October 1964, to reverse the whole 
process of reform within a few months of taking office, before 
the G.L.C. and the new boroughs assumed power in April 1965. 
However, neither the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, nor the 
Minister of Housing and Local Government, Richard Crossman, 
attempted to change any aspect of the new system, wi th the 
exception of a short lived proposal to keep the L.C.C. 's 
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children's service as a unified service for all of inner 
London. 
The nature of the politics behind the transi tion in London 
government is further confused by the large number of non-party 
political organizations and individuals involved in the 
process. Many of these had influence and defini te points of 
view. One such important organization was the County Councils 
Association which opposed the changes. Four of its members were 
to lose territory (Essex, Kent, Surrey and Hertfordshire) and 
one (Middlesex) was faced with abolition. It also recognized 
that a local government system that relied on large district 
authori ties as the primary uni ts of local government would 
reduce the role of county councils, or even abolish the need 
for such councils. 
A second such body was the Association of Municipal 
Corporat ions. I t supported the changes. Al though some of its 
members were facing abolition, municipal corporations in 
general would gain because of the introduction of a new more 
powerful type of local authority. The new London boroughs were 
to be most-purpose authorities and thus much less likely to be 
dominated by a county or regional authori ty. Both the above 
organizations were political in as much as they were controlled 
by local government Councillors from around the country (many 
from the Labour or Conservative Parties). There were also many 
professional groups, teachers, doctors, social workers and 
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others who feared for the futures of their own services, and 
perhaps their own careers. The new system would need far fewer 
Medical Officers of Health, for example. The majority of these 
owed little or no loyalty to any political party. Nonetheless, 
they were highly organized and quite capable of campaigning in 
much the same way as political parties. Many of the groups 
discussed above have detailed records of their role in the 
creation of a new local government system for Greater London. 
Much of the political debate centred around how best to 
administer local government in Greater London, and what area 
best represented Greater London. Although the Conservative 
Government had given the Royal Commission a definition of the 
Greater London area this definition did not restrain further 
debate. This is reflected in the thesis, which draws on the 
many development plans, which by their nature attempted to 
di fferent iate predominant ly urban London from its surrounding 
rural hinterland. Among the most important are J.R. Forshaw and 
Patrick Abercrombie's, County of London Plan (1943) and 
Professor Abercrombie's Greater London Plan (1945). Many other 
local government development plans were used in the course of 
research; these dated from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. 
The inadequacies of town planning in Greater London were 
perceived in the late 1950s and early 1960s to be one of the 
major failings of local government in Greater London. This can 
be seen in many of the sources used in the preparation of this 
thesis. The Royal Commission's report, the oral evidence given 
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to the Royal Commission. which was published at the time in 
four large volumes, and the other records of the Royal 
Commission stored at the Public Records Office form one of the 
greatest sources of information used in the compilation of this 
thesis. These records include all the research undertaken on 
behalf of the Royal Commission. the opinions of all the members 
of the Royal Commission and the minutes of all their 
discussions. and all the evidence and opinions given to the 
Royal Commission. The official Minutes of the L.C.C. since 
1945, and the G.L.C. until 1970, have been of great use. These 
minutes. which include committee reports. help explain the 
attitude of both Councils to the transition in London 
government. They also contain copies of Council correspondence 
wi th the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Al though 
they include details of votes taken in the Council Chambers 
they do not include details of any debates in Committees or 
full Councils. Much the same applies to the the Minutes of the 
County Councils Association and the Metropolitan Boroughs 
Standing Joint Commi t tee. However, of greatest importance in 
demonstrating the validity of this thesis' propositions 
regarding political considerations dominating the transition in 
London government have been the records of the political 
parties. These include the L.L.P. archives at the Greater 
London Records Office and the records of the L.M.S. at the 
City of London's Guildhall Library. To complement these London 
regional records, the national Labour Party archive at the 
Museum of Labour History, Manchester and the Conservative Party 
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Central Office Records at the Bodleian Library, Oxford have 
been extensively consul ted. Of real importance have been the 
insights gained from newspapers. The Times has an index, and 
thus all relevant information can, and has, been extracted for 
use in this thesis. The Evening Standard does not have an 
index but careful study of every issue between 1957 and 1970 
has led to a mine of useful data. Selective reading of the 
Evening News has added other interesting data. The L.M.S. '8 
journals The Ratepayer and The Londoner and the L.L.P. 's 
journal London News have proven of great use as have various 
local newspapers. 
A series of interviews with politicians involved with the 
transi tion in London government has proven of great value. 
Among those interviewed are Lady Evelyn Denington, a former 
member of the L.C.C., G.L.C. and St.Pancras Metropolitan 
Borough Council; Mr Enoch Powell, Director of the L.M.S., 1951 
- 1956 ; Lord Mellish, a past Chairman of the L.L.P.; Mr Illtyd 
Harrington, formally a member of Paddington Metropolitan 
Borough Council, the City of Westminster Borough Council, and 
the G.L.C., Deputy Leader of the G.L.C. and Chairman of the 
G.L.C.; Sir Ashley Bramall, who has been member of the L.C.C., 
the G.L.C., the I.L.E.A. and Westminster City Council; Lord 
Merlyn-Rees, an expert on local government in Middlesex in the 
1950s; Lord Jenkins of Putney, a former member of the L.C.C.; 
and Lord Plummer, once a member of Paddington Metropol i tan 
Borough Council, the L.C.C. and the G.L.C. Some of the above 
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allowed the conversation to be recorded, others did not. All 
interviewees were initially allowed to talk freely of their own 
memories. The majority of interviewees were then asked specific 
questions designed to encourage them to expand on particular 
points. These interviews have helped to interpret information 
obtained elsewhere, have brought fresh information and helped 
to confirm or refute several ideas. They have also helped to 
identify some of the hidden agendas. An example of this was Mr 
Enoch Powell's admission that the Conservative's saw the 
destruction of Labour's hegemony in London as a very useful by­
product of the local government reforms in Greater London. 5 
The number of former politicians who were unable or unwilling 
to be interviewed was disappointingly high. This failure to 
identify more willing interviewees is compounded by the loss of 
other important records. The Public Records Office has the 
records of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, but 
these records do not contain any useful details concerning the 
Ministry's important role in the creation of a new local 
government system for Greater London. This loss has been 
compensated to a degree by the details available in other 
departmental and cabinet records. It has not been possible to 
trace the records of the Metropolitan Water Board, but this has 
been at least partially compensated for by other records (i.e. 
L.C.C. records of its role within the Metropolitan Water 
board). All the records of the London Teachers Association are 
stored at the Greater London Records Office, but have not been 
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indexed and are not available to researchers. These were the 
most important records, but by no means the only records, to be 
missing or unavailable. It is not possible to fully quantify 
the importance of missing records because it is not possible to 
judge how relevant such records would have been. The lack of 
certain records, however, may have distorted this thesis. 
The nature of the evidence helped to establish the structure of 
this thes is. For example, the evidence gathered demons t rated 
the need to take account of the long term, intransigent nature 
of the problems causing dissatisfaction with the local 
government system in Greater London prior to the introduction 
of the G.L.C. 
The very large range of sources available from the many local 
au thori ties and other pressure groups dicta ted that several 
chapters would be based on selective, representative examples. 
It has not been possible to study the council minutes of the 
105 district authori ties wi thin the Royal Commission's review 
area. Nor has it been possible to study all the written 
evidence supplied to the Royal Commission. 
IV 
The second chapter establishes that the size and character of 
London has caused much concern for a very long time. Further, 
it shows that the social and economic problems faced by London 
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in the 1950s and 1960s were not very dissimilar from those that 
London had faced for very many years. It demonstrates that no 
system of local government in London has been totally 
success ful. It es tabl ishes the uniqueness 0 f London and its 
local gove rnmen t sys tern. I t aims to 'set the scene' for the 
following chapters. This chapter takes the narrative up to the 
establishment of the Royal Commission on London Government in 
1921. 
The third chapter discusses the period from 1921 to the 
establishment of the Royal Commission on Local Government in 
Greater London in August 1957. I t is more detailed than the 
previous chapter and it puts local government in London in a 
national context at a time when local government throughout 
Britain was seen to be failing. This chapter demonstrates how 
and why social and economic problems in Greater London were 
linked to a perceived failure of the local government system. 
Chapter four continues the narrative through to the assumption 
of power by the G.L.C. and the new London Boroughs in April 
1965. It briefly details the report of the Royal Commission, 
the Government's whi te paper on local government in Greater 
London of 1961, and the London Government Act, 1963. The major 
emphasis of this chapter is on the actions and reactions of the 
national Government, particularly the individuals who made the 
decisions within that Government. 
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Chapter five considers Labour in London. It details all strands 
of Labour thought and reaction, and includes some analysis of 
the national Labour Party's role. It is primarily concerned 
with the period 1957 to 1967. At the core of this chapter is 
the Labour Group of the L.C.C., which controlled that council, 
the L.L.P., and the Labour controlled Metropolitan Borough's 
Standing Joint Commi t tee. There is not the space to consider 
the roles of every consti tuency party nor every Metropoli tan 
Borough Labour Group, but representative examples of each are 
considered. As in other chapters the aim is to consider the 
politics behind the transition, in this case Labour politics. 
The sixth chapter treats Conservatives in London in the same 
manner as the previous chapter dealt with Labour. It examines 
the relationship between the L.M.S., the Conservative Group on 
the L.C.C., and the Conservative and Unionists Party. One of 
the main functions of this and the previous chapter is to 
examine the process of political bargaining and compromise 
within the various strands of each party. 
The Liberal Party and the Communist party of Great Britain both 
gave evidence to the Royal Commission. Neither party, however, 
were able to win more than a handful of seats on Metropolitan 
borough Councils and the new London boroughs, nor did they win 
any representation on the L.C.C or the G.L.C. There is no 
evidence ei ther party had enough influence to play a 
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significant part in London politics. Consequently. they do not 
warrant any significant space in this thesis. 
Chapter seven is about the county councils and the so called 
'Surrey Plan' favoured by most county councils as an 
alternative to the G.L.C. It analyses why the initial co­
operation between the county councils broke down and 
demonstrates how various of the county councils involved came 
to see their own best interests served by accepting the 
reformed system of local government. 
As the title of this work suggests the main focus of this work 
will be upon the abolition of the L.C.C. and the creation of 
the G.L.C. However, the latter Council covered an area 
considerably larger than the former, and its creation 
necessi tated the abolition of Middlesex County Council, 
Croydon. East Ham and West Ham County Borough Councils and the 
severance of the Metropolitan areas of Essex, Kent, Surrey and 
Hertfordshire County Councils. With the exception of Harrow all 
lower tier authorities in these areas were also abolished. It 
is not possible to fully investigate the role of these areas 
within the thesis, yet neither is it possible to understand the 
nature of the G.L.C. without some knowledge of the non-L.C.C. 
areas. 
Chapter eight studies the role of the district authorities. At 
the core of this chapter is the role of the metropolitan 
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boroughs. The role of the boroughs will be amplified and 
emphasized in this chapter by case studies. Although the thesis 
has concentrated on the County of London the majority of 
district authorities affected by the creation of the new London 
boroughs were beyond the County of London, and so this chapter 
takes such district authorities into account. 
Chapter nine expands the analysis of the poli tics behind the 
transition to the many organizations and individuals with 
points of view or vested interests. Al though many bodies are 
briefly named this chapter examines three cases. Firstly, it 
explores the role of pressure groups in the decision to save 
the L.C.C. 's education service as the I.L.E.A. rather than to 
fragment it among the new boroughs. Secondly, it examines 
whether the Metropolitan Wa ter Board, which wished to avoid 
losing its independence to the new G.L.C., was an effective 
pressure group, or whether other reasons account for its 
apparent success. Thirdly. it explains the role of the many 
pressure groups concerned wi th local government provision of 
public health, personal health and welfare services. 
Chapter ten in conclusion, explores the nature of the new 
system in its first few years. It draws on the previous 
chapters to demonstrate why the G.L.C. was as it was, why it 
was prone to adverse publicity and certainly flawed. It 
ampl i f ies important strands wi thin the thes is, for example, 
that many of London's problems were almost ageless, and 
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solutions had never been found in the past, that most 
politicians and local government experts recognized the G.L.C. 
could not be a total solution to London's many problems, but 
the political process necessitated that it be 'sold' to the 
general public as an ideal solution. It emphasizes the effects, 
ra ther than the nature of pol i tics, in the process of London 
government in transition. 
In sum, then, the thesis explores the complex nature of many of 
London's long term social and economic problems, and how these 
have affected local government in the capital. The thesis aims 
to fill important gaps in our knowledge and to challenge some 
existing interpretations. 
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NOTES 

1/ This point is confirmed in Rhodes, G. The Government of 
London; The Struggle for Reform (London, London School of 
Economics and Political Science & Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1970) 
p.54. 
2/ Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in 
Greater London CMND 1164 para. 740. 
3/ Centre for Urban Studies London~ Aspects of Change (London, 
MacGibbon & Kee, 1964) p.xxvi 
4/ Ibid. p.xxvii. 
5/ Private conversation with Enoch Powell, 6.10.93. 
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Chapter Two 

The Development of London: 

From City Walls to the Rise of Suburbia 

I 
The conditions that led to the creation of a new local 
government system for Greater London in April 1965 had been 
developing over a great deal of time. This chapter explains the 
long term and intractable nature of many of the perceived 
failings of London government. 
London has always provided a unique example of local government 
in Bri tain. The size of London, the weal th of London and its 
ability to act as a magnet to attract yet more wealth and more 
people has made London dramatically larger and richer than all 
other urban settlements in Britain for most of its long 
his tory. I t has been sugges ted that as early as the Norman 
Conquest London required special treatment. William the 
Conquerer built the White Tower to the east and Baynards Tower 
to the west in order to demonstrate his power to the people of 
London, yet at the same time allowed the citizens to keep their 
pre-conquest rights and privileges because he recognized the 
need to keep the support of London.l 
William l's accommodation of what became the City of London was 
only the first in a long series of compromises between those 
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exercising national power and the local authorities in London. 
William I' s Charter of 1067 recognized the Ci ty of London' s 
existing status. It has left its mark to this day in as much as 
the City's constitution is recognized to have been in existence 
since 'time immemorial'2 and has left the Corporation's private 
funds, the Ci ty Ches t, beyond the laws of ul tra vires which 
control local government expenditure in the rest of Britain. 
However. in other respects the City of London has been allowed 
less freedom than many other large towns and cities in Britain. 
I t was only in 1215 tha t the office of Mayor of London was 
officially recognized by the Monarch of the day. King John. 3 
Although the Mayor has been known as the Lord Mayor for many 
centuries this has become established by usage alone, andthe 
title has never been formally granted. 4 
It is not possible to give a date of the time at which London 
gained independence from the county of Middlesex which 
surrounded the City on its three landward sides. The status of 
the City of London was such that it automatically developed its 
own local government functions through the Monarch's Sheriffs 
and later the system of Justices of the Peace parallel to, but 
separate from, the county of Middlesex. By the fourteenth 
century a system recognizably similar to that of the modern 
Corporation of the Ci ty of London had come into existence. A 
system of Guilds, one for each trade or service in the City 
grew to control individual trades: they controlled prices, 
quali ty of work, apprenticeships, and wages. Only members of 
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these Guilds could become members of the Court of Common 
Councilmen or the Court of Aldermen, and only an Alderman could 
become a Sheriff or Lord Mayor. The area of the City of London 
did not remain static. The city walls followed the line of the 
old Roman walls. and until about the fourteenth century this 
allowed room for growth wi thin the walls. Following this the 
City of London absorbed some areas just outside the walls. Yet 
the City of London's very success caused problems in as much as 
the rudimentary local authorities based on the Mayor, the 
Sheriffs, the Guilds and the two courts of Aldermen and Common 
Councilmen could not maintain control and impose direction over 
an increasing area of densely populated · London' beyond the 
Ci iy walls. The Ci ty of London sought no further increase in 
its area after the fifteenth century. Any population beyond the 
few Aldermanic wards outside the City walls had no connection 
with local government in the City of London with the exception 
of some control imposed over Southwark. 5 The population around 
the City of London continued to grow and the term London was 
applied to a wider, but vaguer area. It did, however, clearly 
include the built up area around the City of London stretching 
towards Westminster, and at least from Shakespeare's time, 
included developments on the south bank of the River Thames 
stretching out from Southwark. 
Between 1085 and 1315 the population of London doubled from 
about 20,000 to approximately 40.000. 6 London was the largest 
market in England. 7 By 1480 farmers in North Kent were 
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specializing in supplying the London market. s The population of 
London is estimated to have been 50,000 in 1485 and to have 
risen to about 250,000 in 1603. 9 During the sixteenth century 
towns such as Kings ton and Hert ford and Lee valley vi llages 
grew into specialist centres orientated towards supplying 
London. 1 0 Merchants organized some suppliers as far as a 
hundred miles from London.ll During the same period in bad or 
average years London's "supply radius crept outwards as far as 
York or Exeter."12 The wealth and trade of London continued to 
grow. There had been Italian bankers in London before the 
fourteenth century. but their influence declined after the 
London Goldsmi th' s Charter of 1327 allowed them to develop a 
banking function. 13 Pollard and Crossley point out that over 
many centuries London merchants were richer than merchants in 
other centres in England. 14 These richer merchants increasingly 
dominated trade. By 1548 ninety per cent of cloth exported from 
England was shipped from London. 1 5 Pollard and Crossley also 
point out that London grew at a faster rate than other 
flourishing centres in England. For example London had a 
population three times as great as Bristol in 1334, but fifteen 
times as great as Bristol in the 1520s. 16 
The old communi ty based at Southwark at the southern end of 
London Bridge, spread along the south bank of the Thames. It 
had originally been a Liberty of the City of London, but 
obtained its own Charter, becoming a Corporation in its own 
right. 17 This is one more indication that the rudimentary 
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authorities in the City of London could not cope with the rapid 
growth of London from, approximately, the fifteenth century. 
Urban settlements grew along the old highways leading out from 
the old City gates,18 particularly towards Westminster, itself 
growing in importance and size. 
Until the dissolution of the Monasteries Westminster had been 
dominated by the Abbey. This had shared its site with a Royal 
residence for many centuries. As the Monarch of the day began 
to spend more and more time close to London, and as more and 
more central government functions such as Parliament and the 
Judiciary became both settled in the London area and grew in 
importance,l9 many of England's (later Britain's) most powerful 
individuals built large establishments close to London and 
Wes tmins ter. 2 0 Throughout London' s his tory, part icularly when 
land denoted wealth and status, large and powerful land owners 
often borrowed money from individuals in the City of London, 
but very few wanted to see the power of the City of London's 
bankers and merchants become too dorninant. 21 
From the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many land owners 
in the growing London area developed their estates into high 
quality residential areas by careful control over the quality 
of housing built and by selling leases rather than freeholds. 22 
Very few rich or powerful individuals, such as the Dukes of 
Bedford and Devonshire, or organizations, such as City livery 
companies and Oxford colleges,23 in London, or its surrounding 
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. semi-rural, area wished to see any diminution of their own 
power over thei r land. 2 4 Despi te the growth in the size of 
London very few individuals or groups with the power or 
influence to insist on the development of a proper local 
government system for London wished to see such a system. The 
wealthy sought to protect themselves against disease, against 
crime and against urban squalor in well designed, but expensive 
residential areas such as Bedford Square, Russell Square, 
Cavendish Square and Harley Street, rather than seek a communal 
solution through the development of local government.25 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many more of 
the rural and semi-rural parishes surrounding the urban areas 
of London became increasingly densely populated, entirely urban 
areas, but without local government functions capable of 
controlling or servicing their new populations. In the 
sixteenth century the urban area spread to include Covent 
Garden in the west, parts of Shoreditch and Whitechapel in the 
east, and Rotherhithe on the south bank of the Thames. 26 In the 
seventeenth century the continuously built up area spread from 
the west at Chelsea through Marylebone to parts of Islington in 
the north and thence through parts of Hackney and Bethnal Green 
to Poplar in the east. To the south of the river the built up 
environment spread from northern Lambeth through Southwark, 
Walworth, Bermondsey and Rotherhithe to Greenwich. 27 The 
authorities in the City of London retained their functions in 
the City of London, but continued to show little interest in 
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extending their jurisdiction over any larger area. 28 Commercial 
interests allowed one exception, the protection of the rights 
of City traders and craftsmen over as wide an area as possible, 
for example through the control of markets for seven miles 
around the Ci ty, a right the Ci ty had maintained for several 
centuries. 29 Into the nineteenth century, the rudimentary 
parish vestries, with some powers to help the poor of the 
parish, to keep law and order through the parish constable and 
highway maintenance through the parish surveyor, were the main 
local government units. 3o Other functions such as the issuing 
of various licences, for example, required by the retailers of 
gin after 1751, were carried out by the County Justices of the 
Peace. 31 By 1801 the population of urban London had grown to 
over one million,32 the urban area was several miles broad and 
several miles deep, although the continuous urban area did not 
extend out to the yet to be established boundary of the London 
County Council. 33 
Such a large population concentrated around the centre of 
national power created a source of concern to those wielding 
central power.34 There are many examples of the 'London Mob' 
causing considerable concern to the central authori ties, such 
as the Gordon riots in the 1780s, the Spa Fields riot of 1816, 
· Bloody Sunday' in Trafalgar Square in 1887 when police and 
troops dispersed an S.D.F. demonstration, and the 'poll tax' 
riots of 1990. It is no coincidence that the first police force 
to be established by Parliament in Britain was the Metropolitan 
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Police force in 1829. This new force aimed to protect property 
and help to keep civi 1 order, two of the longes t es tabl i shed 
roles of local au thor i ty in Bri tain. The Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police was responsible to the Home Secretary who 
represented central authority, not local authority. This is a 
further indication of the uniqueness of London government. Even 
after the establishment of the London County Council the 
Metropolitan Police remained answerable to the Home Secretary. 
To an extent this was justified because the Metropolitan Police 
held jurisdiction over a larger area than the London County 
Council. Once created, however, the Greater London Council 
held sway over an area very similar to the Metropolitan Police 
district, but unlike any other area of Britain there remained 
no local government control, or even influence, over police 
matters.35 The City of London has retained its traditional 
independence from the rest of London. It has its own police 
force and associated police authority.36 
Large, densely populated areas not only present a danger to the 
maintenance of public order, they also present a danger to the 
maintenance of public heal th and safety. The Ci ty of London 
developed some controls over such matters from an early date. 
Two famous examples, but by no means the earliest, are the 
a t tempt to quarantine suspected plague victims in their own 
homes during 1665/6,37 and the imposition of strict building 
regulations to help retard the spread of fire after the great 
fire of London in 1666. 38 Local government remained partial and 
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limited in its effect, even in the City of London. Bills of 
mortality had been kept in the City and neighbouring populous 
parishes since the sixteenth century, however as Gibbon and 
Bell state this was "largely so that the Court and others might 
be warned of the coming of the plague and seek a safer 
retreat."39 Even if this gathering of statistics equates to a 
local government function, it was of little use because there 
were no local authorities with power to act upon the 
information in anything but the most superficial manner until 
the nineteenth century. During the 18th century, Parliament did 
take some interest in disease and squalor in London. The result 
of one such interest was the Gin Act of 1751, which stopped the 
unregula ted sale of gin. Cheap gin had caused very serious 
problems in the first half of the eighteenth century and the 
act forced local magistrates to licence all retailers of gin in 
the hope that restricting the supply would reduce drunkenness, 
des ti tution, lawlessness and premature death among very large 
numbers of Londoners. 4o 
Into the nineteenth century all aspects of local government in 
London, even in the City of London, although to a lesser degree 
there, remained extremely rudimentary. Royle points out that 
fourteen London Parishes had populations of over 20,000 in 1801 
and the largest, Marylebone, had a population equivalent to 
that of Bristol. 41 Royle also points out that while London's 
population breached the one million mark the next seven largest 
towns in Britain all had populations between 50,000 and 
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100,000. 42 London's population was ten times as large as that 
of the next largest British town, yet unlike many other growing 
urban areas in Britain, such as Leeds and Manchester,43 there 
does not seem to have been any widespread view in London that a 
collective approach to the many problems of urbanization would 
be more appropriate than an individualistic ad hoc approach. 
However, by the beginning of the nineteenth century this seems 
to have been becoming progressively unrealistic. 
II 
There was no dramatic revolution in local government affairs in 
either London or the rest of Britain. But the nineteenth 
century brought about a radical change in government, both 
local and national. 4 4 A single example is that of the 1844 
Building Act which put District Surveyors on a more 
professional footing and increased their authority and powers 
within the developing local government structure,45 During the 
nineteenth century the functions of local government became 
more clearly defined, and these functions were continually 
expanded, The disposal of family refuse, personal hygiene and 
many other similar areas ceased to be purely personal matters 
and became the concern of communi ties. For example, in 1850 
Edwin Chadwick in his Report on the Supply of Water to the 
Metropolis argued that London's water supply should be provided 
by a public concern, not a patchwork system of private 
companies," 6 Science increaSingly proved the need for major 
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improvements such as better sewerage disposal, better 
sanitation, healthier living conditions for the masses. 47 The 
continuing growth of industrialization and urbanization created 
demands for better roads, better water supplies, efficient 
public transport. Britain's growing commercial and industrial 
success created sufficient wealth within the nation to finance 
organizations capable of providing all these new requirements. 
The dramatic increase in the size and status of the middle­
class professions such as the medical profession and 
engineering not only provided the experts to administer the new 
technical services, it also gave them the addi t ional s ta tus 
they needed to fight for bigger and better services and for a 
higher priority.48 One example is that of Dr John Snow, who in 
1849 published his findings concerning the spread of cholera. 
His pamphlet The Mode of Communication of Cholera demonstrated 
a link between the disease and impure water supply.49 In short, 
the nineteenth century saw the transformation of local 
government in Britain into a recognizable modern form in which 
modern abstract ideas such as democratic accountability and 
efficiency were clearly visible. London was part of this. 
However, London continued to develop along different lines to 
much of the rest of the country. 
The population in the London area increased to 2,685,000 in 
1851 and 6,586,000 in 1901. 50 Thus, London remained over ten 
times the size of Manchester or Birmingham. Throughout the 
nineteenth century London continued to swallow up populous 
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parishes and large villages. By the middle of the century as 
communities like Brixton in the south-west and Hackney in the 
north-east began to merge in to the general urban spread of 
London,5 lit became possible to portray London as a series of 
interconnected, but separate communities rather than as a 
single cohesive unit. 52 The issue of whether London is a single 
community or a series of many communities has yet to be 
decided. It has become one of the major issues in the debate as 
to how best to govern London.53 It has been aired many times in 
the politics of London whether at the old parish level, borough 
level, county level or in national politics. It has always been 
easier to identify what and where the majority of other urban 
communities are. London, unlike the City of London, has never 
been clearly defined. 
The Municipal Reform Act of 1835 reformed and often transformed 
urban local government in England and Wales. 54 However, it did 
not apply in London. As on many occasions during the nineteenth 
century and later, the City of London used its wealth and 
influence to gain an exemption from the reforms. The Public 
Health Act of 1848 did not apply in London. This act 
established a General Board of Health which in turn was 
empowered to establish local boards of health. Under an 
amendment to this act in 1858 local government boards were 
created instead of local health boards. This system developed 
into the pattern of rural district councils, urban district 
councils and borough councils throughout Bri tain, apart from 
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London. These new developments throughout the nineteenth 
century allowed the rapidly growing industrial centres such as 
Manches ter, Leeds and Birmingham to become very large urban 
areas with a single local council controlling all local 
government matters.55 Parishes, villages, and later rural 
districts were swallowed up and incorporated within a unitary 
system of local government which became known as county 
boroughs. As these areas grew throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries local government services developed within 
the unitary system without reference to county councils created 
in 1889 by the 1888 Local Government Act. It was not without 
its problems. County boroughs such as Manchester and Salford or 
Birmingham and Wolverhapton merged into single urban 
conglomerations, yet remained determined to retain their 
separate identities. However, their problems were very 
different from those faced by London during the same period. 
In London, during the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
old system of local government based on parish vestries 
remained in place. However. many of these were unable, or 
unwilling, to undertake some of the urgently required tasks. A 
series of ad hoc commi t tee's developed controlling various 
aspects of local government. These were not new to the 
nineteenth century. but they grew in number quite considerably 
as new local government functions were identified. Some were 
large, some were small, some were powerful, some had 1itt le 
power, some were open and almost democratic, while others were 
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secretive and had self-perpetuating memberships. Perhaps even 
more importantly some were efficient and effective and others 
were the opposite. It is not possible to be more specific about 
these bodies, but the following quote from Gibbon and Bell 
demonstrate some of the worst points of these ad hoc 
committee's by mid-nineteenth century: 
... there was, for various functions sewers, 
paving, lighting, surveying buildings - a crowd of 
different authorities, in all no less than three 
hundred bodies comprising about 10,500 members, 
mostly self-elected and with no responsibility to the 
rate payers. They operated under about two hundred 
and fi fty separate s ta tu tes, raised rates and loans 
according to their own fancy and had numerous 
unqualified and over-paid functionaries ... ln St. 
Pancras there were sixteen paving boards, yet a great 
portion of the parish was without paving and part of 
it under no jurisdiction whatsoever: they had 
accumulated a debt of £135,000 .. ,. The Strand between 
Northumberland House and Temple Bar was divided among 
seven different paving boards. some of them with only 
a few yards of the thoroughfare under their 
jurisdiction, and that for only part of its 
width ... ,56 
It is also difficult to summarize the nature of the parish 
vestries. They tended to share similar powers, mainly along the 
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lines discussed above, yet some had acquired additional powers 
over such matters as street lighting and paving. As with the ad 
hoc committees some were large, some were small. Some parishes 
were efficient, some were not. Some were open vestries in which 
all rate payers in the parish had a right to participate, 
others had a small elected membership.57 Thus although London 
was often exempted from central government legislation 
concerning local government it was by no means void of local 
government in the first half of the nineteenth century. Space 
does not allow a list of all changes in the nature of local 
government in London. Neither does the scope of this present 
work allow a full analysis of the efficiency or otherwise of 
the system as it existed. By the middle of the century, 
however, those demanding reform, such as Sir Benjamin Hall, had 
become more powerful than the forces demanding the continuation 
of the status quo. 
In 1855 Sir Benjamin Hall, M.P. for Paddington, by then an 
integral part of urban London, introduced the Metropolis 
Management Act into Parliament. 58 Hall was not only a London 
M.P. he was also President of the General Board of Health, and 
thus somewhat of an expert in local government affairs. He was 
able to int roduce a reformed sys tern of local government for 
London that was seen to be better than the system it replaced, 
but was also acceptable to those with the ability to stop the 
measure of reform, such as the Corporation of the City of 
London, large land owners and influential rate payers. 
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The Metropolis Management Act created a Metropolitan Board of 
Works. The Board replaced the existing authorities responsible 
for drainage, paving. cleansing and lighting throughout an area 
of 75,000 acres covering a population of 2,800,000. 59 The Board 
not only took control of these aspects of local government it 
was also given a responsibility for improving these services. 
The Board did replace many, but not all, of the ad hoc 
committees and it did not replace any of the parish vestries. 
All parishes in the Board's area had to establish a closed 
vestry, that is they could no longer be open to participation 
by all parish rate payers, only to an elected representative 
number. The vestries also had increased responsibili ties to 
employ specialist staff, provide certain local government 
services and keep proper records. Smaller parishes wi thout a 
sufficient rate base to undertake all their new 
responsibilities were obliged to merge their local government 
duties wi th those of similarly posi tioned neighbours to form 
local government boards to undertake the new functions. so 
In order to avoid controversy regarding the area of the 
Metropolitan Board of Works (hereafter the M.B.W.) Hall used a 
pre-existing area, that of the Registrar-General's area, for 
urban London. This area was based on that used for the Bills of 
Mortality, which had been periodically enlarged over two 
centuries to incorporate the whole of urban London, and some 
semi-rural areas. 61 Because in 1855 it represented a pre­
existing and accepted definition of London it was difficult to 
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criticize. 62 The vestries and boards appointed members to the 
M.B.W., thus creating appointments for the most influential of 
the former members of disbanded committees. 63 Because the 
M.B.W. was not elected it helped soothe fears about the 
possible expense and radical nature of a body dependent on the 
electoral support of a large numbers of Londoners. The limited 
nature of its functions also helped allay fears that the Board 
could cost rate paying Londoners dearly.64 The Corporation of 
the City of London appointed three members to the M.B.W. and 
the Board did exercise its functions in the area of the City. 
Yet the City lost little of its status, did not become a 
subordinate body and lost none of the powers most important to 
the City, thus enabling the Corporation to work with the 
M. B. W. 6 5 Wi thin the parishes those wi th influence and power 
gained because of the increasing role of the vestries as local 
authorities. Because the M.B.W. had forty-six members, mainly 
appointed by the parishes, the most powerful local vestry 
members were able to expand their influence via the M.B.W.66 
The M.B.W. was a success in so far as it was more efficient 
than the many local ad hoc committees it replaced. It also had 
the abili ty to borrow large sums in order to undertake large 
scale projects which won popular support. Once established as a 
London-wide body with executive power, the Board, like its 
successors the London County Council and the Greater London 
Council, was able to a tt ract more power. I t was able to take 
responsibili ty for the embankment of the Thames, flood 
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prevention, many of the bridges over the Thames and for the 
London Fire Brigade. Despite popular and long lasting support 
for M.B.W. projects such as the Thames Embankment and main 
drainage and sewerage disposal schemes. much of the work 
undertaken represented the continuation of existing trends in 
local government rather than a radical change in the nature of 
local government. 6 7 The Board improved efficiency mainly by 
allowing a single body to administer several London wide 
functions. In a similar manner the changes at parish level 
allowed for greater efficiency by allowing a single authority 
to undertake functions undertaken by many smaller bodies. As 
Janet Roebuck has said: "The local government organization in 
London set up by the 1855 Act represented a stage in 
development rather than a completed system."68 As Roebuck goes 
on to explain, the vestries and boards in London developed into 
embryo boroughs· 69 They gave way to the twenty-eight 
metropoli tan boroughs of 1899 which preserved London's unique 
local government system in as much as they were different from 
any other borough in Britain. Similarly, the M.B.W. gave way to 
a London wide authority, the London County Council, which also 
remained, throughout its life, a different type of authority to 
any other county council. 
There were other attempts at major reforms of the local 
government system in London during the nineteenth century, but 
many of these were blocked by vested interests wishing to see 
the maintenance of the status quo, very often in the shape of 
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the Ci ty of London. The Ci ty retained its strong desire to 
preserve its independence from the rest of London,7o thus 
protecting its ancient privileges and stopping any dilution of 
its wealth. There were Royal Commissions established in 1835, 
1853 and 1894 all of which examined local government in London. 
Select Committees of the House of Commons in 1861,1866 and 
1867 also examined the issue. All efforts to reform the 
Corporation of the City of London were overthrown. 71 A London 
Government Bill, introduced by the Horne Secretary Sir William 
Harcourt in 1884, ran out of time, defeated like many other 
measures by friends of the City of London. 72 However, by the 
late 1880s, at the time of the creation of the London County 
Council, London did have a local government system which was as 
effective as local government in much of Britain. 
London remained unique. It did not become a county borough like 
Manchester or Leeds. London became an administrative county, 
but because of the urban nature of the Administrative County of 
London it was unlike any other county in England and Wales. 
III 
The Local Government Act of 1888 established county councils in 
all counties in England and Wales. 7 3 Throughout the country 
large towns with their own charters of incorporation retained 
their status as towns and counties in their own right with no 
administrative connections to the surrounding counties. 74 The 
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new county councils replaced the system of rural county-wide 
administration undertaken by unpaid, unelected Justices of the 
Peace. Once again the reformed pattern of local government in 
Britain was inappropriate for London. 
By the 1880s the M.B.W. had become tainted as corrupt and 
expensive. 75 As members of the Board were appointed, not 
elected, it was not easy for ordinary rate payers to remove 
them. At that period the idea of an elected London wide 
administrative body was either popular or at least acceptable 
to enough Londoners to be feasible. Thus, the Local Government 
Act of 1888 made provision for the M.B.W. to be replaced by a 
County Council for London. 76 It was to be the first urban 
county council in Bri tain and thus had di fferent powers and 
duties to the other new county councils. As London had never 
been a county, an area very similar to that of the M.B.W. 
became the Administrative County of London. Its area was taken 
from the traditional, geographical, counties of Middlesex, Kent 
and Surrey. The Ci ty of London became part of the 
Administrative County of London, but remained a largely 
independent unit within the London County Council (L.C.C.) 
area.?7 Davis describes the status of the City of London as 
close to a quarter session borough, retaining mos t of its 
privileges and remaining a judicial county wi thin the 
Administrative County of Londoil. 78 The L.C.C. administered some 
local government services in the City of London, but appears to 
have enjoyed cordial relations with the Corporation of the City 
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relations with all its neighbouring county councils. Such 
county councils, however, had a common fear of the continuing 
spread of urban London which could have resulted in the L.C.C 
expanding to incorporate large parts of those counties. 79 The 
population of the county of London reached a peak of 4,500,000 
at the 1901 census· eo Thereafter the population of the L.C.C. 
area declined, although the urban area and the population 
continued to grow beyond the L.C.C. area into Middlesex, Essex, 
Kent and Surrey. This gave rise to a completely urban Greater 
London of which the Administrative county of London became an 
increasingly smaller part. 
The first election for the L.C.C. took place in 1889, and this 
introduced a new aspect to London politics, the participation 
of organized political parties in local government. In 1889 a 
loose alliance of Liberal, Fabian, some Trade Unionist and some 
Socialist councillors organized themselves into the ruling 
group on the L. C. C., which adopted the name Progressives. B 1 
Initially the L.C.C. had very similar powers to those of the 
M.B.W. However, the ruling Progressives were keen to use the 
council's powers to the utmost, for example by the provision of 
technical education,82 and where possible to increase its 
powers, possibly by the introduction of a municipal tram 
system. 83 The Progressives had some success with both aspects. 
The Council comprised 124 directly elected councillors and 
twenty aldermen appointed by the councillors. Those members who 
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disliked the aims of the Progressives gravitated into a loose 
knit opposition. It is possible to simplify the aims of this 
opposition group into a desire to expand the councils services 
very cautiously, to keep rates as low as possible and to 
support a high level of parochial involvement in London 
government via the vestries and local boards. 8il L.C.C. 
elections were fought every three years and at the 1892 
election the Progressives retained their loose alliance and 
control of the council. 
Those members of the council, and individuals beyond, who 
disliked the expensive, expansive, centralizing policies of the 
council, including such prominent national figures as the 
Marquiss of Salisbury and Joseph Chamberlain, organized a more 
formal grouping to oppose the Progressives. 85 The London 
Municipal Society (L.M.S.) was founded in 1894, and supported 
L.C.C. councillors who operated under the nomenclature of 
Moderates until 1906, Municipal Reformers until 1945 and 
thereafter Conservatives. 
The Progressive group controlled the L.C.C. until the 1907 
election at which time the Municipal Reform group won the 
largest number of council seats.86 Control of the council was 
retained by the Municipal Reformers unt i1 1934.87 when they 
lost power to Labour. The Progressives had remained an alliance 
of Liberals, Fabians and other Socialist groups. Although 
London Liberals were usually radical within the Liberal 
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spectrum, the Progressive group always contained strains and 
differences between Liberals and Socialists. B8 In 1914 the 
London Labour Party (L. L. P.) was founded and following the 
First World War fought L.C.C. elections in opposition to 
Progressives and Municipal Reformers. 89 In the 1920s the 
remaining Progressive councillors, predominantly Liberals, were 
eclipsed by the Labour councillors and as mentioned above 
Labour won control of the L.C.C. in 1934. They retained control 
until the abolition of the L.C.C. thirty-one years later. The 
L.L.P. introduced far more discipline into party politics in 
London, forcing all who would oppose them to an equal party 
discipline and tough ideological approach. 9o 
I t is di fficul t to judge the role of poli tical parties or 
individual party members in the politics of the local 
government boards and vestries. After 1855 twenty-two parishes 
had retained their separate identity as local government 
authorities and fifty-six other parish vestries had been merged 
into a series of fifteen local government boards. In the 
Woolwich area, within the Administrative County of London, a 
health board had been established under the 1848 Public Health 
Act, the only one in London. The City of London and a few very 
small areas mainly coneent ra ted around the Inns of Court and 
Westminster Abbey continued to exist beyond the parochial 
system and to undertake local government functions. Much of 
this system was swept away by the London Government Act. 1899 
which established a series of twenty-eight authorities to 
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replace the boards and vestries (not the City or Inns of 
Court).91 The L.M.S. had circulated a list of its principle 
aims shortly after its foundation in 1894. Aim one stated: 
To extend and complete the policy for the reform of 
London Government initiated by the Unionist Ministry 
of 1886-92 in the creation of the London County 
Council, by the establishment of District Councils or 
Corporations, and their endowment with adequate 
authori ty, so that every part of London may obtain 
the reality and advantages of self-government. 92 
The L. M. S. had retained the support of Lord Salisbury, the 
Unionist Prime Minister after 1895. Conservative and Moderate 
opinion within the L.C.C. and within London generally remained 
opposed to the ruling Progressive groups expensive and 
expansive policies. The creation of the twenty-eight 
Metropolitan Boroughs was seen by the government of the day and 
its supporters as a rival, less expensive source of local 
government power in London. 93 The Boroughs were given Charters, 
Mayors and a full set of municipal regalia in order to create 
authorities of high status which would develop a high level of 
civic pride. The L.C.C. had been negotiating with the vestries 
and boards regarding the possibili ty of transferring some of 
the county council's functions to district authorities. 
Consequently, their slightly more powerful successors were not 
seen as a major threat by the L.C.C. The L.M.S. organized 
Municipal Reform candidates for the first metropolitan borough 
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elections in 1900, and won control of a majority of the new 
authorities. 
The Metropolitan Boroughs enjoyed an enhanced status compared 
to their predecessors, and some extra power. All the borough 
councils began as party political controlled organizations and 
continued as such throughout their existence. As we have seen 
the L.C.C. had developed into a similarly controlled body. 
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century local 
government in London was provided by twenty-eight boroughs, the 
Corporation of the City of London, and by the L.C.C. Although 
the powers and functions of each authority was established by 
law and clearly set out, tension developed between county and 
borough level authorities sharing the same geographical 
territory. Tension was increased due to political differences 
and by an increasing complexi ty in local government affairs. 
New functions and the expansion of older services led to debate 
regarding which level of government was best sui ted to take 
responsibility. Tension was also increased because the L.C.C. 
did not collect its own rates. I t issued a precept each year 
and the boroughs had to collect the L.C.C.·s rate demand along 
with their own. This created a long standing contention in some 
borough circles that the L.C.C. was able to increase rates with 
impuni ty because the boroughs suffered all the unpopulari ty 
when rates had to rise. 94 
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Tension between different levels of local government was not 
unique to London. In the counties surrounding London the two 
tiered system was enhanced by the Local Government Act 1894 
which introduced the system of rural or urban district 
councils. This created a system whereby rural districts could 
gain more power and higher status by becoming urban districts, 
then incorporation as borough councils and finally the highest 
status of all as county boroughs with no local government 
connection to their county council. The status of a local 
authori ty was usually linked to its population. As the urban 
population around the county of London grew, local authorities 
in that area rose in status. The metropolitan boroughs were 
precluded from any such promotion. By the end of the first 
world war there were three county boroughs adjoining London 
(Croydon, West Ham and East Ham). Within Greater London, as 
defined by the Metropolitan Police area, a complicated system 
of county councils, county borough councils, non-county borough 
councils, urban and rural district councils and some new parish 
councils had developed. The pattern did not remain static in 
the nineteenth century or in the twentieth century, as 
authorities changed their status and occasionally their areas. 
There was a great deal of co-operation between various 
authorities, but there was also a great deal of tension and 
jealousy between neighbouring authorities and different levels 
of local government serving the same communities. 
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Within the County of London the L.C.C. continued to expand the 
range of its functions during the early part of the twentieth 
century. By 1900 the council had obtained the power to buy land 
and build council housing outside the county of London. 95 One 
of the first L.C.C. estates built outside London was in 
Tottenham in Middlesex shortly after 1900. Out-county housing 
estates were often unpopular with the local authority in whose 
area they were located. 96 The local authority had no control, 
no voice in the building, yet had to provide local government 
services such as personal and public health facilities, 
although the L.C.C. retained the income from council rents. By 
1905 the L.C.C. had taken responsibility for the tram system in 
London and was busy trying to co-ordinate its service wi th 
services beyond the county boundary seen at the time as L.C.C. 
interference beyond its borders. 9 7 I n the last hal f of the 
nineteenth century, the M.B.W. and the L.C.C. had taken over 
the functions of a number of ad hoc committees culminating in 
the L.C.C. 's assumption of responsibility for education in 
London in 1904. 98 
There remained, however, a number of ad hoc committees in the 
London area. These often existed because they provided a 
service over an area larger than any single local authority. 
One such was the Metropolitan Water Board (M.W.B.) .99 The 
M.W.B. had been established in 1903 to provide a reliable 
source of fresh water to Londoners. It had not, however, been 
practical to limit its supp to London alone and the board had 
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been established to serve most of the continuous urban area, 
and indeed some semi-rural areas. The M.W.B. had sixty-six 
members, fourteen appointed by the L.C.C., one each appointed 
by the metropolitan boroughs and City of London and the rest by 
other local authorities served by the board. The existence of 
the M.W.B. and a growing number of other bodies serving areas 
beyond any single authori ty in Greater London added to the 
complexity of local government in the wider London area. The 
M.W.B. demonstrated that local authorities could work together, 
but it also added another source of tension and even conflict. 
An example of this took place years later when Middlesex County 
Council complained of only having four representatives upon the 
M.W.B. compared to the L.C.C.'s fourteen.IOO 
IV 
By 1914 urban London had a highly complex system of local 
government. The urban area extended beyond the boundaries of 
the L.C.C. It constituted the largest town in the world and was 
still growing in size and population. It was riddled with 
vested interests and political rivalries. The local authorities 
provided a vastly increased range of services to their 
populations in relation to previous years. However, there were 
many calls for new services and claims that existing services 
were not adequately provided. At the centre sat the largest 
local authority in the world, the L.C.C. The complexity of 
government in Greater London allowed all who wished to, to 
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demonstrate very many failures in the system. Politicians, 
academics and journalists were able to find ample evidence to 
suggest their own 'pet· solution would be better than the 
system as it existed. In 1919 the L.C.C. further complicated 
matters by asking the government to extend its area quite 
significantly into that of its surrounding neighbours. 
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Chapter Three 

Ullswater Commission to Herbert Commission 

I 
From the end of the first world war until the early 1960s 
urban Greater London continued to grow. Throughout this period 
the services and functions provided by the local authorities in 
this area also grew. This chapter explains both why there were 
many demands for a change in the structure of local government 
and why no such change occurred. 
For the duration of the first world war party poli tics were 
suspended by the two largest parties represented on the L.C.C. 
The Municipal Reform and Progressive coalition continued beyond 
the 1919 county council election and, despite misgivings among 
some sections of the Municipal Reform Party, the L.C.C. 
formally requested the Government to look into the desirability 
of reforming London government. 1 
Progressive policy had called for the extension of L.C.C. 
boundaries since 1907. 2 The Fabian Society, by the end of the 
war linked to the L.L.P.,3 rather than, as before, the 
Progressive Party, had also recommended such changes. 4 By the 
immediate post-first world war period, the L. C.C. was 
surrounded by a string of boroughs and urban districts forming 
parts of other counties, yet indistinguishable to all but 
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locals or local government experts from the administrative 
county of London. In the east, Poplar merged into West Ham,5 
and Hackney merged into Leyton. 6 In the north, Islington merged 
into Hornsey,7 Paddington merged into Willesden,8 and along the 
Wandsworth and Wimbledon boundary it was not easy to see where 
London ended and Surrey began.9 Similarly, north-west Kent and 
south-east London had begun to merge together into a suburban 
area more akin to urban London than rural Kent.IO Essex, 
Middlesex, Surrey and Kent had developed large, populous 
met ropol i tan areas which shared many of London's 
characteristics and problems. They were part of Greater London. 
In 1921 the Government appointed a Royal Commission on London 
Government under the Chairmanship of a former speaker of the 
House of Commons, Lord Ullswater. The terms of reference for 
this Royal Commission were: 
To enquire and report what, if any, alterations are 
needed in the local government of the administrative 
county of London and the surrounding districts, with 
a view to securing greater efficiency and economy in 
the administration of local government services and 
to reducing any inequalities which may exist in the 
distribution of local burdens as between different 
parts of the whole area. l I 
The Royal Commiss ion confined i tsel f to seeking the opinions 
of local authorities, individuals and groups within its review 
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area. The Commission undertook no visits in order to see or 
hear for itself, and remained a passive body basing any 
opinions it expressed on the evidence taken from interes ted 
parties. In its of f icial evidence the L. C. C. sugges ted its 
administrative area should be extended to include the entire 
bui 1 t up area, and those areas likely to become so in the 
following few years. 1 2 I twas sugges ted in the evidence that 
the provision of some services, such as electricity and water, 
might necessitate further rural areas being included within the 
Greater London administrative area, thus enabling a Greater 
London authority to administer all regional services. The 
L.C.C. expected the lower-tier district authorities to 
continue. 
Conservative opinion in London, most often represented by the 
Municipal Reform Group and the L.M.S., had long been primarily 
concerned to provide efficient minimalist local government. 13 
In order to achieve this, small local authorities sensitive to 
the needs of ratepayers as well as local citizens requiring aid 
from their local council, had often been seen as most 
appropriate. 14 The L.C.C. had been seen by the conservative 
minded as a high spending, centralizing, social-reformist body, 
little concerned with limiting rate rises. ls 
The Municipal Reformers, however, had been in control at County 
Hall since 1907, and several leading Conservatives elected to 
the L.C.C. felt that a regional administration was required in 
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to extend the area of that regional body in the name of 
efficiency.17 Many Progressives were also interested in 
efficiency though the provision of better and more wide-ranging 
local government services. is However, after the 1922 L.C.C. 
elect ion, the Progressive Party lost ground, squeezed between 
the Municipal Reform Party and the L.L.P. They held forty six 
places on the council in 1919, thirty in 1922, nine in 1925, 
six in 1928 and 1931 and lost all their members in 1934. 
Herbert Morrison, Secretary of the L.L.P., in his evidence to 
the Ullswater Commission, also called for a Greater London 
Authority, Which would include the counties of London, 
Middlesex, Hertfordshire, Kent, Surrey and all but the north of 
Essex.is For a brief period all the parties represented on the 
L.C.C. were prepared to see the County of London extended. 
Shortly after the Municipal Reformers rejected the council's 
position. 
There was little support for the view expressed by the L.C.C. 
The majority of the local authorities abutting London rejected 
the idea, as did the majority report of the Royal Commission. 2o 
It recommended the continuance of the status quo, and pointed 
out that even if it had identified a need for an extension of 
the L.C.C. it would have been difficult to impose in the light 
of the hostility that the idea had aroused. 21 Despite the 
recommendations, however, the population and area of urbanized 
Grea te r London cont inued to grow, part icular ly in Middlesex 
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which had joined London as a predominantly urban county by the 
end of the 1930s,22 The Royal Commission majority report made 
one concession to the growth and increasing complexity of 
Greater London. It had recommended the establishment of a 
statutory commi ttee, whose members would be drawn from local 
authorities in Greater London, to advise government ministers 
on local government matters in Greater London. 23 
The government of the day took little action. Yet it had 
increased the complexity of local government through the 
introduction of town planning as a local authority function. 
The Housing and Town Planning Act of 1919 was not the first Act 
of Parliament concerning local government, but it was the first 
to impose a town planning function on all urban districts and 
boroughs with a population of 20,000 or more. 24 All such 
au thor i ties in Grea ter London had an obI iga t ion to produce 
plans to control new housing areas. Because of the high 
concentration of such boroughs and districts in Greater London 
there were many plans over a limited area, but with no controls 
to impose any form of co-ordination. Within the Administrative 
County of London housing powers were shared between the L.C.C. 
and the twenty-eight Metropoli tan Boroughs (plus the Ci ty of 
London), and the duty to produce a housing plan was given to 
the L.C.C. This may have aided co-ordination in London, but it 
increased the differences between the the County of London and 
other counties within Greater London. 25 It also further 
differentiated between the Metropolitan Boroughs and their 
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counterparts just beyond the L.C.C. boundary. These authorities 
beyond the county of London grew in population and in the range 
of functions many sought to enhance their status, often by 
applying for county borough status. 26 Few wanted their status 
reduced to that of the Metropolitan Boroughs by incorporation 
in an enlarged Greater London authority. The differences 
between London and other counties was enhanced, not reduced, as 
was the case between the L.C.C. and the Metropolitan Boroughs. 
The L.C.C.'s housing programme extended beyond its own county 
boundary and added to the complexity of Greater London and its 
local government system. For example, by the end of the inter­
war period the L.C.C.'s Becontree estate covered 2,800 acres, III, 
contained 26,000 houses and a population of 120,000· 27 I twas 
1.·.1·
,
, 
the largest local authority housing estate in the world. 28 I 
Essex County Council and the district authorities of Barking II 
and Dagenham were required to provide the usual range of local 
government services. Coupled to the development of the massive 
Ford motor manufacturing plant in Dagenham, the entire nature 
of the area was changed. These inter-war developments at 
Dagenham helped the local authority to achieve incorporation. 29 
The 1919 Housing and Town Planning Act along wi th subsequent 
Town Planning Acts did give Barking and Dagenham many controls 
over the L.C.C. 's development, yet this example shows how 
Britain's wealthiest and most populous county, London, managed 
to change the character of its neighbours quite considerably, 
sometimes wi thout the full support of the local authori ties 
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involved. Such L.C.C. housing estates created the potential for 
wide spread antagonism and tension between local au thori ties. 
As Middlesex grew towards complete urbanization it offered 
".1·.1(i, 
greater scope for tension, particularly as the L.C.C. continued 
to purchase land for housing. District authorities increasingly 
resented not just the L.C.C. 's presence in their area, but the ~I'i 
': 
fact that they had no control over the social class of the 
L.C.C. 's tenants,30 something which remained beyond the scope 
of Town Planning legislation. 
Although local government boundaries remained unchanged during 
the inter-war period, changes in the nature of local government 
created a stronger identity for Greater London. As mentioned I 
J 
above large numbers of Londoners moved to L.C.C. housing i 
estates beyond the county of London. These families were able 
to make cheaper and quicker journeys by public transport back I, 
to their old areas of residence. The London underground system I 
continued to grow into Middlesex and Essex. 3 I Perhaps more 
importantly buses improved in this period. They became 
reliable, economic and flexible. 32 It became possible for 
working men to retain their homes in one area yet work ten or 
more miles away. Men living in the old urban areas of Essex 
could travel from their homes in, for example East Ham, through 
the county of London to work in the new factories in Middlesex. 
As the underground system spread beyond the borders of the 
County of London, to areas such as Golders Green and Wood 
Green, speculative builders were able to fill these still semi­
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rural areas with new houses. 33 Many acres were covered with low 
density housing.34 
There had long been a trend for the few who could afford it to 
live on the coast in Sussex or Kent and commute to London. and 
the 1920s and 1930s allowed greater numbers than ever before to 
commute quite long distances. 35 The spread of the electric 
railway into what became known as 'metro land', as the 
Metropolitan Railway spread into outer Middlesex and 
Hertfordshire allowed, large numbers of white collar workers to 
move their families to new private housing estates and to 
commute to work into London. 36 By 1939, Watford, in 
particular, but also several other Hertfordshire towns such as 
St.Albans. had become London satellites. 37 Although they 
remained market towns separated from London, wi th their own 
separate community identity, as more and more of their 
inhabitants worked and took their leisure in London they 
developed a new aspect to their identities as London dormitory 
towns. Towns and villages in Hert fordshire. Berkshi re, 
Buckinghamshire and as far away as parts of Bedfordshire. 
Oxfordshire. Hampshire and Sussex were cuI turally and 
economically linked to the ever growing amorphous Greater 
London. 38 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s controls on the siting of 
industry. and indeed other sources of employment, remained 
rudimentary. The same period allowed the almost indiscriminate 
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development of private housing, public housing. shopping 
facilities, leisure facilities and other services. 39 The rapid 
development of electricity supply and efficient electric motors 
allowed many industries to develop within Greater London away 
from the more traditional sources of power. 40 Local government 
boundaries did not change, but communities did. Greater London 
grew, and developed, yet it remained beyond clear definition in 
local government terms. 
Nonetheless, various defini tions of the Greater London area 
were established. As we have seen, the metropolis as defined by 
the Met ropol i tan Police area and the M. W. B. area were both 
considerably larger than the L. C. C. area. The London Traff ic 
Act of 1924 established the London and Home Counties Traffic 
Advisory Committee. 41 This Committee was to advise the 
government of the day on traffic and transport within a large 
area centred upon London, but covering over 1,800 square miles. 
It also created a definition of a Greater London region. The 
1933 London Passenger Transport Act created the London 
Passenger Transport Board. This Board owned and opera ted the 
majority of public transport in the London and Home Counties 
Traffic Advisory Committee area including most buses and trams, 
the London underground and the Metropoli tan Railway. 4 2 This 
Board did not consist of appointees from the local authorities 
in its area of operations. The Board was appointed by five 
t rus tees, of which only two had any connect ion with local 
government in Greater London (the chairman of the L.C.C. and a 
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~ 'j,representative of the London and Horne Counties Traffic Advisory 
Committee. 43 ) The same Act of Parliament changed the nature of 
the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, 
changing its constitution and increasing its functions to 
include reporting on the best methods of improving traffic flow 
and public transport. The Commi ttee comprised forty members 
appointed for three years at a time by the various local 
authorities in the Committee's review area. Both the provision 
of public transport and the planning of traffic and transport 
facilities became linked to local government in Greater London, 
and the two new bodies provided a new defini tion of Greater 
London. It is possible these changes improved the bus service 
and provided a better traffic flow, but these considerations 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. The new provision added to 
the complexity of local government in Greater London and added 
to the scope for conflict. For example the L.C.C. apPointed six 
members of the Committee, while the other county fully within 
the Committee's area, Middlesex, only appointed two. This was 
at a time when the population of the County of London was 
falling, but was rising in suburban Greater London, which 
included most of Middlesex. Also the only district authorities 
to appoint members were in the L. C. C. area and not evenly 
divided there; the City Corporation and the City of Westminster 
apPointed one member each while the other metropolitan boroughs 
appointed six between them.44 
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A further Committee established in 1927 which aided the growing 
awareness of the existence of Greater London was the Greater 
London Regional Planning Committee. The Committee had advisory 
powers only, but Neville Chamberlain, as Minister of Health, at 
that date responsible for local government in England and 
Wales, had given the committee its official status. 45 This 
Committee shared the same area as the London and Home Counties 
Traffic Advisory Committee, but because of the very name of the 
Greater London Regional Planning Committee it added authority 
to claims that the Greater London Region was a coherent entity. 
The Planning Committee had a membership of forty-five and 
represented 152 separate local authorities, once again adding 
to the complexi ties of local government, or at least local 
government planning, in the area. 46 
The Bressey Report of 1937 used the same area to define Greater 
London. This was a report by the Ministry of Transport's chief 
engineer, Sir Charles Bressey, concerning the problems of 
highway development in Greater London. This further added to 
the official recognition of the existence of Greater London. 
The report also recognized the need for planning and the 
provision of some services over an area considerably larger 
than the county of London. 17 
A further acknowledgement of the growth of Greater London, and 
that this growth had caused problems both within Greater London 
and the rest of Bri tain, came wi th the report of the Royal 
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Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population in 
1940. The report stated that between 1921 and 1937 the 
population of London and the home counties increased by 
eighteen percent. This compared with a population increase of 
eleven per cent in the Midlands, six per cent in Yorkshire and 
less than one per cent in Lancashire. The report also stated 
that during the same period the population had decreased by 1 
approximately one per cent in County Durham and Northumberland, I 
and by nine per cent in Glamorgan and Monmouth. During this 
period the population of Great Britain grew by six per cent.48 
As the population grew disproportionately in Greater London, so 
the same area attracted a disproportionate share of Britain's 
economic growth. The report quoted from an earlier report of 
1936 by Sir Malcolm Stewart, the Commissioner for the Special 
Areas (England and Wales), which expressed the hope that 
industry that did not need to be located in Greater London 
could be encouraged to develop in areas of high unemployment. 
The Royal Commission report did recommend to the government of 
the day that a new central authority should be given power to 
regulate the establishment of new industrial undertakings in 
London and the home counties. 49 
The above report suggested that the continuing growth of London 
could be a threat to the wellbeing of the rest of Britain. By 
1939 Greater London was larger than ever before. 5 0 and was 
linked to an even larger area. the whole of South-East England. 
A number of small towns around Greater London such as Slough 
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and Luton had expanded as industrial centres. 51 They were 
connected to London by good road and rail links, and they often 
found ready markets for their manufactured goods in Greater 
London. The Royal Commission report argued that many other 
Iii 
areas of South-East England had also shared Greater London's 
growth and apparent prosperi ty during the inter-war period. !il 
;1 
This contrasted sharply with many other areas of Britain. III 
South-East England was, and remains, a diverse area, yet it 
became possible for official reports such as the above to 
equate the whole area as a unified area with Greater London at 
IIthe centre growing at too great a speed, drawing in too much of 
the nations population, industry, trade and commerce to the q',,:1 
I 
,I 
detriment of the rest of Britain. The Royal Commission report 
suggested a central government agency to help redress this I 
imbalance. 52 This in itself would not have needed any change to 
,I 
the local government system. Yet by its nature it would have 
had an impact on local government because of its influence on 
the growing field of local authority town planning, and by its 
proposed powers to encourage particular projects such as the 
L.C.C. 's 1935 plan to encourage the growth of a green belt 
around London. The second world war temporarily stopped any 
such developments. 
II 
Within the county of London there were no changes to the local 
government structure during the 1920s and 1930s. However, many 
- 76 ­
pre-existing tensions continued, and in some cases were 
heightened. Many local government services became increasingly 
technical and more expensive to provide. Demographic changes 
affected many of the Metropolitan Boroughs, as the County of 
London continued to lose population to the outer areas of 
Greater London. 53 Some boroughs, such as Paddington,54 went 
through a period of 'gentrification' , others, such as 
Islington, the opposite. 55 
Disagreements between the L.C.C. and the Metropolitan Boroughs 
regarding the best division of service provision continued. 56 
An example of the complexi ty of this problem is that of the 
school medical service. Because the L. C. C. was the education 
authori ty in London it provided the school medical service. 
However, many boroughs argued that most personal services were, 
II 
and indeed should be, provided by the boroughs because they I 
were smaller organizations more attuned to the needs of their 
:1 
residents, who knew where to find the town hall when in need. 
Supporters of the borough argument suggested that because the 
lower tier authori ties provided materni ty and child welfare 
services they would be efficient and responsive providers of 
the school medical service. This implied that if the school 
medical service was to continue to be linked to the provision 
of education that service would also have to be transferred to 
the boroughs. Some of the larger or richer boroughs had 
sufficient rate base or school age populations to become full 
education authorities, but if the Metropolitan Boroughs took 
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control of education the implications for very small boroughs, 
such as Chelsea or Holborn, could have been incorporation into 
their larger neighbours. Both the above authorities were 
unwilling to lose their independent identity.57 Because of the 
close relationship between many services, any change to the 
status quo could have wide-ranging consequences. Most suggested 
changes to the status quo aroused a high level of opposition, 
and consequently did not happen. 
;!
IThere were several Acts of Parliament, such as the Local I 
:1 
Government Act, 1929, which added to the debate regarding which .1 i 
;1level would best provide each service. As a consequence of this ", 
Act all the Poor Law Unions and Boards of Guardians in London 
were abolished and their powers and functions transferred to 
the L.C.C. 58 Although the Poor Law authorities had had no 
Iconnection to the Metropolitan Boroughs they had derived from 
the old parishes, and often shared similar names and similar 
areas to the boroughs. Despite this, their functions were 
transferred from locally elected bodies to the London-wide, 
more impersonal L.C.C. Among the effects of this legislation 
was that the L. C. C. became respons ible for most hospi ta1s in 
London, but the majority of clinics dealing with many aspects 
of personal health remained borough services. A further result 
was that the county council became responsible for the 
provision of unemployment assistance throughout London. It 
fulfilled this function through a series of local committees, 
one in each borough, yet the boroughs lacked any control over 
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these committees. 59 This aspect of the Act could be interpreted 
as a move towards the central direction of an essentially local 
service. A less familiar example of tension between the 
metropolitan boroughs and the L.C.C. is given by Gibbon and 
Bell: 
In its most acute form this conflict arose over the 
new midwifery service set up by the Act of 1936, when 
the borough councils urged vigorously but 
unsuccessfully that they, not the [London County] 
Council, should be the authority under the new Act. 
The powers were given to the Council, which was 
already the supervising authority under the Midwives 
Act.GO 
Because midwives were supervised by the LoC.Co, but many 
rna terni ty services were provided by the boroughs, an 
improvement to the state's aide to expectant mothers caused a 
major disagreement within London government. 
Shortly before the second world war the LoC.C. expressed the 
opinion that: " ... Greater London is already larger than is 
desirable either on proper planning principles or in the 
interests of the population of the County of London. lI6 I As 
Greater London grew, the influence and importance of the L.CoC. 
in the centre declined. Demands for the L.C.C. to be supplanted 
by a regional Greater London Authority grew. 
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One of the most vociferous and articulate supporters of radical 
change was William Robson, Professor of Public Administration 
at London University. Robson continued to campaign for radical 
'IIi ' ','..1 
change until such change occurred in 1965. However, one of his d 
most detailed critiques of London government appeared in 1939, i.il''1II 
I, 
Th~_ Government and Misgovernment of London. In this 500 page 
work Robson explained how the local government system in 
Greater London had come about, what he saw as its failings and 
detailed what he considered to be a bet ter sys tern. In very 
basic terms Robson argued for a Greater London Authority I 
responsible for regional or strategic matters and a series of 
large local authorities capable of undertaking the majority of 
II 
local government functions. Robson's work was detailed and 
thorough, yet his basic ideas could be rendered into a 
simplistic plan with great appeal to many unaware of the 
pitfalls implicit in such simplicity. This is especially 
possible when it is contrasted with the apparent archaic nature 
of London government. This archaism is demonstrated in Robson's 
own description: 
The area known as Greater London contains the 

following medley of local government bodies: the 

London County Council; the City Corporation; 28 

metropolitan borough councils; the Metropolitan Water 

Board; the Port of London Authority; the Thames and 

Lee Conservancy Boards; 5 county counc i Is (Essex, 

Herts, Kent Middlesex and Surrey); 3 county borough 
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councils (Croydon, East Ham and West Ham); 35 
municipal borough councils; 30 urban district 
councils; 4 rural district councils and 6 parish 
councils. The total is 117 organs of which all but 4 
are directly elected. 62 
The above does not include the various advisory or co­
ordinating committees which all helped to illustrate the system 
was over-complex to those who wished to draw such conclusions. 
'I 
! 
III 
The war years were not years of actual reform for the British 
local government system. However, they were years of thought I 
and planning and as early as 1941 the minister responsible, 
Lord Reith, called for a London development plan. 63 As a 
consequence the County of London Plan was prepared on behalf of 
the L.C.C. and published in 1943. 
A second war-time development plan was the Greater London Plan 
by Professor Patrick Abercrombie sponsored by central 
government. It was not as detailed as the L.C.C. development 
plan. but incorporated a far larger area of approximately 
thirty miles radius from Charing Cross. I t went beyond the 
built up area of Greater London. The plan included many rural 
areas of the home counties. It extended to parts of Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire. It brought Luton and Slough 
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among many other towns wi thin Greater London. The plan was 
published in 1945. The plan's definition of Greater London had 
no local government status whatsoever. It was, however, one 
more formal recognition of the existence of a Greater London 
region. This was a region which incorporated more than the 
built-up area of Greater London. It was an area suitable for 
medium and long term regional planning al though it did not 
include all areas of prosperous South-East England, as 
industrial areas such as Reading and Oxford were excluded. 
The development of a 'green belt' around London helped limit 
the outward spread of built-up Greater London. 64 This was an 
area considerably smaller than that in Abercrombie's plan, but 
a definable urban area. Abercrombie's Greater London region and 
Greater London, confined by the 'green belt', offered two 
competing images of Greater London. Perhaps one was best suited 
to town and country planning and one best suited to reform of 
the local government system, although both matters were inter­
connected. 
During the war a system of regional commissioners had developed 
throughout Britain. Their main function had been to co-ordinate 
local government, particularly civil defence. These 
commissioners were not elected and did not long survive the 
war. They did, however, represent an embryonic regional system 
of local government, and thus enhanced the argument that 
regional government could work and was desirable. One such 
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demand had been accepted at the Labour Party's annual 
conference in 1943. This theoretically committed the Labour 
Party to introducing a system of regional authorities 
complemented by a much reduced number of subordinate district 
authorities throughout Britain. 65 
IV 
The Local Government (Boundary Commission) Act, 1945 
es tablished a Boundary Commission to examine local au thori ty 
boundaries in England and Wales. The Commission had executive 
power to change boundaries and merge local authorities (subject ~I 
II'··'1 
to Parliamentary approval) in order to create a reformed 
pattern of local authorities better able to reflect changes in 
populations and to promote efficient local government. However, 
the Boundary Commission had no powers to examine boundaries in 
the county of London or to recommend county borough status for 
any Middlesex au thori ty. 66 The whi te paper which preceded the 
Act, Local Government in England and Wales During the Period of 
RecQnstruction (CMD 6579) , acknowledged that there were 
concerns regarding whether the boundary of the county of London 
needed to be extended. The white paper suggested London 
government would be examined separately. 
The same government whi te paper expressed the problem at the 
very crux of the ' Middlesex Problem', that because Middlesex 
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had become an almost entirely urban county, many of the 
district authorities had become very populous, and quite large 
enough to support separation from the administrative county of 
Middlesex by gaining county borough status. The boroughs of 
Ealing, Edmonton, Hendon, Heston & Isleworth and Tottenham plus 
the urban district of Harrow had population levels above the 
normally requi red minimum for county borough s ta tus. 67 There 
were three further authori ties. Hornsey and Twickenham 
boroughs, and Enfield urban district, with populations within 
5,000 of the required minimum. s8 If just one Middlesex district 
had gained that status there would have been little 
justification for denying it to the other authorities which met 
the criteria. The few areas left within the administrative 
county of Middlesex would not have been sufficient to maintain 
a county administration. Middlesex required either all county 
boroughs or no county boroughs, or possibly a new alternative 
within a Greater London authority.69 
Two separate committees were established to examine aspects of 
London government. The Committee on London Government, known as 
the Reading Commi ttee after its chairman Lord Reading, was 
established in April 1945. It was to examine and report on the 
most suitable number, size and boundaries of the metropolitan 
boroughs, and the distribution of functions between the 
boroughs and the L.C.C.70 The Reading Committee was wound up in 
October 1946 because the Labour Government claimed a wider 
investigation into London government was required. 71 The other 
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committee, The London Planning Administrative Committee, 
chaired by Clement Davies M.P. ,72 had been established in 
February 1946, initially to co-ordinate town planning between 
all 143 planning authorities in Greater London, but it produced 
a report in late 1949 calling for regional planning authority 
for Greater London. 73 
The Labour Governments of 1945-51 neither introduced 
legislation for local government reforms nor produced detailed 
plans for such reforms. Even the Boundary Commission had been 
abolished in 1949 after a disagreement between the Minister of 
Heal th and the Chairman of that Commission. 7 4 Despi te this, 
local government reform both in London and the rest of Britain 
remained an issue. 
As detailed above, the L. L. P. had favoured reform of London 
government in the past. However, when Labour gained control of 
the L.C.C. in 1934 it was naturally keen to ensure its 
continued dominance at County Hall. Nonetheless, the Leader of 
the controlling Labour Group on the L.C.C., Charles Latham, 
investigated whether his group should adopt a policy aimed at 
reforming London government. As Mason has written: "At the end 
of 1940 Latham instigated and conducted the most thorough 
inquiry into the structure of London government ever carried 
out by Labour. 1175 The review had been undertaken by a 
committee of senior L.C.C. members and L.L.P. executive 
committee appointees, aided by representatives from the 
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Metropolitan Boroughs. The committee was unable to find a 
sui table scheme to allow a larger Greater London authori ty 
which remained centralized yet fully accountable to 
democratically elected members. The commi ttee also failed to 
define the role of lower tier authorities which would have been 
considerably larger than those they would replace. Latham and 
his colleagues attempted to design a new local government 
system for Greater London that would have retained a great many 
of the characteristics of the system within the county of 
London. Creating a smaller number of larger second tier 
authorities with no greater powers than the metropolitan 
boroughs would. however. have increased the tensions between 
the two tiers of local government. An upper tier carrying out 
very many functions throughout a large area would have required 
a large bureaucracy with the possibility that senior officers 
would gain too much control. The committee collapsed by the end 
of 1942 wi thout issuing a report. 7 6 The exercise demonstrated 
the difficulties of designing a system that would allow Labour 
a reasonable chance of retaining power and of directing 
socialist policies throughout Greater London. The L.L.P. and 
the national Labour Party's recorded interest in regional 
government made it difficult for the L.L.P. to argue that it 
was opposed to a Greater London authority in principle. It 
could only logically argue it was opposed on the grounds of 
impractibility and inefficiency. 
! 
'I 
I 
I 
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During this period Conservatives in London were also showing an 
interest in reforming London government. In August 1945 
Geoffrey Hutchinson, former Conservative M.P. for Ilford in 
metropolitan Essex and a member of the L.C.C., was appointed as 
the Chairman of Conservative Central Office Local Government 
Committee. 77 Hutchinson had a record of demanding change in 
London government. In 1943 he had suggested all the planning 
authori ties in Greater London should be replaced by a single 
Greater London planning authority.7B Later, in 1952, while 
still Chairman of the Conservative Local Government Committee, 
he recommended that local government in Greater London should 
be radically changed with all county councils swept away and 
lower tier authorities in Greater London grouped into 
Corporations approximating to county boroughs, with a Minister 
for London to co-ordinate their activities. 79 These ideas were 
given some support by the L.M.S.BO The Conservative Party went 
on to recommend a similar system for the whole of Britain in a 
Pamphlet, Local Government Reform, published in January 1954. 
Although the post-war Labour Government was unable to find time 
to reform local government it did introduce several i terns of 
legislation which affected local government in London. The New 
Towns Act, 1946, allowed central government to finance a series 
of satellite towns around London in order to house London's 
surplus population displaced by large scale redevelopment. 
These new towns were to be developed by government appointed 
Development Corporations, and thus were outside the normal 
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local government system. 8l They were to be developed along the 
best town and country planning practices of the time, which 
included encouraging industry and other employers to relocate 
to these new sites. Hemel Hempstead, Stevenage, Harlow and 
Crawley were the first new towns to be developed,82 but several 
others followed in the Sou th-Eas t of England. These were not 
developed for the exclusive use of Londoners, and indeed they 
attracted job seekers from many areas of Britain, but many 
firms retained business links with London, and many individuals 
retained family and social links with London. 83 They required 
good links with London in order to thrive. From the 1950s these 
new communities developed some of the characteristics of older 
towns such as Watford and St.Albans. Such communities developed 
very close ties with London, yet retained an identity separate 
from urban Greater London. The new towns, by reducing the need 
for L.C.C. housing estates within, or very close to, urban 
Greater London, helped constrain the growth of Greater London, 
which initially reduced the urgency of local government reform 
within Greater London. 84 The L.C.C. helped to finance new 
housing in several local authority areas in South-East England, 
some as far away as Bury St.Edmunds. 85 
The 1947 Town and Country Planning Act obliged the county and 
county boroughs in Greater London (and the rest of Britain) to 
produce development plans, rather than the district 
authorities. 86 The Act reduced the number of planning 
authorities in the Metropolitan police area to nine. Because 
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these authorities had a duty to plan in the spirit and pattern 
of the Abercrombie Greater London Plan, a high level of Greater 
London co-operation was required. 
The post-war requirement for detailed town and country 
planning, backed with some elements of compulsion, changed the 
nature of the centuries old outward movement of urban London. 
The pre-war trend of closer links between London and 
surrounding, but separate, communities was intensified. The 
Abercrombie plan went beyond Greater London as defined by the 
built up area, and this trend continued. In 1946 the New Towns 
Act by-passed the existing local government system, and this 
trend also increased, particularly in the late 19505 and 19605 
with bodies such as the South-East Regional Planning Council of 
1965 and the South-East Economic Planning CounciL87 Unless 
central government had reassigned almost all local government 
functions away from local authorities there remained a need for 
such authorities to take an interest in town and country 
planning. The building of a new library by a local authority, 
for example, needed to take account of local town and country 
planning policy. A new library might need to be situated in an 
area designated for high density hous ing rather than an area 
set aside for industrial use. Local authorities needed to work 
with town and country planners on a wide range of matters such 
as setting appropriate population levels and public transport 
services. 
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Although many aspects of town and country planning required 
regional co-ordination and direction, many consequences of a 
failure in planning were seen at a more local level. Both the 
L.C.C. and the Metropolitan Boroughs felt the consequences of 
fai lures in planning, and other funct ions, which were beyond 
their control. The local authori ties in the county of London 
often had no power to interfere in issues causing problems. As 
Peter Hall shows, the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act 
allowed developers to add ten percent to the existing cubic 
capaci ty of individual of fice buildings, and coupled wi th a 
trend towards the lowering of ceilings, an extra forty percent 
of floor space could often be added to offices. aa Hall points 
out that the L.C.C. 's official development plan of 1947 did not 
anticipate the growth in office based employment in central 
London. Developers had no responsibility towards developing the 
:1 
infrastructure, nor did the individual firms creating new jobs 
in central London. Thus, the provision of offices and jobs was "I I 
not linked to the provision of new roads and public 
transport. 89 The existing planning legislation throughout the 
1950s gave the local authorities in central London little power 
to control the development of employment, which added very 
large numbers of commuters to those already using the 
overcrowded public transport system in the London rush hour. 
The L.C.C. and the Metropolitan Boroughs did have some 
influence upon the London Transport system, but throughout the 
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1950s public transport in London lacked the massive funds 
required for major improvements to the public transport system. 
Some, such as the Evening Standard,9o blamed the L.C.C., 
others, such as Edward Carter, Director of the Archi tectural 
Association, in The Future of London (1962),91 recognized the 
L.C.C. was powerless. Both attitudes, however, expressed a view 
that London government had failed. On the one hand, it could 
have, and should have done more. On the other hand. it was 
incapable of solving the problem and thus required reform. 
The period between the end of the second world war and the 
appointment of the Royal Commission on Local Government in 
Greater London (1957) saw the continuation of several long term 
trends. One such trend was the afore-mentioned centrifugal 
dispersal of London's population. Many Metropol i tan Boroughs 
continued to see a decline in their population levels,92 but in 
central London this was complicated by the growing number of 
workers commuting into the area to shops and offices. 93 The 
City of London, the City of Westminster and the Metropolitan 
Borough of Holborn were the most seriously affected, but other 
boroughs, such as Paddington and Finsbury, were also affected. 
Because of the population density in 1899 many of the inner 
London boroughs were qui te small, Holborn covered some 406 
acres, even smaller than the City of London. The day- time 
population of these areas was becoming far higher than the 
night-time population. Holborn had a day-time population of 
250,000 but a night-time population of 20,000. 94 The L.C.C.'s 
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1960 review of its Development Plan identified an increase in i I 
employment of 15,000 per anum in central London, an increase 
almos t twice as great as the res t of England and Wales. 95 It 
acknowledged the many problems caused by such growth. 96 The 
very nature of these inner London boroughs had begun to change, 
and with this change some local government functions declined 
while others were subject to growth or distortion. What failed 
to change was the size and functions of these authorities. This 
helped to add weight to the argument that local government 
reform was urgently required in London. 
The L.C.C.'s development plan of 1951 had committed the L.C.C. 
and the boroughs to a plan of redevelopment in specific areas, 
the largest of which affected Stepney and Poplar in East 
London. Hall points out there were, however, several defects 
in this plan, mainly because the lack of resources required 
concentration on the most pressing areas to the detriment of 
problems elsewhere. In many areas of London such as North 
Kensington large houses had been sub-divided and left to decay 
by their owners. They were not slums as such and thus the local 
authorities allowed many such areas of poor housing to continue 
in exis tence through lack 0 f resources to improve them. This 
left many Londoners in poor housing with the feeling that the 
local authorities were unable to solve London's housing 
problems. 97 Because the L.C.C. and the Metropolitan Boroughs 
shared similar housing powers there were tensions between the 
two tiers on some housing matters. The Metropolitan Boroughs 
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Standing Joint Committee (M.B.S.J.C.) wanted the L.C.C. to 
concentrate on providing out-county housing and to leave the 
boroughs what land remained inside the county for their own 
housing schemes. 98 Hall claims that Barlow, Chairman of the 
Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial 
Population, and Abercrombie, author of the Greater London Plan, 
had been misled by demographers of the 1930s who had expected a 
static population in the South-East of England during the 
1950s. This had proved to be wrong and by the early 1960s 
building land in London had virtually run out. 99 This enhanced 
tensions within the local government system in London and 
provided further evidence to those wishing to conclude that 
London government required major reform. 
Hous ing was by no means the only local government funct ion 
causing tension between the L.C.C. and the Metropolitan 
Boroughs. The creation of the National Health Service (N.H.S.) 
shortly after the war induced change in the local government 
heal th services. County councils lost their hospi tals to the 
new N.H.S. and the district councils were required to transfer 
most of their health services to the relevant county council. 
The L. C. C. arranged its personal heal th services through a 
series of health divisions, although the divisions were not 
coterminous with the boroughs, they demonstrated that personal 
heal th services needed to be provided through administrative 
units smaller than the L.C.C. The M.B.S.J.C. began negotiating 
with the L.C.C. to return personal health services to boroughs 
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in 1954. 100 Although the L.C.C. did not formally refuse to do 
so, the issue was not solved before the establishment of the 
Royal Commission in 1957. The ruling Labour group on the L.C.C. 
was reluctant to see powers transferred away from itself, 
although it acknowledged in principle some services, including 
personal heal th services, might be trans ferred. 10 1 Issues such 
as this drove a wedge between the Labour controlled L.C.C. and Ii 
! 
Labour controlled Metropolitan Boroughs,102 and gave yet more 
: II 
ammunition to those calling for reform in London government. 
! I 
The L.C.C. differed in opinion from the Conservative Government 
of 1951 to 1964 on several issues. One such issue was the 
L.C.C.'s support for comprehensive schooling. The 1947 London 
School Plan had projected the development of sixty-seven 
comprehensive schools, but these developed slowly, the first 
not opening until 1953, although the number continued to rise 
in the late 1950s and 1960s. 1 0 3 Not all Conservatives in 
Parliament or the L.C.C. were opposed to comprehensive 
education, but many were. Thus the L.C.C. adopted an education 
policy unpopular with many Conservatives and education became a 
contentious issue, often dividing the L.C.C. from central 
government. 104 Some of the metropolitan boroughs offended the 
Government by refusing to adequately prepare for their civil 
defence duties in event of war.l05 Some Labour politicians of 
the period have argued that such controversial policies as 
education and civil defence influenced the Conservative 
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Government's decision to appoint a Royal Commission to :1 
investigate local government in Greater London.los 
In July 1957 Henry Brooke, the Minister for Housing and Local 
Government, announced the establishment of the Royal Commission 
on Local Government in Greater London. Later, it was announced 
that it would be chaired by Sir Edwin Herbert, a leading 
solici tor in the Ci ty of London. Herbert and six colleagues 
were to study and recommend changes. if regui red, in to local 
government in Greater London. It created little surprise, as 
reform of London government had been expected for several 
years. Both major parties in Parliament had shown interest in 
such reform. Although none of the county councils in the review 
area had demanded change, there were other interested bodies 
such as the Association of Municipal Corporations urging 
change. Local government in London had proven to be flexible 
and adaptable. However, the complex interrelation of district, 
county, and ill-defined region, and of planning, provision of 
services and regulatory functions, failed to operate to a 
standard which was self-evidently efficient. By 1957 criticisms 
of the existing system were numerous, as were the plans for 
reform, yet central government had failed to introduce change. 
Throughout the period from the Ullswater Commission to the 
establishment of the Herbert Commission, Greater London had 
changed and developed, yet the local government system had 
remained virtually static. The complex nature of Greater London 
meant any change to the local government system would risk 
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arousing the opposi tion of many interested parties. Any new 
pattern of local government risked becoming as complex and as 
prone to cri ticism as that it had replaced. Also the local 
government system did work, and ultimately it had to be a 
political decision whether reform would improve local 
government in Greater London, and if so what reforms would be 
most effective. 
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Chapter Four 

Transition in London Government 

Royal Commission to Act of Parliament 

I 
This chapter examines the constraints imposed upon Hi>... ~~vJ' ..... : 
~Commission on Local Government in Greater i..UlH..i<..iii , uc,: L vi ",' 
began its deliberations. It demonstrates how these constraints 
effected the recommendations of the Royal Commission. 
Furthermore this chapter examines the pressures and influences 
upon the Royal Commission throughout its life and explains how 
these contributed to the Royal Commission's report. This 
chapter moves on to explain why the Government' s response to 
the Royal Commission's report, the 1961 white paper, 
recommended a few significant changes to the findings of the 
Royal Commission. It then goes on to explain why the Government 
was forced to introduce a number of important changes to its 
own plans before the London Government Act 1963 became law, 
On the 29 July 1957, Henry Brooke, Minister of Housing and 
Local Government, announced a Royal Commission would be 
appointed to examine local government in Greater London. 1 There 
was no announcement regarding the exact terms of reference of 
the Royal Commission. nor of its members. These were not 
formulated for several months. This bare announcement was not 
controversial, and it received little attention in rhe Times or 
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the Evening Standard. Herbert Morrison, senior Labour 
politician and a former leader of the L.C.C., claimed there was 
no urgent need for change in the local government structure in 
London, and that previous Royal Commissions had failed to 
identify a better system for Greater London. 2 This did not 
amount to bitter opposition, but Morrison was to became one of 
the most vociferous opponents of change. 
Brooke had only been Minister of Housing and Local Government 
since January 1957. Thus, during the year the Royal Commission 
was established many of the Conservative Government's 
initiatives on local government were associated with his 
predecessors, Duncan Sandys and Harold Macmillan. Sandys had 
been Minister between 1954 and early 1957, and his words and 
actions set the scene for the Royal Commission. At the 
Conservative Local Government Conference at Llandudno in 
October 1956, Sandys said: 
There is no case for scrapping the present system of 
local government, which has stood up to the severest 
tests in both peace and war. On the other hand, while 
preserving the existing structure, we must 
undoubtedly take steps to bring it up to date. 
Considerable adjustments are necessary to take 
account of changes in the distribution of industry 
and population, in the scope of the social services 
and generally in the pat tern of national and local 
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administration. 3 
This general approach had been accepted by the Government 
which had caused a whi te paper to be published a few months 
earlier.4 This paper had suggested the best way to create the 
appropriate changes in the local government structure in 
England and Wales would be by the creation of two Local 
Government Commissions, one for each nation. The whi te paper, 
however, made it clear that if the recommended Local Government 
Commission for England was established it should have no power 
to examine the County of London, nor should it have the 
authori ty to create county boroughs in Middlesex. The Local 
Government Act, 1958, did establish the two Local Government 
Commissions. but not until after the appointment of the Royal 
Commission on Local Government in Greater London (hereafter the 
Royal Commission or Herbert Commission). Hence, in August 1957 
Government action regarding London and Middlesex was not 
unexpected. 
Henry Brooke took a slightly different approach to that of his 
predecessor, in as much as a Royal Commission created the image 
(and in this case the reality) of a greater 'root and branch' 
investigation into the functions and boundaries of local 
government units than that previously suggested by Sandys. 
Brooke announced that previously the question of county 
boroughs in Middlesex had been dealt wi th by disallowing any 
such authorities in Middlesex, but the Royal Commission would 
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not be handicapped by the imposition of such a policy. It would 
have the authority to recommend far more than a little 
tinkering wi th the s ta tus quo. 5 Brooke had one advantage his 
Conservative predecessors lacked: he had been an elected member 
of the L.C.C. for many years and had been leader of the 
Conservative group on that Council between 1945 and 1952. 6 He 
did have personal experience of London government. This may 
have made it more difficult for Brooke's political opponents to 
claim he did not know what he was talking about, but it had the 
disadvantage that those same poli tical opponents could argue 
that Brooke was motivated by a desire to destroy Labour's 
hegemony in London. Morrison was among the first and the most 
persistent in claiming that Brooke wished to destroy the L.C.C. 
because the Conservatives had been unable to win control of the 
council, particularly under the leadership of Henry Brooke. 7 
Four-and-a-half years later this accusation still persisted: a 
Labour politician claimed that the Royal Commission had been 
established in order to facilitate the abolition of the L.C.C. 
It was claimed that the Conservative Government was determined 
to push through such a Bill because "Mr Brooke would love to 
see the end of the L.C.C .... "8 (thirty years after the creation 
of the G.L.C. this claim is still common among former L.C.C. 
Labour members. 9 ) There is no evidence to substantiate any such 
claim. Brooke and his allies and successors may have been happy 
to see the end of Labour's hegemony in London, but their 
primary aim seems to have been to create a more efficient local 
government structure for Greater London. 
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Greater London remained an ill defined area, or perhaps over 
defined in as much as there were many different defini tions. 
Before a Royal Commission could inquire into local government 
in Greater London, Greater London needed to be clearly defined. 
Similarly, local government needed to be defined before any 
inquiry could be set in motion. For example, it was important 
to establish whether the provision of public transport, water, 
and the police should be included. Outside of Greater London 
these were normally provided by local government, but in 
Greater London they were not. The Minister needed to decide 
whether the prospective Royal Commission should consider these 
services before its terms of reference could be drawn up. 
Brooke and his advisors probably had in mind the need to give 
the Royal Commission a manageable task, to enable it to report 
in a reasonable time and to minimize the anticipated opposition 
before that opposition was aroused. At the same time Brooke had 
to be careful not to emasculate the Royal Commission. The 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government set in motion a 
process of consultation with many of the local authorities and 
other interested organizations in order to establish the 
attitude of such bodies regarding the desirability or otherwise 
of including them in the Royal Commission's remit. As an 
example, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government wrote to 
the M.W.B. in September 1957 to enquire of the Board's attitude 
towards the Royal Commission. I 0 The Board replied that the 
supply of water was a technical matter and thus should be 
beyond the scope of the Royal Commission. I I In the case of the 
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M.W.B. its opinion was accepted and the Royal Commission was 
given no power to examine the supply of water to Greater 
London. 
In November 1957 details of the Royal Commission's terms of 
reference and its composition were announced by the Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan. It was normal for a government to 
consult with the interested parties before the announcement of 
any Royal Commission's terms of reference, thus the period 
between the announcement of the decision to establish a Royal 
Commission and the publication of its tasks caused little 
concern or suspicion. Neither The Times nor the Evening 
Standard passed comment on the delay. The full terms of 
reference were: 
To examine the present system and working of local 
government in the Greater London area; to recommend 
whether any, and if so what. changes in the local 
government structure and the distribution of local 
authori ty functions in the area, or in any part of 
it, would better secure effective and convenient 
local government; and to regard, for these purposes, 
local government as not including the administration 
of police, or of water, and the Greater London area 
as comprising the Metropoli tan Police District 
together wi th the Ci ty of London, the Boroughs of 
Dartford, Romford, and Watford, the Urban Districts 
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of Caterham and Warlingham, Chorleywood, Hornchurch, 
Rickmansworth, and Walton and Weybridge, and the 
Parish of Watford Rural in the Watford Rural 
District.12 
There were 111 local au thor i ties wi thin the review area. It 
included the whole of the Counties of London and Middlesex and 
parts of Surrey, Kent, Essex and Hertfordshire, and the county 
boroughs of East Ham, West Ham, and Croydon. It represented 
what was considered to be the continuously built up area of 
Greater London. 13 Greater London was not, however, a 
geometrically perfect area. There were many open spaces, which 
remained rural, or at least partially rural in character. This 
was particularly so in areas between the 'ribbon development' 
which spread along the arterial routes out of London. Romford 
is an example. It was connected to urban Greater London at 
Ilford along the A12 and Dagenham along the A13, yet between 
these major roads it remained separated by a considerable area 
of semi-rural land. 14 The irregular pattern of urban Greater 
London made it impossible to provide the Royal Commission with 
an entirely suitable review area. It proved to be large enough 
to allow authorities on the periphery to argue they were not an 
integral part of Greater London, yet too small to convince 
sceptics it could find solutions to region-wide problems. 
The London Transport Executive provided a public transport 
system consisting of buses and the London Underground, both of 
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which extended beyond the review area. The London Transport 
Executive (L.T.E.) had replaced the London Passenger Transport 
Board in 1947, and like its predecessor retained links with the 
local government system in London. J 5 However, British Rail, 
which shared responsibili ty for public transport in Greater 
London with the L.T.E., had no connection with the local 
government system in Greater London. Not only had public 
transport provision allowed Greater London to spread ever more 
widely from the late nineteenth century, but it remained of 
vital importance to the pattern of work and leisure in Greater 
London. Edward Carter estimated that 1,148,000 people entered 
Central London daily by public transport in 1958. 16 Commuters 
continued to travel over many miles in order to work in London, 
shoppers, theatre goers, tourists and many others continued to 
enter London by train or bus. I t was the public transport 
system, coupled to the increasing use of the private motor car 
(a seventy-five per cent increase in six years to 195817 ) which 
had allowed the development of dramatically higher day-time 
populations, as opposed to night-time populations, in many 
inner London boroughs. A third of a million commuters entered 
the Ci ty of London to work each day, over 300,000 entered 
Pinsbury and 100,000 Holborn. i8 
Public transport had allowed the development of large scale 
employment and leisure activities in London, and continued in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s to carry the majority of 
individuals into London. J 9 Nonetheless the private car, with 
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its need for road space for transit and parking, had become a 
major issue by the time of the Royal Commission's examination 
of local government. 20 In December 1958, as the Royal 
Commission continued its deliberations, the Evening Standard 
produced an editorial claiming that traffic congestion had 
virtually brought London to a halt. 21 The Eveping Standard did 
not attribute blame entirely to the local authorities in inner 
London, nor did the edi torial suggest the Royal Commission 
should give priority attention to the problem of traffic 
congestion. This problem was, however, one of London's most 
visible issues, and had been the subject of frequent debate,22 
and although most acute in Central London, it also affected 
many other focal points in Greater London. 
However, it was effectively beyond the power of the Royal 
Commission to tackle, partially because public transport was 
not part of the local government structure, and partially 
because the size of the review area did not allow any 
consideration of the impact within the review area of the many 
public transport routes initiated outside that area. For 
example, communities such as Loughton and Debden in Essex, both 
of which had large L.C.C. estates, were connected to London by 
both bus routes and the London Underground, but were outside 
the review area. British Rail brought people from further 
afield into London, but, once again, this was beyond the Royal 
Commission's remit. The Herbert Commission's report restricted 
itself to commenting that there may have been a case for the 
-117­
municipalization of public transport, but it could contain no 
further suggestions because it was not the function of the 
members of the Commission to do SO.23 
Public transport was an integral part of town planning.24 The 
county and county borough councils in the review area had a 
responsibility for the production of development plans and 
their periodic review. For example the L.C.C. 's 1960 review did 
consider public transport. 25 These plans had to be tailored to 
the requirements of the 1944 Greater London Plan, discussed 
ear 1ier. 2 6 This plan, called the Abercromb ie plan, after its 
author, included a far wider area than that to be reviewed by 
the Royal Commission. As the Royal Commission pointed out in 
its report: "Town and country planning is, and always has been, 
an essential function of local government. "27 Thus. the Royal 
Commission's remit allowed it to examine the technicalities of 
planning in the various county and county boroughs within the 
review area, but not the overall plan itself. In essence, this 
meant that the Royal Commission had the power to examine 
whether, for example, the traffic congestion in London could be 
alleviated by changing the powers or the boundaries of the 
L.C.C. or metropolitan boroughs, but it could not offer a 
detailed critique of the overall development plan. To have 
extended the area under review would. however, have 
dramatically increased the work load of the Royal Commission. 
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At the time the Abercrombie plan had been published in 1944 it 
included 180 local authorities, including several county 
councils only partially within that review area. As we'll as 
urban Greater London it also included large rural areas. To 
have inc luded this entire area wi thin the Royal Commission' s 
rem! t would have greatly increased the evidence presented to 
the Royal Commission and also greatly increased the range of 
issues tha t would have had to be tackled. This surely would 
have resulted in a far more complex report, and possibly a lack 
of unanimity among the members of the Royal Commission. 
Brooke and his advisors could have adopted an earlier solution 
to the problem of selecting the ideal area. The Ullswater 
Commission of 1921 had been given greater scope to define its 
own area of review. 28 It had been asked to examine local 
government in " ... the administrative county of London and the 
surrounding districts, ... ".29 It also had the freedom to define 
for itself what functions and which services were properly 
those of local government. 3 0 Perhaps this greater freedom 
accounts for the earlier Royal Commission's lack of unanimity. 
It issued three separate reports. The Royal Commission, having 
a tighter remit, in effect had little choice but to divorce the 
problems of urban Greater London from those of south-East 
England despite the fact that in its report it acknowledged the 
problems of Greater London were inextricably linked to those of 
South-East England. 3 I In local government terms, and in terms 
of regional issues, this reinforced an already existing 
-119­
dichotomy between urban Greater London and its hinterland. 32 
Although the Royal Commission had no remit to work against the 
broader planning concepts of the Abercrombie plan, and the 
Abercrombie region, its very terms of reference reinforced more 
traditional views regarding the strong differences between 
urban and rural local government structures. 
After the publication of the Royal Commission's report Morrison 
claimed it had been unduly influenced by the Conservative point 
of view, and that there was not a single Labour supporter among 
the members of the Royal Commiss ion. 33 This view had been 
expressed by Labour members of the L. C. C. while the Royal 
Commission was still active,34 but there seems to be no further 
evidence of bias beyond the personal views of Labour 
politicians. The members of the Royal Commission were Sir Edwin 
Herbert, appointed Chairman, a prominent City Solici tor; Mr 
P. S. Cadbury, a prominent Birmingham businessman; Miss A. C. 
Johnson, a senior figure in the world of voluntary social 
services; Mr W.H. Lawson, serving as President of the Council 
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants when appointed to the 
Royal Commission; Professor W.J.M. Mackenzie, Professor of 
Government at Manchester University; Sir Charles Morris, Vice­
Chancellor of Leeds University; and Sir John Wrigley, a retired 
Deputy Secretary at the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. Apart from the professional interest in local 
government of Professor Mackenzie and Sir John Wrigley, Mr Paul 
Cadbury and Sir Charles Morris had served as local councillors 
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in the past.35 It is possible that Morrison and his fellow 
critics were right and all the members of the Royal Commission 
were Conservative supporters. There is, however, no evidence of 
their personal political beliefs. 
II 
The Royal Commission worked hard in order to receive the advice 
and opinions of as wide a range of interested parties as 
possible. All the local authorities within the review area were 
invited to submit their opinions regarding the need, or not, of 
reform in the local government system. They were also invited 
to express their view on how best to reform the system if such 
reform was supported. The Royal Commission went considerably 
further than just the local authorities. Also invited to give 
evidence were local authority associations, government 
departments, regional pol i t lcal parties, various associations 
or trade unions whose members provided or adminis tered local 
government services, research groups or individuals from 
British Universities, and a number of individuals. 
Initially the Royal Commission received evidence in wri tten 
form, but many of those submitting evidence were asked to 
attend the Royal Commission in order to present any further 
evidence orally and to answer questions from the Royal 
Commission. Sir Edwin and his colleagues undertook a number of 
visits to various locations within the review area. The Herbert 
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Commission also employed a Research Officer from the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government in order to provide the 
Commission with its own research papers when required. 
As the Royal Commission existed to provide the Government with 
advice, the Conservat ive Government was not asked to provide 
official evidence, nor were the other national political 
parties. A number of Members of Parliament. however, did give 
evidence as did the regional organizations of the national 
poli tical parties. Three Labour controlled local authori ties, 
the Metropolitan Boroughs of Bermondsey, Southwark, and Poplar 
refused to co-operate because they believed the Royal 
Commission served no useful function. 3 6 They did not provide 
the Royal Commission with any evidence, and a number of other 
local authorities, predominantly Labour controlled, refused to 
give oral evidence and submit to examination by the Royal 
Commission. These authorities were listed in the final 
report,37 but there is no evidence that this lack of local 
information affected the nature of that report. 
When the Royal Commission invi ted local authori ties to offer 
their opinions in February 1958 it asked for comments on the 
six functions of local government it considered to be of 
greatest interest - education, environmental health services, 
housing, personal health and welfare services. town and country 
planning, and highways and traffic. It also asked for comments 
regarding the most appropriate size for a local authority 
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charged with such functions. All were invited to present any 
other information they wished. 38 
Many authorities took the opportunity to suggest local 
government could be improved by the enhancement of their own 
powers and prestige. Rhodes points out that if the Royal 
Commission had accepted all such advice it would have 
recommended twenty-seven new county boroughs. 39 Vested 
interests permeated through much of the evidence presented to 
the Royal Commission - the County Councils Association defended 
the continued existence of the county council in the review 
area,40 the Association of Municipal Corporations argued that 
Greater London needed aunt tary system of powerful municipal 
corporations. 41 In a similar vein, the Labour controlled 
Metropolitan Standing Joint Committee allied itself with the 
Labour controlled L.C.C.,42 as did many of the Labour 
controlled metropolitan boroughs to defend the status quo which 
remained Labour dominated. 43 There are very many more examples 
of attempts to further vested interests in the published and 
unpublished evidence presented to the Royal Commission. 44 
The Herbert Commission also faced a problem in as much as the 
majority of local authorities were reluctant to offer opinions 
on matters beyond their own jurisdiction. Local authorities had 
a right to express any opinion they wished upon the efficiency 
or otherwise of their neighbours, but it is hardly surprising 
that many refrained from doing so. The rules of ultra vires 
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restricted local authori ties in Britain from undertaking any 
role unless specific authority had been given for such a 
function. Local authori ties, thus, tended to 'mind their own 
business', and attempted to foster harmonious relationships 
with their neighbours. As an example, when Sir Isaac Hayward 
gave oral evidence to the Royal Commission as leader of the 
L.C.C., he strongly supported the continuation of the status 
quo in the administrative county of London, but would not be 
drawn into what local government system would be most 
appropriate for the neighbouring county of Middlesex, despite 
the fact that that county council was also Labour controlled 
and its Labour members shared membership of the L. L. P. wi th 
Hayward and his L.C.C. colleagues. 45 In a similar manner, 
Geoffrey Rippon, leader of the Conservative group of the 
L.C.C., answered the Herbert Commission's questions on behalf 
of his group. Rippon acknowledged the need for reform, and 
accepted that the boundary of the L.C.C. might require 
alteration, but he felt unable to comment on the matters 
concerning Greater London beyond the County of London. 46 
The Royal Commission received all opinions with politeness, but 
the parochialism and vested interests of the local authorities 
lowered the esteem in which their views were held. The report 
stated: 
... we do not feel that the at t i tude of the local 
authorities was entirely tactical. There seemed to us 
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to be a genuine lack of understanding of the needs of 
London as a whole, due not to purely selfish reasons 
but to the concentration by each authority on local 
problems within the area for which it is 
responsible. 47 
Most government departments were equally reticent to talk 
about local government in Greater London as a whole. The Home 
Office was prepared to offer comments regarding children's 
services in Greater London, but not education. 48 The Department 
of Education would discuss any aspect of education, but not the 
local authority provision of children's homes or foster 
parents. 49 The same disinclination to go beyond their own areas 
of expertise applied to the many associations representing 
professional groups employed in local government. 50 The Royal 
Commission received a very great deal of factual information 
explaining exactly how every aspect of local government worked 
in Greater London. Rhodes's comments illustrate the weight of 
factual information presented to the Royal Commission: 
It also provided incidental illustration of that 
pride in achievement which is so characteristic of 
English local authorities. Perhaps the prize here 
should go to the Borough of Uxbridge whose 62-page 
volume of written evidence included information about 
geology, population, staff and their salaries, 
departmental organization and much more besides. But 
most authori ties submi tted fairly weighty memoranda 
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and it is not surprising that these fill four large 
volumes of nearly 2,500 pages in all in the printed 
version. 51 
The Royal Commission was, thus, provided with detailed 
information explaining how local government worked in Greater 
London. I t received suggestions iha t aspects of local 
government in Greater London did not work well, but no 
suggestions that the system did not work at all. Despite the 
dominan t parochial outlook there were some maj or c ri tic isms 
from local authori ties. In both Essex and Middlesex several 
district councils criticized their county councils. A common 
complaint was that the system of delegation did not work 
well. 52 Var ious local government services were the 
responsibility of the county councils, but they had an 
obligation to delegate the running of such services to certain 
district authorities. It was often the case that various Acts 
of Parliament had established a right for district authorities 
wi th populations above a fixed level to have such services 
de legated. The Dis tr ict Of ficers of Heal th (Greater London) 
Commi ttee can offer an insight into why tension grew between 
county councils and district councils regarding delegated 
services. Dr Gordon, the District Medical Officer of Health in 
the Borough of Ilford in Essex, claimed that Essex had one of 
the most comprehensive systems of delegation in Britain. 
However, he claimed that Essex County Council was always 
interfering in the services it had delegated, and in the event 
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II 
of a dispute it was always the county council that prevailed. 
In his evidence he claimed to receive up to five letters a day 
from the County Medical Officer concerning aspects of the 
delegated services. 53 In Middlesex the delegation of education 
caused tension between the two tiers of local government. 
Members of the Royal Commission who visited Middlesex reported 
seeing at first hand the major failings in the system of 
delegation.5 <1 In Kent and Surrey tension seems to have been 
less acute, and in London the Metropolitan Boroughs wanted 
services transferred not delegated. 
The factual information offered to the Royal Commission added 
to the authori ty of its final report, and enabled the Royal 
Commission to confidently dismiss much local authority advice. 
As the report noted: 
Notwithstanding the many virtues of local government 
today the parochial outlook that has been one of the 
great obstacles to any serious reform of London 
government is still very much alive. 55 
The report went on to suggest there were only two options 
facing the authorities in Greater London, reform or the 
abdication of important powers to central government. 56 
Despi te the need to propose a plan of reform that would be 
acceptable to the majority of interested parties, or at least 
not so unpopular that it could not be imposed, the Royal 
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Commission recognized it would have to disapPoint, or even 
anger, many local authorities and, of course, some other groups 
or individuals. 57 It was the function of the Royal Commission 
to suggest the best form of local government in Greater London, 
not the most popular. 
The Herbert Commission did receive evidence recommending 
reform, including some from local authorities, As mentioned 
above, much was seen to be in pursuance of the enhancement of 
s ta tus , and much to ease tens ions and minor problems. Some 
bodies, such as the Conservative dominated L.M.S., which aimed 
to end the Labour domination of the L.C.C., and the Association 
of Municipal Corporations, which hoped to improve the status of 
all boroughs. could be said to have had a vested interest in 
the abolition of the L.C.C. in the first case, and the county 
council system in general in the second case. Indeed, Herbert 
Morrison did claim both were politically motivated. 58 The 
motivation behind the evidence did not, however, necessarily 
destroy its usefulness to the Royal Commission. 
Some evidence calling for reform came from groups without 
apparent vested interests. One such which impressed the Royal 
Commission was the Greater London Group from the London School 
of Economics and Political Science. The Chairman of the group, 
Professor Robson, had published his proposals for reform many 
years before the appointment of the Royal Commission in 1939. 59 
Robson made clear in his evidence to the Royal Commission the 
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Greater London Group fel t no need to submi t just one plan of 
reform. 6o The group. thus, submi t ted two plans, one of which 
closely followed the ideas suggested by Robson in 1939. The 
recommendations contained in the report of the Royal Commission 
resembled quite closely the Greater London Group's plan A. The 
report acknowledged this, and it also registered which local 
authorities suggested similar schemes of reform. It pointed out 
that evidence from the London School of Economics (schemes A 
and B), the City of Westminster, the Metropolitan Boroughs of 
Chelsea, Fulham, Hampstead and Kensington, and the Borough of 
Twickenham all supported the idea of a Greater London Authority 
and "adequate authorities to perform the more local 
functions. 116 1 The report, however, went on to minimise the 
importance of the evidence from local authorities and to praise 
that of the Greater London Group_ Speaking of that Group' s 
scheme B, it commented: 
This scheme was supported by much research material, 
which we found very interesting and valuable. Indeed, 
the diagnosis of the problem was common to scheme A 
and to Scheme B and to Professor Griffith [also a 
member of the Greater London Group]. We do not touch 
in any detail upon the proposals of local authorities 
referred to, because they coincide to a greater or 
lesser degree with scheme A from the London School of 
Economics, but were naturally not worked out in 
anything like the same detail or supported by 
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anything like the same wealth of material. We think 
it noteworthy, however, that it is those who have 
done the greater amount of work on the subject who 
have reached conclusions nearest to our own.62 
The Royal Commission seems to have been impressed by the 
analytical work of the Greater London Group, and a little wary 
of evidence submitted by local authorities. This could explain 
why the one local authority plan of reform that attempted to 
deal wi th all Greater London's administrative problems, and 
gained considerable support, was dismissed by the Royal 
Commission. This plan, put forward by Surrey County Council,63 
will be fully discussed in chapter seven. Surrey County 
Council's ini tia1 evidence suggested a third tier of 
administration. This was to have been a joint board with its 
members appointed from the county and county borough councils 
within the area covered by Abercrombie's Greater London Plan. 
This joint board would take responsibility for all issues of a 
regional nature. The evidence, as provided by Surrey, did 
contain some detail, but remained a partial and flexible plan. 
Surrey did not envisage any major changes to the boundaries of 
the existing local government structure, and it did not 
recommend a wholesale redistribution of functions between the 
layers of local government. However, the Royal Commission could 
have taken the basic concept and suggested a more radical 
reform of the authorities below the new joint board if it had 
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not been for the various major constraints imposed upon the 
Royal Commission, as discussed above. 
The Royal Commission's report, published in October 1960, did 
more than simply reproduce the Greater London Group's plan. It 
presented a detailed analysis of the problems of local 
government in Greater London, and explained the nature of the 
evidence it had received and why the members had unanimously 
recommended the detailed reforms outlined here in Appendix A. 
Among the strengths of the report was the fact that it did not 
destroy the underlying structure of English local government. 64 
It would retain a two tiered structure of district authorities 
and a regional authority. The district authorities were to be 
known as London Boroughs. They were to be the primary units of 
local government in Greater London, and they would also have 
large populations, in the range of 100,000 to 250,000 people. 65 
Like county boroughs they would be responsible for the majority 
of local government functions. However, unlike other geographic 
areas governed by county boroughs in Greater London, services 
which would have been uneconomic or inappropriate for the 
district authority were to be administered by a regional 
authority.66 It was not to be a county council, it was to be 
constituted as an equal authority to the boroughs, but with 
different functions. The report was qui te clear on the point 
that the Greater London authority should not control the new 
London Boroughs. All authorities would be of equal esteem. 67 To 
emphasize this equality between the two types of local 
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government, some services were to be the responsibility of the 
regional authority and the boroughs. There would be no 
delegation from a senior authority to a junior authority. 
Housing and education represent two such services. 68 The 
Greater London Authority, termed the Council for Greater London 
by the report, was to be more than a residual body for services 
inappropr ia te to the new boroughs. The report recommended in 
strong posi tive terms that this regional body should have an 
active part in creating an efficient planning system of local 
government in Greater London. It suggested: 
I t is impera t i ve in our view. that the Council for 

Greater London organize competent
should a 
intelligence department to keep all these matters 
under constant study and research, the fruits of 
their labour being available to all the other 
departments, whether town and country planning, 
housing, traffic management, highway construction, 
planning and maintenance and education. To this 
central intelligence department all other departments 
should be able to turn for information and to it they 
should address requests for research and advice. 69 
The report suggested that there should be fifty-two new London 
boroughs wi thin the review area, thus requiring many existing 
district authorities to merge with neighbours. 7o Also 
contentious was the proposed abolition of the London and 
Middlesex county councils. These were to be replaced together 
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with the severed metropolitan areas of Surrey, Kent, Essex and 
a small part of Hertfordshire, by the proposed Council for 
Greater London. 71 On the very day of publication, the Evening 
Standard printed the headline "Storm over plan to blot out 
L.C.C."72 The same issue reported that the leaders of London, 
Middlesex, Surrey and Essex county councils opposed the 
recommendations in the Royal Commission's report. 
The Herbert Commiss ion provided a b luepr int for a new local 
government system in Greater London. It provided a detailed 
justification for the implementation of that blueprint. The 
Royal Commission had undertaken some independent research into 
the most appropriate area for its suggested Council for Greater 
London. 73 This research had considered the local authorities on 
the periphery of the review area and had taken into account 
such matters as the extent of the built-up area, the pattern of 
employment among the local population, and the number of trains 
to central London each day. By a system of ratings based on 
these factors it had been able to state, in the Herbert 
Commission's view, the exact area of urban Greater London. The 
report suggested that South-West Hertfordshire, centred on 
Watford, Potters Bar, Waltham Holy Cross, and Dartford in Kent 
should be excluded from Greater London. 7 4 Rhodes states that 
this amounted to 60,000 acres, or eleven per cent of the review 
area, and 276,000 people, or three per cent of the population 
of the review area. 73 
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The two major constraints imposed upon the Royal Commission, 
that is its inability to take into account urban Greater 
London's relationship to its hinterland and the limitations 
regarding which functions or services could be considered. to a 
large extent, dictated the nature of its recommendations. 
Wi thin those constraints the Royal Commission's report 
represented a logical and well argued case in favour of the 
recommended reforms. From the publ ica t ion of the report, it 
became the responsibility of the Government to act, or not. and 
the right of all other interested bodies to react to the 
Governmen t . 
III 
The chronology and the details of the transition in London 
government have been detailed by Rhodes' The Government of 
London; The Struggle for Reform and will not be discussed in 
detai 1 here. Rhodes has also given much at tent ion to 
discussions on London government reform in Parliament. 76 Thus. 
this thesis will not fully discuss the Parliamentary process 
leading to the creation of the G.L.C. and new London boroughs. 
It will suffice to note that following the publication of the 
report the Government. through the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government, sought the opinions of local authorities in 
Greater London. 77 
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In November 1961 the Government published a whi te paper on 
local government in Greater London. 78 This paper accepted the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission in general, but wi th 
some changes. There are only two important changes worthy of 
discussion here. The number of London boroughs was to be 
thirty-two, (plus the City of London) rather than the fifty-two 
(plus the City of London) suggested by the Royal Commission. 
The major effect would be to increase the number of 
amalgamations among local authorities and to increase the size 
of the average population in each borough. It was the latter 
point which had induced the changed borough size. Brooke, 
Minister of Housing and Local Government until promoted to Home 
Secretary two days before the publication of the white paper, 
had insisted that all boroughs should be large enough to carry 
out all functions asked of them efficiently and without 
recourse to joint arrangements with neighbouring authorities. 79 
His successor, Dr Charles Hill, reinforced this point later in 
Parliament when he explained why a minimum population of 
200,000 would create higher standards and greater economy in 
administration. He argued it was because of: 
... a number of factors including the greater 
resources that would be available to boroughs of this 
size, the increased specialization of staff and 
institutions on all the personal services that would 
be practicable, and the special circumstances of the 
continuously built up area of Greater London.so 
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The second major change to the Royal Commission's proposals 
put forward in the white paper concerned education. The Royal 
Commission had recommended that the provision of state 
education in Greater London be split between the new boroughs 
and the Council for Greater London. The Regional authority was 
to own all Greater London's schools and colleges and take 
f inanc ial respons ibi 1 i ty for the education service. I t was to 
take responsibili ty for the maintenance of educational 
standards and was to formulate an education development plan. 
The new boroughs were to take responsibility for the management 
and maintenance of schools. They were to appoint managers and 
governors, and employ the teaching staff. 8 I This 
recommendation, however, did not entirely coincide with the 
evidence given to the Royal Commission by the Ministry of 
Education, which had recommended unitary education authorities, 
and had expressed contentment wi th both the structure of the 
education service and the standard of education in the L.C.C. 
area. The Ministry was primarily concerned to provide students 
wi th a system of seamless progression through all levels of 
educa tion. 8 2 I f a single education authority was to provide 
primary, secondary and a full range of further specialist 
education, it would need to draw upon a large population base 
to remain efficient. 
As discussed above the Royal Commission was subject to many 
pressures and to many constraints. I ts report contained many 
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compromises. Even within the local government provision of 
education, the Royal Commission had to balance several points 
of view. For example, the Metropolitan Borough of Hackney was 
one of several medium-sized authorities (in this case 
authorities with populations above 100,000 but not close to 
Eccles' desired 400,000, see below) which had suggested to the 
Royal Commission that education should became a borough 
function. 83 Such requests conflicted with the advice offered by 
the Ministry of Education. The Royal Commission's 
recommendation on education can be seen as a compromise which 
gave the boroughs some control over education, yet allowed many 
of the existing medium-sized authorities to retain their own 
identities, rather than being merged with their neighbours into 
much larger units capable of becoming full Local Education 
Authorities. Other subjects such as the children's service and 
housing remained contentious but education seems to have been 
the only issue that split the Cabinet. 
The Minister of Education, Sir David Eccles, strongly supported 
the point of view expressed by his Ministry to the Royal 
Commission. When the issue was discussed in Cabinet in July 
1961 he argued for a single education authority in central 
London which would service a population of one-and-a-half 
million to two million. He wanted this to be a joint board of 
all local education authorities in the area. Eccles presented 
three reasons for this central London education authority: 
firstly, to save the core of the L.C.C.'s education service, 
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generally recognized as a good service; secondly, to preserve 
a wide choice of schools in the area; and thirdly, to avoid 
mul tiplying the number of education authori ties to such an 
extent that there would not be enough staff to go around. 84 
Eccles also argued for a further series of joint education 
boards throughout the rest of Greater London. The members of 
these joint boards would be appointed from among the members of 
the London boroughs wi thin the area of each joint education 
board. Eccles envisaged each education authority serving a 
population of about 400.000. 85 The July Cabinet discussion on 
local government in Greater London discussed reducing the 
number of new London boroughs to forty with the possibility of 
some joint boards,86 but this did not satisfied either Brooke 
or Eccles. The latter continued to argue for a series of joint 
education boards large enough to cover all education functions 
and the former disliked the idea of a series of ad hoc boards 
existing because the normal local government structure was not 
adequate to cope with educational requirements. s7 
A few weeks before the publication of the white paper, on the 5 
October. Brooke wrote to Eccles asking him to think again. 
Brooke pointed out that the proposed London boroughs would be 
among the largest local authorities in the country_ He pointed 
out: "The reorganization proposed by the Local Government 
Commission in the Black Country is not going to achieve county 
boroughs of the size proposed for the London Boroughs."8s 
County boroughs were education authorities. Thus Brooke's point 
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was that if new author i ties in the Black Count ry were to be 
allowed to control education, it was illogical to refuse 
similar status to new authorities in London. By the time the 
white paper was published a compromise of sorts had been 
achieved. The new London boroughs were to take sale 
responsibility for education, but the average population level 
of each was to be increased, consequently reducing the number 
of boroughs as detailed above. The white paper also stated that 
a central London education authority would be established which 
would serve a population of approximately two million. Eccles 
and the Ministry of Education achieved much of what they 
regarded as necessary to allow the development of a high 
quality education system for Greater London. 
Because of the lateness of the compromise regarding education 
the details of the new pattern of London boroughs in the white 
paper were rather patchy, as were the details of the central 
London education authority. The white paper gave no hint that 
the central London education authority was to comprise the 
whole of the L.C.C. 's education service. B9 Education remained a 
contentious issue within the Conservative Government, as is 
attested by the Prime Minister's note to his new Minister of 
Housing and Local Government, Dr Charles Hill, of 10 October in 
which Macmillan instructed Hill to consult with the Chairman of 
the Conservative Party, lain Macleod. over education in London. 
Macmillan described it as a "highly political subject".90 
I 
I 
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The above details were not available to Rhodes, writing only a 
few years after the event. Nonetheless, as already stated, 
Rhodes has adequately detailed the process leading from the 
publication of the white paper to the establishment of the new 
system of local government in Greater London. 91 
r,', '
'I~iAfter the publication of the whi te paper the Leader of the 
Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, made plain that his Party would not 
support the Government's proposed reform of local government in 
Greater London. Gaitskell promised to retain the existing I 
system if his Party obtained power in time to stop the proposed 
changes. 92 This lack of Parliamentary unanimi ty created the 
need for the Conservative Government to impose a very strict 
time- table upon the process of reform if the new authori ties 
were to be in place before the next general election and a 
possible change of government. A Parliamentary Bill needed to 
begin its progress through Parliament in late 1962. This would 
allow the Bill to become an Act before the summer recess of 
1963. Then the elections for the new authori ties could take 
place in April and May 1964, before the last date for the 
general election in October 1964. 93 I t is not known if the 
desire to pass the London Government Act affected the timing of 
the general election or not. but the above time-table was 
achieved. However, it necessitated some changes. 
Within a few weeks of the publication of the white paper the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government issued a circular 
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showing the proposed groupings of local authorities in the new 
London boroughs. 94 A few months later Dr Charles Hill announced 
he had invited four Town Clerks from beyond the Greater London 
area to inves t igate and recommend the final pa t tern 0 f new 
London boroughs. In the House of Commons, in March 1962, he 
announced their terms of reference: 
1/ To take into consideration the map showing the 
possible grouping of boroughs sent to local 
authori ties in the London area of 16 December 1961 
(subject to any amendment to the outer boundary which 
the Minister may indicate), and the views expressed 
and any al ternative suggestions made by local 
authorities in respect of this map. 
2/ To make recommendations (after such consul ta tions 
with each other and with the Department as they may 
think necessary) for the creation of a pattern of 
London boroughs over the whole of this Greater London 
area (other than the Ci ty 0 f London) mainly by the 
amalgamation of the existing local government areas. 
3/ In making recommendations to have regard to the 
minimum population of around 200,000 wherever 
possible (some boroughs might be substantially bigger 
than this); and also to the present and past 
association of existing local government area, to the 
lines of communications, the patterns of development, 
and the location and areas of influence of service 
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centres. 95 
Thus, by March 1962 the Government had decided on the nature 
of the new local government structure in Greater London. The 
four town clerks, Mr Littlewood from Cheltenham, Mr Lloyd Jones 
from Plymouth, Mr Plowman from Oxford, and Mr Young from South 
ShieIds, 96 had no power to examine funct ions and no power to 
examine the extent of Greater London. This, of course, had been 
the function of the Royal Commission. The Town Clerks 
conferences were the last opportunity for the local authorities 
to express their opinions. The first conference was held on 9 
April and the last 5 June, and their final report went to the 
Minister on 18 July. The Town Clerks recommended several 
changes, the most important concerning south-west London 
centring on Wandsworth and Battersea. 97 Given the need to have 
the Parliamentary Bill drafted by the autumn the Minister can 
have had Ii ttle choice but to accept the Town Clerks final 
report, and indeed he did so. The Town Clerks, however, had not 
been totally successful. Their new pattern had been created 
mainly by the amalgamation of existing local government areas, 
but four existing local authorities were to be spii t between 
more than one of the new London Boroughs. 98 
The Minister's announcement of acceptance of the Town Clerks' 
recommendations caused little surprise and little active 
resentment. Many opponents of change had grown used to the idea 
that change was inevitable and were contemplating how best to 
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make the new system work in their favour. Issues such as re­
warding the new boroughs and elections to the new authorities 
were becoming increasingly important by mid-1962. This 
pragmatic approach among the many did not stop the total 
opposition of a few, nor did it end the rhetoric of opposition 
among many former opponents of change. This may have caused 
confusion at the time, and since. Similarly the majority of 
local authorities had come to accept the inevitability of 
change by mid to late 1962. The majori ty were beginning the 
complex process of merging with neighbours whilst protecting a 
high level of local authority service and protecting the future 
of their staff. Many local authorities were also endeavouring 
to protect their municipal status through such methods as 
sponsoring their own name as that of the new borough and their 
own Town Hall as the new borough's Town Hall. 99 Shortly before 
the first elections for the G.L.C. in April 1964, the Evening 
News commissioned National Opinion Polls to test the public's 
attitude towards the new system of local government. A series 
of polls were carried out in Hounslow, Havering, Lambeth, 
Barnet, and Bexley. It proved that: 
Almost 80% of the electors knew that Middlesex 
County Council is to be abolished and its area 
absorbed by Greater London, but the majority of them 
were indifferent to this change in their local 
government. Almost half of the electors did not care 
about this change and the number who disapproved of 
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it was balanced by an almost equal number who 
approved. lOO 
In Havering, at that time still in Essex, the findings were 
similar - twenty-two per cent approved of the changes, twenty­
five per cent disapproved, thirty-two per cent did not care, 
and twenty-one per cent did not know. 101 In Bexley, then in 
Kent, twenty-six per cent approved, twenty-nine per cent 
disapproved, twenty-two per cent did not care, and twenty-three 
per cent did not know. 102 In Barnet twenty-five per cent 
approved, twenty- four per cent disapproved, twenty-seven per 
cent did not care, and twenty-four per cent did not know. 103 In 
Lambeth the figures were as follows - twenty per cent approved, 
nineteen per cent disapproved, twenty-six per cent did not 
care, and thirty-five per cent did not know. 104 These figures 
are here used in a crude manner to indicate that public opinion 
was not overly concerned about the changes in local government. 
During its investigations the Royal Commission had established 
that in many areas of Greater London the existing local 
authorities were not the centre of a strong community 
feeling. lo5 This was particularly so in Middlesex. Thus, the 
merging of authorities and the abolition of some county 
councils did not arouse great public anger. Research carried 
out for the Royal Commission found that there were seventy to 
eighty shopping centres, considered the most important centre 
for a community. which coincided with bus traffic centres. lOS 
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There were also fifteen to twenty major centres such as 
Croydon, Kingston, Watford, Bromley, Brixton, Kilburn and 
Stratford which were second only to central London as centres 
of business. finance and shopping. 107 The Royal Commission's 
researcher suggested that: 
With an overall grasp of the patterns of centres and 
hinterlands of various grades. a pattern could be 
tailor-made to fit any desired break up of area. LOB 
The final pattern of new London boroughs took account of such 
non-local authority centres and created a new system which did 
not damage or challenge such community centres and thus appears 
to have caused little opposition to the new structure of local 
authorities. 
On the periphery of Greater London opposi tion to change was 
stronger. In the process of consultation following the 
publication of the whi te paper the Minister met wi th strong 
opposition from several local authorities on the outer edge of 
Greater London.109 As was made clear in the remit issued to the 
Town Clerks. the outer boundary of Greater London was to be 
determined by the Minister. Banstead, Caterham and Warlingham. 
Cheshunt. Esher. Staines. Sunbury on Thames, and Walton and 
Weybridge were wholly excluded at their own requests from 
Greater London and Chigwell, and Epsom and Ewell were partially 
excluded. I 10 There were other authori ties, such as Romford. 
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whose reques ts to be excluded from Greater London were not 
conceded, I II but by and large the remaining area represented a 
cohesive Greater London area, an area based on research and at 
least the tacit approval of a majority of its inhabitants. The 
exclusions by the Royal Commission, and later by the Minister, 
meant that Greater London was twenty-six per cent smaller in 
area and seven per cent lower in population than the original 
reviewarea. li2 
In May 1962 Hill announced that the L.C.C.'s education service 
would be retained intact, and it would form the expected 
central London education authority. If this decision had not 
been made an alternative education system would have had to be 
detailed in the London Government Bill by the Autumn of 1962. 
The earlier disagreements over the size of local education 
authorities in Greater London probably delayed consideration of 
this matter to such an extent there was not enough time to draw 
up an alternative plan. Although saving the L.C.C. 's education 
service was not popular among many Conservatives, the Ministers 
of Housing and Local Government and Education had little option 
at that late date. A further change to the Government's plans 
concerned the abandonment of plans to incorporate the M.W.B. 
within the G.L.C. This proposal had also to be dropped because 
it would have damaged the chances of the London Government Bill 
passing through the legislative process before the general 
election. These two topics will be discussed in detail in 
chapter nine, but it is important to illustrate that the period 
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between the publication of the white paper and the first 
reading of the London Government Bill in November 1962 was a 
period when the Government was forced to concede points, to 
change the nature of the new London government system, and to 
cut short much of the discussion surrounding the changes (in 
January 1963 the Government imposed a .Guillotine' on 
Parliamentary discussion) . 
In July 1962, Dr Hill, along with several other Ministers. lost 
his job. He was replaced by Sir Keith Joseph. There is no 
indication that Hill's removal had any connection to his 
handling of the transi tion in London government, yet he seems 
to have had little real interest in the subject. London 
government is not mentioned in Hill's memoirs. 113 Joseph had 
been an Alderman in the City of London, and his father had been 
Lord Mayor of London. 1 I <1 By July 1962, however. it was no 
longer possible for the Minister to change any major aspect of 
the London Government Bill wi thout endangering the delicate 
t ime- table. Joseph had Ii t t Ie option but to follow the same 
policies as Hill. It is also unlikely that Henry Brooke would 
have been able to avoid making many of the decisions forced 
upon Hill. 
The London Government Act, 1963 introduced a new system very 
similar to that recommended by the Royal Commission, with some 
important amendments by the Conservative Government as 
described above. The Royal Commission itself had been 
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constrained by its remit. That remit had been imposed by the 
Government, and as discussed in this chapter and earlier 
chapters the Government that appointed the Royal Commission had 
to work wi thin a complex pattern of constraints. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the new pattern of local government in 
Greater London created by the London Government Act, 1963, was 
anything but a logical outcome of a rational process. 
IV 
The G.L.C. and the new London Boroughs were elected in April 
and May 1964 and assumed authority from their predecessors on 1 
April 1965. The new system updated a nineteenth century system 
of urban county and urban district government. There seems to 
be no reason to doubt the findings of Rhodes and Ruck: 
We have argued that the new structure of local 
government set up by the 1963 Act does by and large 
offer the means of dealing with London's local 
government problems. I t does not offer an ideal or 
complete answer; no system could. It raises doubts to 
some directions; and some of its potentialIties may 
not be realized in practise. But on the whole the 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages. I 15 
In 1972 Rhodes published a second study of London government 
in which he analysed the new local government system and came 
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to the conclusion that the new system worked well. lJ6 As a 
local government system for urban Greater London it may have 
worked well, al though even here. as we have seen it did not 
serve the whole of urban Greater London as defined by the Royal 
Commission's own research. However, it failed to tackle any of 
the problems that had arisen from urban Greater London's 
complex relationship with the rest of South-East England. This 
is not surprising. since the whole process from the appointment 
of the Royal Commission to the introduction of the new system 
was not meant to address this issue. The new system was meant 
to improve roads and traffic flow inside Greater London, but 
not just outside. It did not even attempt to change public 
transport either inside or outside Greater London. There was no 
suggestion that the new local government system could ease the 
problems of large-scale commuting into central London. The new 
G.L.C. had responsibility for town and country planning, but 
only within its own boundary, and the new system had no 
improved apparatus for co-ordinating Abercrombie's Greater 
London Plan, nor for liasing with the New Town Development 
Corporations. The new local government system also lacked any 
guarantee of increased central government funding to tackle 
problems such as the ever present demand at that period for 
more and better council housing.117 
The new system did not exist within a vacuum and many of the 
above issues were the responsibilities of other bodies. 
Nonetheless, as wi th the previous local government pattern. 
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problems in Greater London were liable to be associated wi th 
failings in the local government system even when such problems 
were beyond the power of the G.L.C. and the new London 
Boroughs. The new system of local government may have been 
better, but it was not perfect, and many problems continued to 
bedevil Greater London. It seems unlikely. however. that any 
alternative plan recommended by the Royal Commission would have 
been any more successful. Also, if the Royal Commission had 
been given a less restrictive remit, it may well have been no 
more successful than the previous Royal Commission, the 
Ullswater Commission, that had such a wide-ranging mandate. In 
all probabili ty the reforms introduced in 1965 were the best 
politically possible. 
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Chapter Five 
Labour in London: 

Attitudes, Actions and Reactions 

I 
This chapter is necessary because of the complexi ty of the 
Labour Party's reaction to the transition in London government. 
The attitude of the Parliamentary Labour Party was often 
different to that of the ruling Labour group of the L.C.C. Also 
Labour politicians concerned with county-wide issues often had 
quite different views to those more concerned with borough 
issues. Thus, this chapter is not solely concerned with Labour 
opposition to reform, but also with internal Labour Party 
politics when this impinged upon the reform of London 
government. It is explained below how Labour's lack of 
unanimity damaged its fight to retain the L.C.C. This chapter 
demonstrates that those Labour politicians who wanted more than 
a repetitive demand for the maintenance of the status quo were 
overruled. It goes on to show that this support for the status 
quo damaged Labour in London's ability to influence the nature 
of the new local government system. 
At the core of Labour politics in the county of London was the 
London Labour Party (L.L.P.) and the ruling Labour Group of the 
L.C.C. However, both the national Labour Party and constituency 
Labour parties had roles to play wi thin Labour poli tics in 
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London. This is also the case wi th Labour Groups wi thin the 
metropolitan boroughs and the Labour dominated Metropolitan 
Boroughs Standing Joint Committee (M.B.S.J.C.). Consequently, 
this chapter will consider Labour politics in London in a wide 
context. 
The politics of the transition in London government within the 
county of Middlesex and the metropoli tan sections of Essex, 
Kent, Surrey and Hertfordshire are dealt with in chapters 
seven, eight, and to a lesser extent, nine. Consequently this 
chapter is concerned with the area central to this thesis; that 
is the Administrative County of London only. 
II 
The L.L.P. was established in 1914l. It was affiliated to the 
Labour Party. and was subject to the normal rules of 
affiliation. The L.L.P. area formed one of nine Labour Party 
regions, and it was the only county-wide Labour organization to 
form a region on its own. I t had the same s ta tus wi thin the 
Labour Party as the Scottish and Welsh regions, for example. 2 
Between 1914 and 1951 the L.L.P. covered the Administrative 
County of London only. In 1950 constituency Labour Parties in 
Middlesex were invited to affiliate to the L.L.P., and the 
following year all such parties did so, thus allowing one party 
to represent Labour within the majority of Greater London. From 
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that date the new enlarged party continued to have a single 
Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary and Executive Committee. but 
below that controlling level different structures existed to 
guide L.L.P. affairs in Middlesex and London.3 The remit of the 
L.L.P. never covered the affairs of Constituency Labour Parties 
in the metropolitan areas of Essex, Kent and Surrey. 
Affiliated to the L.L.P. were the Constituency Parties, many 
London branches of Trade Unions and other appropriate 
organizations such as London Co-operative Societies. 4 
Prospective candidates for both the L.C.C. and the Metropolitan 
Boroughs were selected by the Constituency Labour Parties in 
each area, and thus the L.L.P. had no direct responsibility for 
the choice of Labour councillors elected to the L.C.C. (or, 
indeed, Middlesex County Counc il) .5 In 1934, for the fi rs t 
time, the electorate in London returned a Labour controlled 
County Council, and from that date until its abolition the 
L.C.C. remained Labour controlled. Within the Metropolitan 
Boroughs there was a little more variety: some such as 
Westminster remained consistently Conservative controlled,6 and 
others such as Poplar remained Labour controlled from the pre­
war era until their abolition in 1965. 7 In other boroughs 
poli tical control changed occasionally. In 1959 Labour 
cont rolled nineteen boroughs and following the 1962 borough 
election Labour controlled twenty-one boroughs. S Within 
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boroughs not controlled by Labour, its Councillors were 
organized in minority Labour groups. 
It is impossible to mention Labour politics in London at any 
stage from 1915 to 1965 without mentioning one man, that is 
Herbert Morrison, Secretary of the London labour Party from 
1915 to 1940. Leader of the L.C.C. from 1934 to 1940 and from 
that time until his death, just before the final abolition of 
the L.C.C. in 1965, one of the most senior and influential of 
Labour poli ticians. At various stages of his career he was 
Minister of Transport, Home Secretary, Lord President of the 
Council and Deputy Prime Minister and briefly Foreign 
Secretary.9 Morrison developed the informal structure and the 
decision making system within London Labour politics and 
retained his close links with the L.L.P. until his death.lo 
Morrison took no direct part in the affairs of the L.C.C. after 
he ceased to be Leader.ll 
The L.C.C. and the controlling Labour group on that Council, 
however, continued to be run in what has been identified as the 
'Morrisonian' style. 12 Sir Isaac Hayward became the leader of 
the L.C.C. in 1947. He had been a close ally of Morrison, 
having been the Labour whip and a member of Morrison's so 
called 'Presidium' which Morrison consul ted on all important 
issues such as the appointment of chairmen of committees. 1 3 
Hayward perpetuated the same style of leadership, al though, 
unlike Morrison, he never tried to dominate the L.L.P. as well 
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as the LoCoCo Discipline was imposed on the Labour group of the 
LoC.C. The Labour group was controlled by a policy committee 
formed of the group leadership, which dictated all Labour group 
business, which in turn was passed down to a full meeting of 
the Labour Group which discussed issues and tactics before 
these were discussed in L.CoC. Committees or in the Council. 14 
Hayward, thus, manipulated the agenda, and disagreements were 
aired in private rather than in committee or at the Council. 
Party discipline and a constant Labour majority on the Council 
allowed the policies and tactics of the Labour group leadership 
to become official L.C.C. policy at all times. 
Hayward's management of the Labour group of the L.C.C. 
represents one aspect of the 'Morrisonian' system of 
controlling Labour in London. 15 The other main aspect was that 
of close cooperation between the Executive Committee of the 
L. L. Po and Hayward's leadership team. 1 6 Hayward and several 
other L.C.C. councillors were members of the Executive 
Commi t tee throughout the period of opposi tion to change in 
London government. 17 Hayward's team and the Executive Committee 
of the L.L.P. worked closely together, shared the same views 
and saw themselves as the leading and directing force of Labour 
in London. Two of the early meetings to discuss opposition to 
change show this. in October 1960 Peter Robshaw, Secretary of 
the L. L. P., sent out invi ta t ions to Labour Leaders (that is 
Leaders of Labour groups in the Metropoli tan Boroughs) to a 
meeting to be held at County Hall arranged by Hayward. 1 B At a 
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further meeting of Labour Leaders in December 1960 Hayward, 
Labour Leader of the L.C.C., chaired the meeting and Robshaw, 
Secretary of the L.L.P., was among the speakers. 19 In practice 
the leaderships of the L.L.P. and the L.C.C. were often 
composed of the same individuals and always worked closely 
together. 
When the Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London 
started to take written evidence in early 1958 both the L.C.C. 
and the L.L.P. were asked to provide written statements 
regarding their views concerning the best structure for local 
government in Greater London. The evidence given by the two 
bodies was virtually identical, and amounted to an 
uncompromising assertion that there was no need for change. 2o 
As early as 1954 the L.L.C. Labour group had debated the idea 
of transferring some of the Council's functions to the 
Metropolitan Boroughs,2l and the 1955 Labour L.C.C. election 
manifesto promised to transfer maternity, child welfare, 
nursing and health visiting services to the Metropolitan 
Boroughs.22 Such a transfer of services to the boroughs had not 
taken place, but both the L.L.P. and the L.C.C. made it clear 
to the Royal Commission that some minor changes to the 
functions of the L.C.C. and the Metropolitan Boroughs would be 
acceptable. 
When Hayward led the L.C.C. party which gave oral evidence to 
the Royal Commission in April 1959 his advice did not vary from 
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the written evidence. The Evening Standard accused him of 
, stonewall ing' 2 3 because he asserted there was no need for 
change in the structure of local government in the county of 
London and he had no opinion concerning the rest of Greater 
London whatsoever.24 A few months later Lord Latham, a former 
leader of the L. C. C., and Peter Robshaw gave evidence before 
the Royal commission on behalf of the L.L.P. Their evidence had 
been discussed by the Executive Committee of the L.L.P.25 and 
followed exactly that offered by Hayward on behalf of the 
L.C.C. 
The report of the Royal Commission acknowledged that Labour had 
advised there was no need for anything more than the transfer 
of some services from the L.C.C. to the Metropolitan 
Boroughs. 26 The report went on to dismiss this idea and to 
assert there were two al ternatives only, reform, and radical 
reform at that, or the central government taking control of 
many issues concerning the whole of Greater London. 27 The 
Labour leadership in London was disturbed by the Royal 
Commission's rejection of their arguments concerning the most 
appropriate structure for London government. 28 Various meetings 
were arranged to gauge the view of Labour activists in 
London. 29 The attitude of the L.L.P. and L.C.C. Labour Group, 
however, remained totally unchanged. 3o The publication of the 
Government's white paper thirteen months later did little to 
change the attitude of the L.L.P.31 After the introduction of 
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the London Government Bill in late 1962 they were fighting for 
their very existence. 32 
The last L.C.C. election took place in April 1961. At that time 
Labour had not conceded that the L.C.C. was doomed to be 
replaced and fought the election, not only on their record, but 
also as a referendum on the Government's plans for London 
government. 33 Labour retained control of the L.C.C. with a 
comfortable majority, but they did lose seventeen seats to the 
Tories. 34 However, at the previous election in 1958 Labour had 
the ir bes t ever resul t taking 101 seats out of a total of 
126. 35 It was an ambiguous result for Hayward and the 
leadership team. Labour had done well, but was it enough to be 
presented as a convincing 'no' by the people of London to the 
Government's plans? Neither The Times nor the Evening Standard 
argued the election results gave Labour in London a mandate to 
oppose the reform of London government. The L.L.P. 's own 
journal, London News, also failed to argue the voters of London 
had given the L.L.P. and L.C.C. Labour Group a mandate to 
oppose the Royal Commission's recommendation. 36 Nonetheless, 
Labour retained control of the L.C.C. and continued its 
opposition to the reform of local government in London. In July 
1962, L.L.P. opposition remained firm. Robshaw wrote to 
secretaries of all Labour Groups in London asking that they 
refuse to co-operate wi th the government on the issue of 
reorganizing London local government. Robshaw claimed: "I t is 
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the Royal Commission and has become universally known as the 
'Surrey Plan'.41 The Executive Committee of the L.L.P., in its 
initial response to the publication of the Royal Commission's 
report, recommended a indi rect ly elected London Regional 
Planning and Traffic Authority which would have authority 
within an area of about thirty miles radius from Charing Cross. 
This was to have been complemented by the transference of some 
L.C.C. powers to the metropolitan boroughs.42 The Labour Group 
of the L.C.C. discussed the 'Surrey Plan' on 15 January 1961 
and came to much the same decisions as the L.L.P., but Hayward 
and his colleagues were concerned that such a joint board 
should not endanger the viability of the L.C.C. by assuming too 
many powers. For example, the L. C. C. Labour Group accepted 
that any joint board would have some housing powers, perhaps 
the ability to negotiate with local authorities prepared to 
accept some of Greater London's overspill population, but 
argued that such powers should not be at the expense of 
existing housing authorities, which included the L.C.C.43 The 
Labour group seems to have expected any such joint board to be 
principally involved in co-ordinating the work of the existing 
county councils within its area. 44 Such a plan would have left 
the L.L.P. intact and left the L.C.C. with a major local 
government role and consequently offered a useful means of 
defence to Labour in London. This alternative reform, however, 
was not acceptable to the government. 45 
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III 

However much power the leadership of the L.C.C. and the L.L.P. 
managed to concentrate within their own hands, there were other 
organizations and individuals who sought to, and often did, 
influence the general trend of Labour politics in London. One 
of the most powerful individuals was Norman Prichard, for many 
years chairman of the M. B. S. J . C. 4 6 This commi t tee had been 
created in 1912 and all the Metropolitan Boroughs, including 
the City of London were members. 47 Because Labour usually 
controlled more Boroughs than the Conservatives, the 
organization had been Labour controlled for many years.~8 
Prichard remained chairman throughout the period of transition, 
but his power and influence was based on more than just this 
chairmanship. He was an Alderman on Battersea Borough Council, 
he was an L.C.C. Councillor and had been Chairman of the 
Finance Committee, and was also a member of the Executive 
Committee of the London Labour Party.49 He was a long serving 
and well respected expert on local government in London.5o 
Apart from Prichard's individual position, the M.B.S.J.C. was 
recognized by the Government, 5 1 and by the L.C.C. ,52 as the 
collective voice of the Metropoli tan Boroughs, and as such 
neither could afford to discount its opinions. 
Like many other local government organizations the M.B.S.J.C. 
was primarily concerned to defend its own position, and, if 
possible, to enhance the role and status of its constituent 
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members. 53 Consequently it hoped to see some of the powers and 
funct ions of the L. C. C. trans fer red to the lower tier 
boroughs. 54 As a Labour controlled body, however, the M.B.S.J.C 
had a vested interest in ensuring any regional tier of local 
government in its area remained Labour controlled. The 
Conservative opposition on the M.B.S.J.C. objected to this, but 
like the Conservative opposition on the L.C.C. they had little 
or no power to influence formal decisions. 55 Perhaps even more 
important to the M.B.S.J.C. was its attempts to defend the 
boundaries of the Metropolitan Boroughs as they existed prior 
to 1965, even though many of the Boroughs had seen many decades 
of decline in their population levels, and many were also quite 
small in area. 56 Consequently Prichard and the M.B.S.J.C. saw 
their best chance of furthering their own interests by 
supporting the continued existence of the L.C.C. To a large 
extent Prichard's colleagues on the L.C.C. and the L.L.P. 
Executive Committee could rely on the support of the M.B.S.J.C. 
throughout their opposition to change. 
In their evidence to the Royal Commission the M.B.S.J.C. 
offered three main points, which must have been of some comfort 
to the L.C.C. and the the L.L.P. The M.B.S.J.C. argued that the 
two-tier system of local government in London, as it existed, 
was the most appropriate. Secondly, it argued that there was 
no need for changes in the existing boundaries of local 
authori ties wi thin London. However, the third point may have 
Thecaused anguish to Hayward and his leading colleagues. 
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M.B.S.J.C. argued there should be a " ... substantial transfer of 
functions from the London County Council to the Metropoli tan 
Borough Councils."57 The services recommended for transfer 
were: 
All functions under the London Building Acts; all 
functions regarding the provision and management of 
parks; all functions regarding the provision and 
management of housing accommodation, including slum 
clearance, but overspill should be left with the 
L.C.C.; personal health and welfare; control of 
development under the Town and Country Planning Act, 
1947, part III, plus concurrent powers for 
comprehensive development; other functions under 
Shops and Weights and Measures Acts, licensing and 
registration, and civil defence. 58 
The report of the Royal Commission offered some comfort to the 
M.B.S.J.C. It may have caused some tension, but it did not 
split the alliance between Prichard's committee and the L.C.C. 
Labour leadership and the L.L.P. executive. The M.B.S.J.C. 
approved of the suggestion that the new London Boroughs should 
become the primary unit of local government. 59 It argued that: 
" ... any projected legislation should embody the principle in 
the most unequivocal terms."60 The Royal Commission report 
recommended that a series of new boroughs should be created 
with a minimum population of 100,000. 61 This idea was rejected 
by the committee,62 since it was obvious to Prichard and his 
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committee that this would mean the forced amalgamation of many 
of the metropolitan boroughs. The M.B.S.J.C. was also forced to 
support the L. C. C. in their claim that many services should 
remain the responsibility of the upper tier authority. The 
M. B. S. J . C. could not argue that boroughs such as Shoredi tch, 
with a population of 45,000, and Pinsbury, with a population of 
36,000. 63 were populous enough to efficiently provide all the 
services suggested by the Royal Commiss ion's report. I twas 
recognized they could not run a full education and children's 
service. 6 4 In order to aid the fight to save all twenty-eight 
metropolitan boroughs, Prichard's committee recognized the 
need to defend the L.C.C. and to leave it with enough functions 
to remain a useful, efficient and practical level of local 
government. Like the L.C.C. and L. L. P. leadership the 
M.B.S.J.C. remained consistent in its views concerning London 
Government until the latter part of 1962 when it became obvious 
that the London Government Bill would become law in the early 
part of 1963. As late as November 1962, Prichard ordered 
officers of the M.B.S.J.e. to give no help in the re­
organization of London government. 65 Prichard and his Labour 
allies controlling the M.B.S.J.C. were tied to the Labour cause 
by more than party allegiance. If the L.C.C. was retained then 
the metropoli tan boroughs were more likely to avoid forced 
mergers. 
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IV 

Sir Isaac Hayward and Norman Prichard were both of the same 
school of long serving, highly experienced local government 
politicians. 66 They both knew London government intimately, 
they could, and did argue that local government in London 
worked, and that any major problems could be solved by more 
modera te changes ( i. e. the . Surrey plan'). The two men were 
colleagues on both the L.C.C. and the executive committee of 
the L.L.P., and there is no indication that they had anything 
but a harmonious working relationship.67 Both men and their 
separate organizations developed slightly different approaches, 
while managing to present, for the most part, a united London 
Labour approach to local government in London. These two men 
and their closest allies represented a very long tradition 
(Hayward had been involved in London government since 1924, and 
a member of the L.C.C. since 1928) ,68 they had a deeply 
entrenched view of how London should be governed. In common 
with most Labour supporters they felt it was in the best 
interes ts of the maj or! ty of Londoners that Labour hegemony 
should continue. There were, however, some Labour members more 
concerned to see some reform of London government than saving 
the 1. C. C. 
Among the Labour controlled Metropolitan Boroughs the majority 
supported the general view of the overlapping leaderships of 
the L.C.C., L.L.P., and the M.B.S.J.C. Nonetheless, there was 
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some dissent, and it did damage the overall chances of Labour 
influencing the final nature of local government in Greater 
London. The Metropolitan Borough of Hackney informed the Royal 
Commission that it felt that the Metropolitan Boroughs should 
have the same education functions as other non-county boroughs 
throughout Bri tain. 6 9 The municipal borough of Ley ton in the 
County of Essex shared a common boundary with Hackney and under 
the 1944 Education Act Leyton had a right to receive delegated 
powers from the education authority (Essex County Council) 
which gave Ley ton control over education in its area. 70 Many 
other Boroughs in Middlesex, Essex, Kent and Surrey within the 
Grea te r London area had these same powers, but the London 
County Council was obliged under the same Education Act to keep 
all aspects of education in its own hands. 71 The L.C.C. was 
happy to see this continue,72 but Hackney was not. 73 Hackney 
was a large borough, with a population of 171,000,74 thus the 
Borough Council felt its own future was quite secure in any new 
system of local government in London. When Hackney was forced 
to merge with two of its smaller neighbours, Stoke Newington 
and Shoredi tch, it became, in reali ty, a takeover of the two 
smaller boroughs by their larger neighbour. The new Hackney was 
dominated by the same Labour group as the old Hackney.75 Apart 
from loyalty to the L.L.P. view, Hackney Borough Council had 
little vested interest in helping to preserve the L.C.C. Thus, 
Hackney was able to demand the Metropolitan Boroughs take 
responsibility for education, plus the other services demanded 
by the M.B.S.J.C., even though the Labour controlled borough 
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mus t have been aware this would leave the L. C. C. dangerously 
c lose to redundancy wi th few useful funct ions, espec ially if 
the 'Surrey Plan' was also adopted. The Conservative L.M.S. 
identified this split within Labour views and gave it publicity 
in their journal The Londoner.76 Later this divergence of view 
within Labour in London was also reported in the Evening 
Standard. 77 
Hackney was not the only Labour controlled metropolitan borough 
to publicly oppose the view of the London Labour leadership. 
Fulham went much further than Hackney. In its evidence to the 
Royal Commission it argued that there was a need for a radical 
change to the local government system in Greater London. 78 
Fulham supported the idea of a Greater London Authority as 
suggested by the Royal Commission, and this support continued 
throughout the process leading to the creation of the G.L.C. 
Once again the L.M.S. publicized this rift in Labour views.79 
Hugh Jenkins, a Labour L.C.C. Councillor, also called for 
radical change. 80 He became M. P. for Putney in October 1964, 
but even before this as a Parliamentary candidate he would have 
been a man of some influence. Jenkins was not a member of the 
national Labour Party's N.E.C. Local Government Sub-Committee. 
but his support. and the support of Fulham Borough Council, for 
radical change was noted by that Sub-Commi t tee· B 1 Such 
opposition to the L.L.P. stance from within Labour in London 
must have helped the N.B.C. Local Government Sub-Committee to 
justify its extreme ambiguity in its support for the L.C.C .• 
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L.L.P .• M.B.S.J.C. point of view. The Sub-Committee steadfastly 
refused to commit itself to full support of the L.L.P. view. 82 
The L.L.P. made several attempts to avoid differences of 
opinion arising among the various Labour organizations in the 
London area. There were many consultations, meetings and other 
reques ts to be kept in touch wi th the views of consti tuency 
parties throughout the entire period. 83 The leadership had 
defini te views, and showed every sign of having developed a 
'siege mentality',84 but nonetheless the leadership recognized 
the need to carryall elements of London Labour wi th them.8 5 
Consequently this continuous two-way process of communications 
between the constituencies, trade unions and Metropolitan 
Borough Labour Groups led to the expression of some divergent 
views. Many of these were from small groups which lacked 
influence and the means to publicize their views. 86 
Among those Labour groups expressing a very different point of 
view, however, was the Labour Group in the Metropolitan 
Borough of Woolwich which envisaged the end of the L.C.C. The 
Woolwich Labour Group suggested that Greater London be divided 
into five metropolitan counties, one of which would be a much 
reduced L.C.C .. This would contain the metropolitan boroughs of 
St. Marylebone, Holborn, Pinsbury, Shoredi tch, Bethnal Green, 
Bermondsey, Stepney, Southwark, Westminster and the City of 
London. This new L.C.C. would have a population of about 
350,000. 87 The Woolwich Labour party had an associate 
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membership of several thousands due to the affiliation of the 
Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society.s8 Its mere size gave the 
Woolwich party a great deal of influence. It had the financial 
base to promote its ideas if it wished to do so. The leadership 
could not afford to totally disregard the views of such 
powerful organizations, nor could the leadership afford to take 
on board such radical ideas without totally discrediting their 
own well known position. The consultations between the 
Headquarters of the L.L.P. and the various constituent 
organizations continued apace and individuals such as London 
Party Secretary Peter Robshaw was forced to write many letters 
assuring these organizations in vague terms of better co­
operation and more devolution of power in the future. 89 
The views of the Labour Party in Woolwich do not seem to have 
been much publicized at the time. This may have been due to 
L.L.P. pressure. 90 Nonetheless, when the Evening Standard 
commented that many of the Labour controlled metropolitan 
boroughs were only half hearted in their opposi tion to the 
proposed reforms it was able to link this to a claim that the 
L.C.C. had shut their minds to the possibility of change, and 
thus emphasize differences wi thin Labour in London. 9 l 
Intransigence at the top and less than wholehearted support 
from some of the cons ti tuent organizations must have damaged 
London Labour's chances of defending Labour's hegemony in 
London and trying to extend it to the whole of Greater London. 
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Despite all the outward signs of unanimity within the 
controlling Labour group on the L.C.C. there were differences 
of opinion within the senior controlling elements. Hayward and 
his main ally, Freda Corbet, had been able to maintain loyalty 
by of fer ing committee chairmanships or vice-chairmanships to 
those who toed the party line. 92 This method seems to have been 
qui te success ful in keeping many young and arnbi tious members 
loyal, although when members acquired seniority through length 
of service. and experience after the control of several high 
prof i Ie commi t tees, they became too influent ial in thei r own 
right and could be neither sacked nor kept quiet if they chose 
to oppose the group leadership. One such member was Wi lliam 
Fiske. It had been rumoured in 1959 that Hayward was to resign 
as leader of the L.C.C. and Fiske was tipped to be the new 
leader.93 Fiske was seen as a potentially modernizing leader of 
both the L.C.C. and the Labour Group.94 Hayward did not resign, 
but in March 1960 Fiske was elected to the post of chief whip, 
ousting Corbet from the job much to the annoyance of Hayward 
who relied on her.95 This effectively meant that Fiske held the 
number two job within the Labour group of the L.C.C. He was 
also a member of the executive committee of the L.L.P. and a 
member of the Local Government Sub-Committee of the N.E.C. of 
the Labour Party.96 Fiske was an influential man, who had his 
own supporters within the L.C.C.97 There is no sign that Fiske 
was anything but loyal to Hayward and the decisions of the 
Labour Leadership team (of which he was a member). 98 Hayward 
and Corbet, however, did not forgive him, and he remained a 
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figurehead and a symbol for many of those wi thin the Labour 
movement dissatisfied wi th the old guard leadership. 9 9 Fiske 
did later emerge as the leader of the first Labour controlled 
G. L. C., and under his leadership there were no Aldermanships 
for Hayward or Corbet even though Hayward was on record as 
saying he would consider becoming an Alderman if offered a 
position as such. IOO 
Dissa tis fac t ion wi th Hayward's leadership of the L. C. C. and 
with the leadership of the L.L.P. also manifested itself with a 
revival of a more radical left-wing agenda among some Labour 
activists. lol Although many of the established figures in 
London Labour politics, such as the leading L.C.C. Councillor 
Evelyn Denington, supported Fiske in his attempt to change the 
leadership without damaging the structure of Labour in London, 
many others saw a need for a more radical change.! 0 2 Some of 
these, such as Illtyd Harrington, gained places on the 
Executive Committee of the L.L.P.' 03 This growing left wing 
discontent permeated all levels of the party by 1963 when the 
leadership finally conceded defeat in the fight to save the 
L.C.C .. 104 The leadership did contain the growing agitation 
within Labour ranks, but not without cost. Hayward's authority 
died wi th the L. C. C. and his place was taken by Fiske, but 
Fiske and his team failed to completely fill the vacuum left by 
the breakdown of the authoritarian L.L.P. and L.L.P. Labour 
Group structure. 
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5 
The L.C.C. and L.L.P. leadership worked hard to keep all the 
various strands of Labour in London working together. To a 
large extent they were successful. Newspapers at the time 
covered the more public splits in London Labour views, such as 
the conflicting evidence given to the Royal Commission already 
discussed, but the two main London wide newspapers, the Evening 
New~ and the ~vening Standard gave no indication of a major 
public split in the Labour stance. Maintaining this stance did 
take a considerable effort on the part of the L.L.P.ID5 as did 
the production of evidence to support the party line that no 
major changes were needed. ID6 This constant defence of the 
sta tus quo, both externally and internally, could have 
aggravated the 'siege mentality' in the established leadership. 
It seems to have left the leadership with little time to 
develop any active policy designed to enhance its position 
rather than just articulate a continuous passive defence. lo7 
One of the few major active policies of the leadership was 
somewhat of a failure and probably damaged the position of the 
leadership. At a meeting of the L.C.C. Labour Group in early 
1962 there was a suggestion that there should be established a 
non-party political organization with the sole purpose of 
bringing together and focussing all the opposition to the 
abolition of the L.C.C.1D8 This idea was taken up by the 
Executive Committee of the L.L.P., and the Labour peer Lord 
Longford was invi ted to become the chairman. There seems to 
have been no attempt to hide this organization's Labour 
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heritage: it was distanced from the L.C.C. and the L.L.P., and 
none of the London Labour leadership took an active role on 
it.109 By mid-1962 the Committee for London Government had been 
established, and it quickly became known as the Longford 
Committee. It did succeed in linking many famous names with the 
cause of saving the L.C.C., and among its official patrons were 
Dame Peggy Ashcroft, Dame Edith Evans and Sir Michael 
Redgrave. 1 10 Its Treasurer was Lord Beveridge, and the Vice­
Chairman was Sir William Holford. 111 Such household names, 
however, did not guarantee the survival of the L.C.C. In 
September 1962 Lord Longford declared he wanted to raise a 
petition of 500,000 signatures against the abolition of the 
1. C. C., and this became the main task of the Commit tee. 1 12 It 
failed. By February 1963 the Longford Committee had managed to 
raise a petition with 171,000 signatures. It was then presented 
to Parliament, but to no avail, and a few months later the 
Committee for London Government was wound Up.113 
The failure of the Longford Committee showed that the 
leadership was unable to break through public apathy, and to 
mobilize massive public support for the continued survival of 
the L.C.C. By late 1962/early 1963, opposition to the 
leadership position was growing within London Labour, the end 
of the L.C.C. looked almost inevitable, and public apathy 
continued. A public opinion poll undertaken on behalf of the 
Evening News shortly before the first G.L.C. election asked 
approximately 1,000 voters in Brixton their opinions. Sixty­
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seven per cent knew the L.C.C. was to be abolished, twenty per 
cent approved of its abolition, nineteen per cent did not 
approve, twenty-six per cent did not care that the L.C.C. was 
to be abolished and thirty-five per cent expressed no opinion 
on the matter.li4 
v 
It was not until the publication of the London Government Bill, 
and the gradual recognition of the inevitability of major 
reform, that the L.L.P committed to paper the idea that there 
was a need to defend the Labour position under the radically 
new local government system in Greater London. ll5 Not until the 
November 1963 Executive Committee meeting did the L.L.P. 
discuss the nature of the then urgently required Greater London 
Labour Party.IIS On the 24 November 1964, after the first 
G.L.C. election (April 1964). the L.L.P. held its first and 
only recorded meeting of the Special Committee to Consider the 
London Labour Party Structure. ll7 This issue was aired once in 
the London News,118 but no decisions seem to have been taken by 
the L.L.P. before their written records stop towards the end of 
1964. 
This L.L.P. apathy can be partially explained by the fact that 
it had lost its main function, that of organizing and 
campaigning on a London wide basis. A Greater London Co­
ordinating Committee had been imposed on all the Labour 
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organizations in the new Greater London Area, and the L.L.P. 
was able to appoint sixteen members to this Co-ordinating 
Committee, but that was then the end of the L.L.P. 's formal 
role in the first G.L.C. election. 119 William Fiske became a 
leading member of this Committee, and later the first leader of 
the G.L.C. after the Labour victory in April 1964. 120 Fiske and 
his new colleagues were busy with the G.L.C. Hayward and his 
remaining colleagues were occupied winding up the L.C.C. By 
mid-1964 Hayward had accepted the inevitable and became a 
member of a joint committee of the G.L.C. and the county 
councils it was to supersede. 121 Prichard was fully employed as 
Chairman of the London Boroughs Committee, which had replaced 
the M.B.S.J.C.122 Constituency and Borough Labour Groups were 
busy in the new London Boroughs. Thus, the L.L.P. had little to 
do apart from drift along until it was replaced by the Greater 
London Regional Council of the (national) Labour Party in 
1968. 123 
VI 
Despite appearances little in London politics happened without 
a logical reason, and the course followed by the L.L.P. and the 
controlling Labour group of the L.C.C. from 1957 until they 
were superseded was, indeed, logical. Sir Isaac Hayward, 
Herbert Morrison, Peter Robshaw and their colleagues were 
primarily concerned wi th the Administrative County of London 
(in Robshaw' s case also Middlesex), not Greater London. They 
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were concerned with maintaining Labour hegemony and unanimity 
in their own area. Equally, the stance taken by the M.B.S.J.C., 
various Labour controlled boroughs, constituency Labour parties 
and individuals were all quite logical and, in their own terms, 
quite reasonable. 
If the L.L.P. and L.C.C. Labour Group had been more flexible 
and attempted to extend Labour's hegemony to Greater London; if 
the G.L.C. had been accepted by London Labour after the 
publication of the Government's white paper in 1961; if a new 
Greater London Labour Party had been established in 1964, then 
the politics of local government in London might have been very 
different during the life of the G.L.C. Perhaps under the above 
circumstances Labour would have retained control of the G.L.C. 
in the 1967 election.124 However, it seems unlikely any action 
taken by the L.C.C. Labour Group and L.L.P. leadership in the 
early 1960s could have successfully extended Labour hegemony 
to the whole of Greater London. This was particularly so when 
so many normally Conservative dominated areas in suburban 
Surrey, Kent, Essex and Middlesex were included in the new 
area. 125 
Yet, if Labour had taken a more active role in helping to 
establish the nature of the G.L.C. it might have been a 
different shape and a very different body. The national Labour 
Party was able to comment on the affairs of the whole of 
Greater London, rather than just the L.C.C. area, and in 
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November 1963 declared its opposition to the G,L,C, because its 
area was not large enough to be an effective planning and 
traffic authority, It also claimed housing provision would be 
inadequate and breaking up the children's services of the 
various county councils would injure the welfare of 
children. l26 Perhaps a slightly more positive attitude from the 
Labour leadership in London could have produced enough pressure 
to see some of these criticisms taken into account in the final 
structure of the new local government system, A more powerful 
G.L,C. would have had a different relationship with the new 
London boroughs. This might have created a system better able 
to survive the 1980s. 
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Chapter Six 

Conservatives in London: 

Attitudes, Actions and Reactions 

I 
As in the previous chapter it is politics within the County of 
London that are of primary concern here. As the previous 
chapter concentrated on Labour in London so this chapter is 
concerned with the Conservatives within the L.C.C. area. 
Al though the primary purpose here is to explain the London 
Conservative role during the transition in London government it 
is necessary to provide a historical perspective in order to 
fully explain Conservative attitudes. This chapter will 
establish that there was a loss of faith among Conservatives of 
their ability to regain control of the L.C.C. It will also show 
that the L.M.S.' role within London-wide Conservative politics 
became marginalised. Also it will explain why the L.C.C. 
Conservative Group felt little fear from a reformed system of 
London government that promised to greatly improve their 
chances of electoral success. This chapter will demonstrate 
that opposition from London Conservatives, mainly within 
Metropolitan Boroughs facing abolition, failed to influence 
L.C.C. Conservative Group and L.M.S. support for the reforms. 
The L.M.S.l maintained a closer relationship with the 

Conservative Group of the L.C.C. than the London Conservative 
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Union, whose primary role was to provide agents and organizers 
in the constituencies. 2 Although the L.C.C. Conservative Group 
and the L.M.S. were separate organizations they worked together 
very closely.3 Thus, it is these two bodies which gain most 
coverage here. 
Although the L.M.S. and L.C.C. Conservative Group retained a 
great deal of autonomy within the world of Conservative 
politics they were not immune from pressure and did not work in 
isolation." Thus, the Parliamentary Conservative Party, the 
Conservative Government, Conservative Party Central Office, 
Constituency Conservative Parties and metropolitan borough 
Conservative groups all influenced the London-wide Conservative 
organizations. Consequently when necessary their role is 
brought into this chapter. 
II 
From its earliest days the L.M.S. had allied itself with the 
Conservative Party.5 It, nonetheless, retained its nominal 
the L.M.S. went into abeyance in late 
independence until 
1963. 6 That independence, however, was only tolerated by 
Conservative Party Central Office because the L.M.S. had always 
been prepared to accept central Office advice and to toe the 
party line, after the Second World War.7 
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By the post-war period the main function of the L.M.S. had 
become that of organizing and supporting the Conservative 
campaign at L.C.C. elections. s The L.M.S. also retained its 
role as a Conservative propaganda agency in the County of 
London. 7 Since its foundation the L.M.S. had maintained lists 
of suitable candidates willing to fight L.C.C. elections on 
behalf of the Conservative cause in London,lo and to a lesser 
extent had helped in the selection of sui table candidates to 
fight the Metropolitan Borough elections,11 but the L.M.S. 
never wielded anything 1 ike complete power in this field. I 2 
Consti tuency associations retained the power to select their 
own candidates for elections to both levels of local government 
in London.L3 So Conservative Councillors elected to the L.C.C. 
had often been suggested as candidates by the L.M.S. but such 
Councillors were selected by the Conservative Constituency 
Associations, aided financially and organizationally by the 
London Conservative Union, and, of course, finally elected to 
the L.C.C. by the voters of London, who had the power to vote 
in an alternative candidate every three years. 14 Consequently 
there was no formal control of the L.C.C. Conservative Group by 
the L.M.S., which had to accept that it had no right, and 
indeed no power, to force its views upon the L.C.C. 
Conservatives. This is shown by the L.M.S.' recognition that it 
could only advise the Municipal Reform Group to change its name 
to the Conservative Group for the 1946 L.C.C. election. 15 By 
the 1950s the influence of the L.M.S. had been further reduced 
because Conservative Party Central Office had begun to take an 
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reform of London government ... The Society will seek 
to supplement that reform by the establishment of 
district councils or corporations in areas 
corresponding as far as possible with existing 
districts; such bodies to be invested wi th the 
powers of various local authorities, including the 
present vestries and district boards, and with all 
the municipal powers and functions not necessarily 
discharged by the central body ... proper dignity and 
importance would be imparted to the local 
authorities; the heavy and growing responsibilities 
of the central body would be lightened; and undue 
centralization would be avoided. 21 
Further it was stated that the Society aimed to secure a fair 
system of ra tes for the ratepayers of London. 22 Wi thin five 
years of the L.M.S.' foundation the system of Metropolitan 
Boroughs which existed until 1965 had been introduced, and 
candidates supported by the L.M.S. did very well in the first 
Metropolitan Borough elections of 1900. 23 The L.C.C .• however, 
retained a great deal of power and the L.M.S expressed a 
dissatisfaction regarding the relative powers of the new 
boroughs and the L.C.C.24 
The Metropolitan Boroughs had been created by a Unionist 
government, which made it difficult for the L.M.S. to express 
too great a disappointment. The L.M.S. continued to espouse 
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the same aims, that of cheap local government through the 
pursuit of efficiency and the constant examination of the need 
for all expenditure. 25 The L.M.S. also continued to express 
the view that the best method of achieving the above aims were 
through the closer linkage of expenditure and the raising of 
the necessary finance through the rates. 26 The L.C.C. did not 
collect its own ra tes, it issued a precept, and the 
Metropolitan Boroughs collected the L.C.C.'s revenue from the 
ra tepayers in conjunction wi th their own rate demands. The 
L.M.S. view was that a greater transference of power to the 
Metropoli tan Boroughs would mean that to a greater degree 
those who were responsible for expenditure would also collect 
the rates. Such borough councillors would be part of the local 
community, and they would be more accountable, more careful of 
their neighbour's money, and better able to decide what the 
local community considered to be essential expenditure. 27 
This general L.M.S. view helped shape its policies throughout 
the seventy year 1 i fet ime of the organization. During the 
inter-war period Labour replaced the Progressives as the main 
opponents to the L.M.S.· Municipal Reform allies on the the 
L.C.C. However, little changed in the L.M.S. and Municipal 
Reform perception of their maj or opponents. 2 8 As wi th the 
Progressives, Labour was seen as a party committed to high 
spending and the centralization of local government in London 
into the hands of the L.C.C.29 
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There was a period of some twenty-seven years in between the 
end of Progressive rule and the beginning of Labour's record 
thirty-three year rule at County Hall. During this period 
between 1907 and 1934 the Municipal Reformers, as the 
Moderates had become known, controlled the L.C.C. They worked 
closely with the L.M.S. Many Municipal Reform Councillors were 
members of the L.M.S. t Executive Committee. 3o There was a 
restrictive limit to what the Municipal Reformers could do to 
change the local government system of London more to their 
liking. Change needed to come from Parliament, not from the 
L.C.C. whose powers and functions were derived from Acts of 
Parliament alone. 3 I WeI fare reforms of various central 
governments (often Conservative dominated) after the First 
World War imposed new duties and greater expense onto the the 
Municipal Reform controlled L.C.C. 32 The Ministry of Health 
took a growing interest in the L.C.C. 's housing policy, and 
encouraged the L.C.C. to invest heavily in council housing.33 
Consequently, during Municipal Reform rule at County Hall the 
Council's powers increased and expenses rose. 34 There was 
little the L.M.S. could do to ensure cheaper, less centralized 
local government, and politics dictated that any criticism of 
the Municipal Reformers or of Conservative central governments 
had to be very limited. 
However, in 1934 Labour gained control of the L.C.C., never to 
lose control of the council during the rest of its existence. 
The Labour Leader of the L.C.C., Herbert Morrison, pursued a 
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policy of efficient and economical management coupled with a 
high level of publicity for such policies. 35 The L.M.S., 
however, was able to return to its traditional attacks on the 
L.C.C. for its centralist tendencies, its inefficiency and its 
alleged financing of unnecessary services or projects. The 
Munic ipal Reform and Conserva t i ve mani fes tos wri t ten by the 
L.M.S. for all the remaining L.C.C. elections repeat the same 
basic formula, that the Labour controlled L.C.C. was too 
expensive and too inefficient and much more power needed to be 
transferred from the L.C.C. to the Metropolitan boroughs.36 
Although the period of Municipal Reform control of the L.C.C. 
had failed to see structural or strategic changes in London 
government along the line hoped for by the L.M.S. it was a 
great disappointment to all Conservatives when their allies 
lost control of the council. 37 This disappointment was 
compounded three years later when they failed to regain 
control of the L.C.C. at the 1937 election.38 The Municipal 
Borough elections of that year were also disastrous from the 
L.M.S. point of view. 39 
In consequence the leader of the Conservative Party (the Prime 
Minister, Mr Neville Chamberlain) , working through the 
Conservative Party Central Office, established a committee 
under the Chairmanship of the prominent Member of Parliament, 
and former member of the L.C.C., Sir Kingsley Wood. 4o This 
Commi t tee was charged wi th the task of examining the 
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Conservative Parliamentary and local government election 
organization in London.41 Its primary aim was to identify any 
changes needed to allow the Conservative party or their close 
allies to regain control of local government in London.42 The 
report of this committee was not ready until early 1939. 43 As 
the primary Conservative organization in the London area the 
L.M.S. had received the most criticism after the two 
consecutive L.C.C. election defeats.44 The report, however, 
was careful to be constructive and to avoid too much 
cri ticism. Despi te this it did suggest there should be much 
closer cooperation between all Conservative organizations in 
London. 45 The report suggested that three members of the 
London Conservative Union, which was directly responsible to 
Conservative Party Central Office, and three Conservative 
M.P.'s representing London constituencies should be appointed 
to the Execu t i ve Commi t tee of the L. M. S. 46 This change was 
accepted by the Society, but not carried into effect until 
after the war.47 The major consequence of this change was to 
tie the L.M.S. into the Conservative Party system very 
closely. The loss of the elections and the subsequent enquiry 
also led to the growth of an air of failure in London 
Conservatism. 48 
Because of its position the L.M.S. could not escape from some 
of the blame for the failure to regain control of the L.C.C. 
After the second world war Conservative fortunes in London did 
not revive. The first post war L.C.C. election took place in 
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1946, and the Labour victory seems to have been expected, and 
thus was not seen as a major setback. 49 The 1949 L.C.C. 
elections resulted in the Conservatives, as the Municipal 
Reformers had become known since the 1946 election, taking 
more votes than Labour, but giving both main parties on the 
L.C.C. an equal number of Councillors. This enabled Labour, by 
the use of its existing Aldermen, to retain full control of 
the council. 5o It also allowed the blame for this Conservative 
failure to be pinned onto what was seen as Labour's shoddy 
behaviour. 51 Nonetheless, it was yet another setback, whatever 
the reason. The L.M.S. put a great deal of effort into the 
1952 L.C.C. election, seemingly convinced they could do better 
and actually win. 52 The result must have been a 
disappointment, since Labour regained much of the ground it 
had lost in 1949, and took a clear majority of the votes. The 
Conserva t i ves fai led to do app reciably bet ter in 1955, 1958 
and 1961. 53 The results alone suggested that nothing the 
L.M.S. could do would result in Conservative victory at an 
L.C.C. election, and this had occurred to some quite early 
on. 54 Within Conservative circles there was a growing call 
for radical changes in the size and nature of local government 
in London which began before the second world war. 
III 
A Royal Commission, the Ullswater Commission, had been 
appointed in 1921 in order to enquire into whether there 
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should be any changes in the area or the structure of local 
government in Greater London. 55 The L.M.S. was asked to give 
evidence to this Royal Commission, which the Society did, and 
it argued there was no need to change the structure of local 
government in Greater London. 56 However, it was not too many 
years before this point of view was being challenged wi thin 
the L.M.S. In January 1935 the Rev. A.G. Prichard, L.C.C. 
Municipal Reform member for West Islington, stated: "The time 
has arrived when Greater London should be brought within one 
co-ordinated London government. "57 Young quotes from a secret 
report of the London organization committee of the 
Conservative Party of June 1938, which shows the attractions 
of a major change in the nature of London government to the 
Conservatives, by that time in opposition on the L.C.C.: 
Suggestions have been made to us that there is a 
real case for an early examination of the present 
boundaries of London ... From a poli tical point of 
view witnesses have urged that with a larger London 
boundary which would include areas to which many 
middle-class residents of London have now moved our 
prospects would be much more favourable. 58 
The report goes on to discuss the possible repercussions of 
such a change: 
... it would involve many difficult questions and 
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might well mean prolonged controversy and 
oPPositions for localities who might not desire to 
be merged in a greater London, ... 59 
It might have been expected that one of the difficulties 
would be that in a new system the L.M.S. would lose its very 
raison d'etre: the nature of the society meant that no L.C.C. 
would, in all likelihood, have meant no L.M.S. Of course, a 
greater London authority if directly elected would need a 
Conservative organization covering the entire area, but the 
L. M. S. wi th its restricted aims and technical independence 
from Central Office would have found it virtually impossible 
to adapt enough to survive. However, the Society was tied to 
Central Office policies. and was in many respects a failure. 
I t lacked the abili ty to follow any other policy other than 
that supported by Central Office even if that meant the L.M.S. 
supporting policies that would inevi tably lead to its own 
demise. 
The L.M.S., and its close ally, the L.C.C. Municipal Reform or 
Conservative group, had to at least take account of, if not 
react to, the opinions of other bodies. There were many other 
organizations and individuals concerned about London and its 
government. In October 1942, an editorial in The Times called 
for local government reform to introduce regional 
authori ties. 60 In November 1942, Lord Kennet, Vice-President 
of the Association of Municipal Corporations (of which most 
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Metropolitan Boroughs were members) wrote of his 
organization's ideas concerning local government reform.6 1 In 
February 1943, the National Association of Local Government 
Officers published its ideas for the reform of local 
government, and this included large single tier authori ties 
which would have necessitated the breakup of the L.C.C.62 The 
Ratepayer, the L.M.S.' own journal, discussed this scheme and 
announced the disapproval of the L.M.S.63 In April 1943, a 
Labour Party conference debated the then future shape of local 
government. This also called for the introduction of regional 
authorities and would have led to the abolition of the 
L.C.C.64 In October 1943 the Conservative M.P. Geoffrey 
Hutchinson espoused his ideas for changes in the nature of 
London government which would have taken account of a 
perceived need for regional planning.65 Once again, The 
Ratepayer discussed several of the suggested plans of reform, 
and announced the L.M.S. was not convinced that any of them 
were entirely appropriate. 66 In May 1944, the National Liberal 
Party published a document setting out its view on local 
government. 57 In February 1945 an article in The Times 
discussed the need for change in the nature of London 
government, 68 and in December 1948 a Times editorial tackled 
the issue of the failings in local government. 69 In May 1950. 
the eminent academic and leading Fabian, Professor W.A. 
Robson, wrote to The Times calling for a dramatic change in 
the nature of London government. 70 In October 1950, in an 
editorial The Times put forward its own views on how to change 
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the system of local government in greater London, and called 
for a regional authori ty and larger district authorities in 
Greater London. 71 In February 1951, the former Chairman of the 
Local Government Boundary Commission, Sir Malcolm Tristram 
Eve, put forward his own views on what form of local 
government would best sui t Greater London, which would have 
led to the break up of the L.C.C. and an indirectly elected 
Greater London Authority.72 
There were many other organizations and individuals expressing 
views concerning local government reform, including reform of 
local government in London. The role of the L.M.S. as a 
conservative-minded 'think tank' on local government in London 
meant the Society collected the published views of other 
groups concerning London and had a duty to make available the 
Conservative view. 73 The L.M.S. probably took into account the 
views of others it had collected when formulating its own 
plans for local government in London. This Conservative 
approach needed to appeal to the voters of London, which meant 
persuading more than the traditional Conservative voters, who 
had been inadequate in number to return the Municipal 
Reformers or Conservatives to power, that a Conservative 
controlled county council was to their good. The L.M.S. needed 
to develop a view on local government in London which not only 
took account of traditional Conservative views of London 
government such as local control of expenditure and the need 
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for efficiency, but coupled this with an appeal to the voters 
capable of overturning the Labour domination of the L.C.C. 
In December 1946 The Ratepayer called for the development of a 
plan for the future structure of local government in London. 74 
A few years later in November 1950 the Executive Committee of 
the L.M.S. recognized that one of the Society's most urgent 
matters was to clarify its view concerning the most 
appropriate boundaries and the functions of local government 
units in greater London. 75 
In May 1952 a young Conservative M.P., J. Enoch Powell, was 
apPointed Director of the L.M.S.76 Powell developed a L.M.S. 
plan for the future local government of London. It became 
known as the Powell Plan and was completed shortly before the 
Royal Commission on London Government was appointed. This plan 
represented years of accumulated thought by the L.M.S., and 
years of accumulated outside influence upon the L.M.S. It 
fitted with the entrenched aims of the L.M.S. and fitted with 
many strands of Conservative thought throughout the country. 
The plan suggested the L.C.C. should be abolished and should 
be replaced by about seven new county boroughs, each wi th a 
population of about 450,000. Although these were larger than 
the Metropolitan Boroughs they were considerably smaller than 
the L.C.C. They would collect their own rates and were 
considered small enough to be in touch wi th the wishes of 
their own ratepayers. It was suggested that the boundaries of 
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the new county boroughs would be so arranged as to provide 
each wi th enough likely Conservative voters to give 
Conservatives a reasonable chance of winning control. The plan 
accepted there was a need for some form of regional co­
ordinating body which would control such London wide services 
as main drainage, the ambulance service, the fire brigade, and 
the planning of main roads. 77 
In January 1958 The Londoner (as The Ratepayer had been 
renamed) carried an article 'The L.C.C., London's Big 
Brother', and this reiterated the time-honoured views of the 
Society: 
The London County Council wi th its present powers 
is too large for local knowledge on the part of 
Councillors to mean much when proper decisions have 
to be made. On the other hand it is not big enough 
to provide any co-ordination either of sentiment or 
over-all services for London as a whole. These 
deficiencies have been apparent for years. The 
Government have now appointed a Royal Commission to 
consider the whole question. 78 
This makes it quite clear what position the L.M.S. would take 
when offering evidence to the Royal Commission, and a few 
months later the same journal carried a report detailing the 
evidence offered by the Society. The L .M. S. offered three 
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different plans. the first of which was the Powell plan as 
above. The second plan called for the amalgamation of the 
twenty-eight metropolitan boroughs into fifteen new 
authorities. The third suggestion was that the smaller 
metropolitan boroughs would be merged. This plan envisaged ten 
Boroughs being merged, but twelve would be unaffected. Despite 
offering three levels of radicalness or otherwise in boundary 
changes, the L.M.S. stuck firmly to its belief that there 
existed a need for a radical redistribution in the powers of 
each level of local government. It argued that the lower tier 
of local authori ty should become the primary uni t of local 
government and the upper tier nothing more than a strategic 
depository which only carried out those local government 
functions which the smaller units were totally unfit to manage 
efficiently. The society was, however, torn between the need 
to adhere to many decades of political rhetoric and the need 
to accept the inherent complexities of London government. 
Thus, it was sugges ted that al though the lower tier 
authori t les should be responsible for primary and secondary 
education, the strategic authority would need to be 
responsible for further and higher education.79 Also, that 
although the new boroughs should be responsible for health and 
welfare, they would not be large enough to run all aspects of 
these services alone and some boroughs would need to combine 
to provide some aspects of the health and welfare provisions 
required of a local authority.so The L.M.S. also recognized 
that planning would have to be in some manner shared by the 
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boroughs and the new strategic authority.81 Because the 
L.M.S. 's remit ran only to the boundaries of the 
Administrative County of London it was unable to offer any but 
very general comments on local government problems in the rest 
of Greater London, but felt there was a need for some form of 
regional co-ordination. 82 The L.M.S policies, if accepted, 
would have led to a new strategic authority for the whole of 
Greater London which would have had to be quite powerful, more 
powerful than much of the L.M.S. 's own rhetoric over the years 
would suggest it was entirely happy to accept. 
The L.C.C. Minority (Conservative) Group was also invited to 
submit evidence to the Royal Commission. Its evidence followed 
very closely that of the L.M.S. This is not surprising. When 
nine L.C.C. Conservative Councillors attended the Royal 
Commission in order to present their case, five were members 
of the L.M.S. Executive Committee. They included the Leader of 
the Conservative Group, Councillor Geoffrey Rippon and 
Conservative Chief Whip, Councillor Francis Bennett. 83 
When the report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in 
Greater London was published, the L.M.S. and the Conservative 
group on the L.C.C. expressed themselves happy with the 
recommendations. Sir Percy Rugg, the new Leader of the 
Conservative Group, and member of the L.M.S. Executive 
Committee, said he was happy with the report. 8 t) Sir Samuel 
Salmon, Chairman of the L.M.S., claimed he was pleased with 
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the report which closely followed L.M.S. advice. 85 However, 
many Conservatives outside London, but within Greater London, 
were far from pleased or happy, and vigorously attacked the 
report. The Conservative Chairman of Surrey County Council 
said: "I have no doubt Surrey County Council will oppose 
it. "86 Some Conservatives in London also disapproved of the 
report, particularly those wi th strong links to the smaller 
Metropolitan Boroughs likely to disappear under the report's 
proposals, such as Chelsea. 87 Thus, the L.M.S. and 
Conservative Group of the L.C.C. 's view of local government 
did not coincide wi th the at t i tude adopted by many 
Conservatives, but it did tally with the view taken by the 
Conservative Government. 
Following the publication of the Government's white paper 
concerning the reform of local government in Greater London 
Sir Percy Rugg said: 
I am sure, too, that the L.C.C. could not have 
withstood the strain of its present work very much 
longer .... The new boroughs will be able to carry out 
the local government work which is now to be 
entrusted to them far more effectively, economically 
and democratically than at present, while the 
Greater London Council will provide the overall co­
ordination increasingly necessary in some fields. ss 
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Once again many Conservatives in greater London failed to 
share the enthusiasm of the L.M.S., the L.C.C. Conservative 
Group and the Conservative Government. Councillor George 
Coulson, Conservative Leader of Middlesex County Council, 
claimed the new sys tern would be: " ... more costly and less 
efficient."B9 Sir Cyril Black, Conservative M.P. for Wimbledon 
and a member of Surrey County Council, said he was: "Confident 
that the proposals will in the main be unacceptable to Surrey 
County Council."90 Alderman Ripley, Chairman of Surrey County 
Council, expressed his regret that the Government had not 
accepted the alternative plan put forward by the counties. sl 
Chapter seventeen of the Royal Commission's report recommended 
the creation of fifty-two new London boroughs, but the 
Government's white paper had reduced this to thirty-four (both 
figures exclude the City of London, whose status and functions 
changed but little). Consequently, the old metropolitan 
boroughs were to be merged into much larger units with a high 
level of lost identity as old names were set to disappear from 
the local government map and town halls were earmarked to lose 
their status, leaving many Conservatives in London 
disappointed and dispirited. For example, the Royal 
Commission's proposals would have allowed the Metropolitan 
Borough of Battersea to retain its identity, but the 
Government's reduction in the number of new London boroughs 
threatened Battersea with becoming part of neighbouring 
Wandsworth. 92 The minority Conservative group on Battersea 
Council had supported the L.M. S. view while the future of 
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Battersea Council seemed secure. When faced with the threat of 
abolition it joined forces with the ruling Labour group of the 
Council to oppose the Government's whi te paper. I t wrote to 
the Conservative Party Central Office expressing its new found 
opposition. 93 
The L.M.S. and the Conservative Group of the L.C.C. offered 
loyal support to the Conserva t i ve Governrnen t. This was not 
enough, however, to break down the opposition of Conservatives 
beyond the County of London to being incorporated in a Greater 
London area, whether that area was called a county or a 
region, or left imprecise, as was the case. 94 The L.M.S. was 
not in a position to claim for itself the role of the 
Conservative voice in Greater London, although the surviving 
L.M.S. records give no indication this was ever their wish. 95 
Despite its support for the Government position the L.M.S. and 
Conservative Group of the L.C.C. were not always successful in 
their relationship with the Government. Before the 
introduction of the London Government Bill in late 1962, the 
L.M.S. attempted to change one aspect of the Government's 
plans, that of the creation of a special inner London 
education authority catering for the educational needs of 
about two million people. 96 Mrs Townsend, opposition leader on 
the L.C.C. 's Education Committee, wanted the new inner London 
boroughs to be education authorities like the new outer London 
boroughs. 97 However, the L.M.S. was unsuccessful, and failed 
to change the Government's positIon regarding education. 
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Following the introduction of the London Government Bill in 
1962 the L.M.S. had no role left to play. 
Immedia tely following publication of the Royal Commission' s 
report in October 1960, Sir Toby Low, Deputy Chairman of the 
Party Organization, chaired a Commi ttee of all Conservative 
organizations in the review area. This committee, however, was 
unable to come to any decisions regarding future Conservative 
Party organization in Greater London until the Government's 
proposals regarding reform of London government were known. 
Immediately following the publication of the Government's 
white paper, a further Committee, Chaired by Sir Eric Edwards 
of the National Conservative Union, was convened to decide on 
future Conservative organization in Greater London. Sir Percy 
Rugg of the L.C.C. and Samuel Salmon of the L.M.S. were 
members of this committee. It decided in favour of a 
conventional area organization under Central Office control 
and such an organization was operational by October 1963. 98 At 
the same time the L.M.S. voluntarily wound up its affairs, 
although Ken Young has claimed that not all senior members of 
the L.M.S. were happy at this and there were some attempts to 
perpetuate the Society.99 
IV 
The Conservatives failed to win the G.L.C. election in April 
1964 and won only thirty-six seats. 100 Al though some of the 
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former leaders of the L.M.S and L.C.C. Conservative group such 
as Sir Percy Rugg were members of the new council, many of the 
new leading Conserva tives were from outs ide the old 
Administrative County of London. Sidney Ripley, formerly 
Chairman of Surrey County Council, and Horace Cutler, formerly 
Chai rman of Middlesex County Council, were among the senior 
Conservatives influencing party policy at County Hall. When 
Sir Percy Rugg resigned from the leadership of the 
Conservative group in 1966 he was replaced by another former 
member of the Executive Committee of the L.M.S. and former 
member of the L.C.C., Desmond Plummer. Plummer, however, was 
no ideologue. Plummer claimed the L.M.S.' long standing views 
on London government had little effect on his pragmatic 
approach to local government. lOl 
In April 1967 the Conservatives won control of the G.L.C. with 
a majority of sixty-four. 102 As Leader of the G.L.C. Plummer 
was primarily concerned with the good running of the 
G.L.C.,103 even if the cost was the abandonment of long held 
principles of the L.M.S., which the L.M.S. had apparently felt 
were enshrined in the London Government Act, 1963. Plummer had 
called the G.L.C. virtually a regional government ,1 04 and he 
had called for a London Ombudsman to deal with the complaints 
of Londoners. 105 He also called for a London traffic 
'overlord' who would be responsible for London Transport, 
British Rail within greater London, traffic control and police 
enforcement. and wanted the G.L.C. to investigate the idea. I06 
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Once in power Plummer was persuaded by Barbara Castle, the 
Minister of Transport, that the G.L.C. should take control of 
London Transport. lO 7 Plummer and his new Conservatives did 
little to challenge the general style of regional government 
which the Labour Governments of 1964 70 and the Labour 
controlled G.L.C. of 1964 - 67 had managed to infuse into the 
G. L . C. 's rem it. lOB Plummer and his allies were able to talk 
about efficiency, and did actually make headway with 
transferring the G.L.C. 's housing stock to the new 
boroughs, I 09 but their administration continued to allow the 
G. L. C. to develop into a very large, very powerful regional 
government rather than a small scale strategic authority which 
the L.M.S. and the Royal Commission had envisaged. 
v 
The stance taken by both the Conservative Group of the L.C.C. 
and the L.M.S. towards the nature of local government in 
Greater London seem to have been logical. However, many other 
Conservative organizations in greater London opposed the 
reorganization. The L.M.S. itself had defended the status quo 
in 1923. and perhaps if the L.M.S. had been less concerned 
about retaining the goodwill of Conservative Party Central 
Office, the Society might not have been so opposed to all 
attempts to save the L.C.C., especially as we have seen some 
Conserva t i ves wi thin the County of London, such as those in 
Battersea and Desmond Plummer, were quite pragmatic and often 
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prepared to perpetuate policies contrary to the general aims 
of the L.M.S. For the L.M.S. to support the continued 
existence of the L.C.C., however, the Society would have had 
to accept that Conserva t i ves were likely to remain 
perpetually in opposition on the Council, or that a dramatic 
change in the structure or attitudes of London voters would, 
at some future date, allow the Conservatives to win back 
control of the L.C.C. It seems unlikely any political group in 
the position of the L.M.S. could have accepted either 
proposition. It seems likely that the Conservatives in London, 
unlike their colleagues in many other parts of Greater London 
could see no other chance of power other than through the 
abolition of both their county council and their own political 
organiza t ion. Thus, wi th the logical support of the L. M. S. , 
the Conservative Party was able to force through radical 
changes which remained unpopular in many quarters including in 
many Tory groups. As chapter eight will show, the loyalty of 
some Conservatives in the smaller Metropolitan Boroughs were 
strained by the process that forced them into mergers with 
larger neighbours. 
Nonetheless if the L.M.S. had been able to follow a similar 
line to the Conservatives in Surrey and Kent, who fought hard 
to retain the existing local government system in Greater 
London with the addition of a non-elected planning board for 
Greater London, the consequences could have been substantial. 
There might have been a far less radical reform of local 
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government in Greater London. Perhaps a series of individual 
ad hoc changes to deal wi th individual problems could have 
left the county council system as it existed in 1963, wi th 
Greater London having five county councils. While 
Conservatives in areas such as metropoli tan Surrey and Kent 
saw the G. L. C. as a threat, 110 many in the County of London 
saw the transition in London government as a means to regain 
power. It was logical for such Conservatives to wish to see 
the end of the L.C.C., and their support may have been the 
essential factor which allowed the Conservative Government to 
impose the new system. 
-231­
NOTES 

• 
1/ Chapter Two above, p.46 ff. 
2/ Young, K. 'Political Party Organization' in Rhodes, G. (ed) 
The New Government of London; The First Five years (London, 
London School of Economics & Political Science and Weidenfield 
& Nicolson, 1972) p.21. 
3/ Ibid. 
4/ Ibid. 
5/ Chapter Two above, pp.47-9. 
6/ Young op. cit, pp. 23-27. 
7/ Jones, H. 'Conservatives and the L.C.C. after 1934', in 
Saint, A. (ed.) Politics and the People of London, The London 
County Council 1889-1965 (London. the Hambledon Press, 1989). 
8/ Bodleian Library, Oxford, Conservative Party Central Office 
archive, files CCO 4/6/236, CCO 4/7/262, CCO 4/8/240, CCO 
4/8/241 all regarding L.C.C. elections; files ceo 3/2/113, CCO 
3/3/94. CCO 3/4/76 correspondence with L.M.S. 
-232­
9/ Bodleian Library, Oxford, Conservative Party Central Office 
archive, files CCO 3/2/113, ceo 3/3/94, CCO 3/4/76 
correspondence with L.M.S. Guildhall Library, London, London 
Municipal Society archive, file MS 19527 Council Minutes, file 
MS 19528 Executive Committee Minutes. 
10/ Bodleian Library, Oxford, Conservative Party Central 
Off ice archive, files CCO 4/6/236, ceo 4/7/262, ceo 4/8/240, 
CCO 4/8/241 L.C.C. elections; files CCO 3/2/113, CCO 3/3/94, 
ceo 3/4/76 correspondence with L.M.S. 
11/ Bodleian Library, Oxford, Conservative Party Central 
Office archive, files ceo 3/2/113, CCO 3/3/94, CCO 3/4/76 
correspondence with L.M.S.; file CCO 4/8/227 Local Government, 
Area A. 
12/ Bodleian Library, Oxford, Conservative Party Central 
Office archive, files CCO 4/6/236. ceo 4/7/262, CCO 4/8/240, 
ceo 4/8/241 L.C.C. elections; files CCO 3/2/113, ceo 3/3/94, 
CCO 3/4/76 correspondence with L.M.S. Guildhall Library, 
London, London Municipal Society archive, file MS 19527 
Council Minutes, file MS 19528 Executive Coromi ttee Minutes; 
private conversation with Mr J. Enoch Powell, a former 
Director of the L.M.S., 6.10.93. 
13/ Private conversation with Enoch Powell, op. cit. 
-233­
• 
14/ Nearly all L.C.C. seats were contested by at least the 
Conservatives and Labour in the post-war period. See L.C.C. 
election results in The Times 8.3.46 p.4, 9.4.49 p.4, 5.4.52 
p.4, 25.4.55 p.8, 17.4.58 p.5, 15.4.61 p.6. 
15/ Guildhall Library, London, London Municipal Society 
archive, file MS 19528 vol.3 Executive Committee Minutes 
25.11.37. (The scheduled L.C.C. elections of 1940 were delayed 
until after the war.) 
16/ Bodleian Library, Oxford. Conservative Party Central 
Office archive, files CCO 4/6/236, CCO 4/7/262, CCO 4/8/240, 
eco 4/8/241 L.C.C. elections. 
17/ Ibid. 
18/ Ibid. 
19/ This pOint is demonstrated by the L.M.S.' representatives 
on the Conservative Party Central Office's National Advisory 
Committee on Local Government. See Bodleian Library, Oxford, 
Conservative Party Central Office archive, files CCO 4/6/48, 
ceo 4/7/63, and CCO 4/8/40. 
20/ Chapter Two above, pp.47-9. 
-234­
• 

21/ The London Municipal Society, The London Municipal Society 
(London, London Municipal society, 1954) p.29. 
22/ Ibid 
23/ Ibid, p.31, 794 Councillors from a total of 1,362. 
24/ Young, K. & Garside, P. Metropolitan London: Politics and 
Urban Change 1837-1981, (London, Edward Arnold, 1982) pp.l00­
101 
25/ The London Municipal Society, op. cit. pp.11-12 
26/ Private conversation with Enoch Powell, 6.10.93. As 
Director of the L.M.S. 1952-56, Powell had been responsible 
for the research and writing of the 1954 L.M.S. History of 
the Society, although not accredited as author, Powell remains 
an expert on the history of the L.M.S. 
27/ Ibid. 
28/ Young, K. Local Politics and the Rise of Party; The London 
Municipal Society and the Conservative Intervention in Local 
Elections 1894 - 1963 (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 
1975). 
29/ Ibid. 
-235­
30/ Guildhall Library, London, London Municipal Society 
archive, file MS 19528 Executive Committee Minutes. 
31/ Davis, J. Reforming London; The London Government Problem 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) p.l03 passim. 
32/ Chapter Three above, pp.78-9; Gibbon, G. & Bell, R.W. 
~H~i~s~t~o~r~y~~o~f~~t~h~e~~L~o~n~d~o~n~~C~o~u~n~t~y__~C~o~u~n~c~i~1~_~1~8~8~9~__~1~9~3~9 (London, 
Macmillan, 1939); Jackson, W.E. Achievement. A Short History 
of the London Cou~Council, (London, Longmans, 1965). 
33/ Young, K. & Garside, P. op. cit. pp. 105-218. 
34/ The total expenditure of the Council was 38s per head in 
1905-06. This had risen to 170s 4d per head in 1930-31, of 
which 44s 7d was in respect of services transferred to the 
Council in 1930. Gibbon. G. & Bell, R.W. History of the London 
County Council 1889 - 1939 (London. Macmillan. 1939) p.183. 
35/ See Donoughue, B. & Jones, G.W. Herbert Morrison; Portrait 
of a Politician (London, Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1973) pp.192, 
207-8. 
36/ See The Ratepayer Febru~ry 1934, February 1937; The Times 
2.2.46 p.2, 3.2.49 p.4. 18.3.52, p.3, 17.3.55 p.4. 
-236­
a 
37/ This can be seen in the Guildhall Library, London, London 
Municipal Society archive. file MS 19527 Minutes of the 
Council, file MS 19528 Minutes of the Executive Committee; 
Also The Ratepayer, journal of the L.M.S. 
38/ Ibid. 
39/ Ibid. 
40/ Guildhall Library, London, London Municipal Society 
archive, file MS 19528 Minutes of the Executive Committee 
25.11.37 & 14.2.38. 
41/ Ibid. 
42/ Young. K. 'The Conservat i ve St ra tegy for London 1855 ­
1975.' in The London Journal, vol.l, May 1975 pp.56-81. 
43/ For details of the report and the L.M.S' initial reaction 
see Guildhall Library, London, London Municipal Society 
archive, file MS 19528 Minutes of the executive Committee 
23.2.39. 
44/ Young, 'The Conservative Strategy for London.' OPe cit. 
p.75. 
-237­
45/ For details of the report and the L.M.S' initial reaction 
see Guildhall Library, London, London Municipal Society 
archive. file MS 19528 Minutes of the executive Committee 
23.2.39. 
46/ Ibid. 
47/ Ibid. 
48/ Guildhall Library, London, London Municipal Society 
archive, file MS 19528 Minutes of the Executive Committee 
7.11.45 contains a comment that Labour was likely to be in 
power for a very long time. 
49/ The Ratepayer, April 1946, p.938, points out the results 
were not as good for Labour as the most optimistic Labour 
predictions, and represented a decline in Labour support 
compared with the 1945 general election. 
50/ Jackson, W.E. Achievement; A Short History of the London 
County Council (London, Longmans, 1965) p.54 
511 The Times 13.4.49 p.4 Henry Brooke, leader of the 
Conservative group at County Hall called Labour's tactics 
"politically immoral." 
-238­
z 
52/ L.C.C. Elections; April 1952, Campaign Guide, issued by 
the L.M.S., written by the Director, lain Macleod, M.P. This 
guide makes the claim that the Conservatives could win the 
1952 L.C.C. election. Also London County Council, 
Conservative Members Report of and Papers Relating to Study 
Conservat~ve L.C.C. Policy, Appointed by Mr Henry Brooke, in 
March 1951, (unpublished document, copy stored at Greater 
London Record Of f ice. Library). This document evalua ted each 
L.C.C. service and suggested the most appropriate Conservative 
response to each service. The explicit aim of the document was 
to make the Conservative campaign for the 1952 L.C.C. election 
the best possible campaign. 
53/ For full election details see The Times 9.4.49 p.4, 5.4.52 
p.4, 25.4.55 p.8, 17.4.58 p.5, 15.4.61 p.6. 
54/ See this Chapter pp.211-5 above. 
55/ Chapter Three above, pp.65-8. 
56/ Young, K. 'The Conservative Strategy for London 1855­
1975.' in The London Journal, vol. 1, May 1975, p.68. 
57/ The Ratepayer, January 1935, p.2S. 
58/ Young, 'The Conservative Strategy' op. cit. p.75. 
-239­
59/ Ibid. 
60/ The Times, 8.11.42, p.5. 
61/ Ibid, 17.11.42, p.5. 
62/ Ibid, 3.2.43, p.2. 
63/ The Ratepayer, March 1943, p.573. 
64/ The Times, 13.4.43, p.8. 
65/ Ibid, 27.10.43, p.S. 
66/ The Ratepayer, March 1944, p.573. 
67/ The Times, 1.5.44, p.S. 
68/ Ibid, 15.2.45, p.5. 
69/ Ibid, 30.12.48, p.5. 
70/ Ibid, 23.5.50, p.5. 
71/ Ibid, 31.10.50, p.5. 
72/ Ibid, 7.2.51, p.3. 
-240­
73/ The London Municipal Society. op. cit. pp. 13-16, explains 
the L.M.S.· role as a library and centre of Conservative 
thought concerning London. 
74/ The Ratepayer, December 1946, p.l059. 
75/ Guildhall Library, London, London Municipal Society 
archive, file MS 19528 Minutes of the Executive Committee, 
8.11.50. 
76/ Ibid, 26.5.52. 
77/ Young & Garside, op. cit. p.292. Also private conversation 
with J. Enoch Powell, 6.10.93. 
78/ The Londoner, January 1958, p.8. 
79/ Ibid, July 1958, p.117. 
80/ Ibid. 
81/ Ibid. 
82/ Ibid. 
83/ Royal Commission on London Government in Greater London, 
Minutes of Evidence, (London, H.M.S.O., 1959), Evidence of 
-241­
London County Council Minority Group, qq 11923 - 12048. Also 
London Municipal Society archive, file 19526 Minutes of the 
Annual General Meeting 1958 & 1959. 
84/ Evening Standard, 19.10.60, p.6. 
85/ Ibid. 
86/ Ibid. Also, see Chapter Seven pp.261-66, below. 
87/ Chapter Eight pp.298-9, below. 
88/ The Times, 30.11.61, p.6. 
89/ Evening Standard, 30.11.61, p.11. 
90/ Ibid. 
91/ Ibid. Also, see Chapter Seven below. 
92/ Rhodes, G. The Government of London; The Struggle for 
Reform (London. London School of Economics & Political Science 
and Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1970) p.256. 
93/ 'A Report on the Government Proposals by the Conservative 
Minority Group, Battersea Metropolitan Borough Council, March 
1962', in Bodleian Library, Oxford, Conservative Party Central 
-242­
Office archive, file CCO 4/9/45 Royal Commission on Local 
Government in Greater London. 
94/ Young & Garside, op. ci t. pp. 312 - 314, but also p. 105 
ff., for history of Conservative opposi tion to inclusion in 
Greater London. 
95/Though it should be noted that the London Municipal 
Society's records contain several gaps. 
96/ Chapter Four above, pp.135-9, and Chapter Nine pp.356-7, 
below. 
97/ The Times, 22.2.62, p.4. 
98/ Young, K. 'Political Party Organization' in Rhodes, G. 
(ed) Th~e~~N~e~w~~G~o~v~e~r~n~m~e~n~t~~o~f__=L~o~n~d~o~n~:~.~T~h~e~~F~l~'r~s~t~~F~l~'v~e=-_Y~e=a~r~s 
(London, London School of Economics & Poli tical Science and 
Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1972) pp.23-27. 
99/ Ibid. also Young, K. Local Politics and the Rise of Party; 
The London Municipal Society and the Conservative Intervention 
in Local Elect ions 1894 1963 (Leices ter. Le ices ter 
University Press, 1975) 
100/ Evening Standard 10.4.61, p.l. 
-243­
101/ Private conversation with Lord Plummer. 16.8.94. 
102/ Evening Standard. 14.4.67, p.18. 
103/ This can be seen in Plummer's paper The Londoner and His 
Environment, (copy at Greater London Record Office, 
Library) ,presented at a conference of leaders of the capitals 
of Europe in Budapest 26 - 28.9.72. 
104/ Evening Standard, 5.7.65, p.ll. 
105/ Ibid. 28.9.66, p.20. 
106/ Ibid. 10.11.66, p.ll. 
107/ Castle, B. The Castle Diaries. 1964-70 (London, 
Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1984) pp. 273, 286, 296, 336. 
108/ Chapter Nine below. 
109/ G.L.C. Minutes, 5.12.67. 
110/ Chapter Seven below, pp.260, passim. 
-244­
Chapter Seven 
The counties and the 'Surrey Plan' 
I 
The review area of the Royal Commission on Local Government in 
Greater London included two complete counties, London and 
Middlesex, and parts of four other counties, Surrey, 
Hert fordshi re, Essex and Kent. I t also inc luded three county 
boroughs, East Ham, West Ham and Croydon. Although this work is 
concerned with the politics behind the abolition of the L.C.C. 
this is inextricably linked to the creation of the G.L.C. and 
since the G.L.C. incorporated more than just the L.C.C., this 
work must take these other areas into account. 
This chapter explains how and why the L. C. C. fought against 
the process that led to the transition in London government. It 
shows how London co-operated with its neighbouring councils in 
the campaign to avoid radical changes to the local government 
system in Greater London. It will explain why their alternative 
less radical plan failed to win any support outside the 
counties and county boroughs within the review area. This 
chapter then moves on to examine why the other upper-tier 
authorities in Greater London were opposed to major change, but 
one-by-one abandoned their opposition to the new local 
government system before the L.C.C. accepted the inevitability 
of the reforms. 
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Although the nine counties or county boroughs all had slightly 
different views and different strategies there is one idea, an 
alternative plan to that offered by the Royal Commission, that 
linked the majority together. This plan was that the existing 
counties and county boroughs should be left in place, but that 
some of their powers and functions, which could be more 
effectively exercised over a wider region, should be 
transferred to a regional planning board. Surrey County Council 
suggested such as board to the Royal Commission and suggested 
what powers and functions the board might have.! Hence the 
adoption, at the time, of the title 'the Surrey Plan' for this 
alternative. Surrey suggested it should be a joint planning 
board whose members were appointed by the planning authorities 
in a larger Greater London Region. 2 As Peter Hall has pointed 
out, town and country planning is an ill-defined function, 
which can incorporate many activities from slum clearance, 
building new roads, regulating industry and employers to 
planning and building entirely new towns. 3 Consequently, a 
joint planning board could have meant slightly different things 
to each council sponsoring the idea, but the flexibility 
allowed the idea to gather support. This superficial uni ty 
among the majority of affected county councils allowed 
influential local government politicians such as Alderman Sir 
Cyril Black, M.P. of Surrey County Council, and Alderman Sir 
Isaac Hayward of the L.C.C., to present a united opposition to 
the Royal Commission's proposals. 
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The 'Surrey Plan' was also able to gather support because there 
had been two similar bodies in existence before. They had not 
encroached on the powers or the dignity of the county councils 
because they lacked any real power. In 1921 Neville 
Chamberlain, as Minister of Health. had created the Greater 
London Regional Planning Committee. All the planning 
authorities in Greater London were represented on this 
committee. but it was wound up in 1931.4 However, the Standing 
Conference on London Regional Planning was established in 
October 1937, and once again all the planning authori ties in 
Grea ter London were represented. 5 I t was this Standing 
Conference which the Minister of Health asked to consider how 
best to produce a regional development plan for Greater London 
from which developed Abercrombie's Greater London Plan, 1944. 6 
There were some suggestions that such a standing conference be 
given some executive powers.7 
Despite the appeal of the idea of a joint planning board as a 
means of survival for the county councils there was little co­
ordination between the councils. There remained many 
differences among the county councils, and one, Hertfordshire, 
even refused to accept that a joint planning board was needed 
in its own area. Consequently, this chapter concentrates on 
each county separately. 
Although much has been said about the L.C.C. in previous 
chapters the first section of this chapter treats the L.C.C. as 
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a single entity with less emphasis on the role of party 
politics. 
I I 
The L.C.C opposed the transition in London government. This is 
not surprising for the process threatened the end of the L.C.C. 
This opposition lasted from the announcement of the Royal 
Commission until after the London Government Bill gained the 
Royal Assent in July 1963. It took various forms. The Council 
sought to explain its reasons for opposition, it sought to 
justify its continued existence, it sought to rally all 
opposition, and it sought to engender alternative plans of 
reform that would save the L.C.C. 
The L.C.C. provided both written and oral evidence to the Royal 
Commission, and on both occasions explained in detail why the 
L.C.C. and Metropolitan Boroughs as then constituted provided 
the County of London with an efficient and thorough local 
government system.8 The L.C.C. refused to consider Greater 
London as a whole in any detail. The written evidence amounted 
to eighteen pages, yet offered no advice to the Royal 
Commission on matters beyond the boundary of the County of 
London. Similarly the oral evidence offered no comments on 
matters beyond the L.C.C.'s boundary, even when the Leader of 
the Council was drawn on this point by the Chairman of the 
Royal Commission. 9 While presenting the above evidence, 
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however, the Leader of the Council was forced to concede that 
if a system of local government for Greater London were to be 
designed de novo it would not be the system as it existed.io 
This concession by the L.C.C. that the system was not perfect 
was compounded by the evidence presented by the Council's 
minority group, once again, both written and oral. The 
Conservative opposition was the only county council opposition 
group asked to provide oral evidence. This may have been 
because the 1. C. C. was the only county council wi thin the 
review area that failed to achieve a reasonable level of 
unanimity between the controlling political group and 
opposition groups. The evidence provided by the minority group 
did not seek to discredit the L.C.C. entirely, it merely 
suggested that the system was outdated and no longer as 
efficient as possible. It suggested that the L.C.C. was by that 
date an inappropriate size and poorly constituted for many of 
the functions it undertook. 11 
This lack of unanimity within the L.C.C. may have damaged its 
fight to defend its own vested interests, but the fight 
continued after the publication of the Royal Commission's 
report in October 1960. The Evening Standard reported Sir Isaac 
Hayward, Leader of the L.C.C., as opposing the proposals within 
the report while in the same article the leader of the 
Conservative opposition, Sir Percy Rugg, expressed his 
satisfaction with it.12 
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Following the publication of the report the L. C. C .. s General 
Purposes, Education, and Finance Committees issued their own 
reports upon the likely implications of the proposed reforms 
for Londoners, both as users of local government services and 
as ratepayers. Much 0 f the work on these reports had been 
undertaken by various officers of the L.C.C., but the final 
reports were the responsibility of each Committee, each 
controlled by the majori ty party on the Council. The 
implication in each of the reports was that the outcome of any 
reform based on the Royal Commission's recommendations would 
lead to Londoners experiencing a lower standard of local 
government services to those they had been used to. As was 
normal procedure the reports were debated in full chamber by 
the L.C.C. in February 1961.13 This process produced no change 
in the L.C.C. position. The majority group was able to impose 
its will, and the minority group continued to demand acceptance 
of the proposed reforms. However. the detailed nature of the 
criticisms within the L.C.C. 's own reports did enhance the 
process in as much as some of the technical problems involved 
with the introduction of a new local government system were 
brought into the public arena. In the council chamber, in the 
press and in other areas of political debate, the 
technicalities of the process of transition were often used as 
ammunition in political debate. 14 Technical points were often 
used to support very general principles. Yet behind the 
poli tical use of technical problems officers worked hard to 
ensure services remained thorough and efficient even during the 
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last stages in the process of transition. This can best be seen 
in the records of the M.B.S.J.C. which show that from 1961 
L.C.C. and Metropolitan Borough officers worked hard on 
identifying the implications of the reforms and on ensuring as 
Ii t tIe disruption as possible to local government services. 1 5 
The records contain numerous reports of various joint working 
parties of L.C.C. and M.B.S.J.C. officers. These detail how the 
transition was achieved without a major breakdown in any local 
government service. They pinpoint problems and how these 
problems were overcome. Some of the reports are minuscule in 
their detail and highly technical. It is hardly surprising that 
only selective pieces of this information impinged on the 
political debate. Local government politicians put in motion 
this process of joint working parties, and retained a right to 
interfere in the process, while still continuing to oppose 
reform. Nonetheless, all the work of local government employees 
during the process of change proved that a smooth transition 
could be achieved and the new system could be made to work. The 
L. C. C. was unable to use any of the technical information at 
its disposal to prove conclusively that the proposed reforms 
would not work. This was particularly so after the government's 
concessions of 1962. 
Following the L. C. C. debate, in February 1961, and the formal 
re-confirmation of the L.C.C. 's opposition to any major change 
in the local government structure. there were few debates on 
the topic. This did not impinge on the campaigning of L.C.C. 
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poli ticians of both parties outside the council chamber as 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Following the publication 
of the Government's white paper, London Government: Government 
Proposals for Reorganization, the Leader of the Council 
announced: "The L.C.C. cannot do otherwise than continue to 
oppose a scheme which it believes to be fundamentally 
unsound."l6 The minority group also maintained its usual 
stance. 17 
Once again the L.C.C. machinery took some time to consider the 
white paper and to produce a long, closely argued case against 
the Government's proposals. The General Purposes Committee 
offered few new points in its report, but it was able to point 
out for the first time, due to the release of more Government 
proposals, that the G.L.C. would have 110 councillors to 
represent a population of eight million, creating the largest 
local government constituencies in Britain (each councillor 
would represent 73,000 residents) .18 The report also gave 
support to the idea of a Joint Planning Board. It condemned the 
proposed G.L.C. as too large to be a local government body yet 
too small to be a proper regional government and the new 
boroughs for being too large and remote from many communities. 
I t also went on to detail the adverse effect the proposed 
reforms would have on all the functions undertaken by the 
L.C.C. The report and the criticisms contained therein were 
debated by the L.C.C. The official recommendation of the L.C.C. 
Leadership that opposition continue was accepted by the full 
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Council with the majority and minority parties voting according 
to their existing views. The L.C.C. document actually voted 
upon was an eight point summary of the criticisms recorded in 
the report. So the L.C.C. 's formal position was both negative, 
in as much as it condemned various points in the government's 
white paper, and positive in as much as it offered alternatives 
based on the retention of the L. C. C. I t is not necessary to 
reproduce all eight points in order to demonstrate that the 
political debate was only partially connected to the 
technicali ties of providing a local government service. Point 
five claimed: 
The fundamental planning and transport problems 
springing from the area around London, of which the 
Grea ter London area is only a part, are not met by 
the establishment of a Greater London Council, which 
moreover appears unlikely to be able to function 
authoritatively or to command the interest of the 
electorate; ... 19 
It is not possible to detect how much of the above point was 
produced by officers of the L.C.C. and how much by politicians. 
It contained broad principles, such as the arguement that the 
Greater London area was too small and that the new Council 
would not engender public support, not an analysis of why the 
proposals would not work. Because the L.C.C. 's process of 
opposition to change was a political campaign with some 
technical input, not the reverse, long technical arguments were 
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large ly expunged from the cut t ing edge of the campaign. The 
majority party's Policy Committee had decided that the 
Council's officers would not be allowed to produce a detailed 
critique of the white paper's proposals because the officers' 
arguments could be countered by the opposition, who would then 
be in a position to seek other expert opinions to demonstrate 
that the proposed system would work.20 
In place of detailed technical argument the majori ty party 
sought other means to defend the L.C.C. The majority party's 
Policy Commi t tee at tempted to manipulate the Council meeting 
which was to discuss the L.C.C. 's response to the white paper. 
I t arranged a large number of speeches from the Labour Group 
and gave adequate time to the opposition to respond. As 
planned. this led to the longest sitting of the full Council in 
its history. The committee hoped this would create a great deal 
of publicity for its cause. 21 The meeting did create publicity 
- the Evening Standard reported "Tempers rise as L.C.C. debates 
its future." 2 2 The Evening Standard had supported the Royal 
Commission's recommendations and the white paper's proposals. 23 
L.C.C. publicity, however, did little to change the pre­
existing views in the Evening Standard, or elsewhere. The 
L.C.C. 's stunt and the display of passionately held beliefs and 
bad tempers did Ii ttle to change opinions. or to save the 
L.C.C. from abolition. 
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After the points had been carried, and adopted as official 
L.C.C. policy, a copy was sent to the Minister of Housing and 
Local Government and to the Prime Minister with a request that 
the Prime Minister receive a deputation from the L.C.C. This 
was to allow the Council to explain its stance and to ask the 
Government to reconsider its position. The Prime Minister 
agreed to see a deputation from the L.C.C. The meeting of the 
Prime Minister and Minister of Housing and Local Government 
with the deputation from the L.C.C. took place on 6 April 1962, 
but on the Government's side there was no intention of 
negotiation or any intention to act upon any of the L.C.C.'s 
proposals. 2 <1 The meeting allowed both sides to be seen to be 
consulting and discussing the issues, and it allowed both sides 
to gain publicity for their respective causes. The Government 
hoped to break down the L.C.C. 's opposition, at least 
partially. The Ministry of Housing and Local Government advised 
the Prime Minister to meet with the delegation from the L.C.C. 
and argued: 
The Ruling party in the L.C.C. need to be told very 
sharply that their attitude towards this business has 
been ignominious from the start and says little for 
their sense of responsibility towards local 
government in general or London in particular. They 
pretend that the proposals for reorganization are a 
political manoeuvre to get rid of the Labour 
controlled L.C.C .... They refused to co-operate with 
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the Royal Commission, thus refusing to help in 
arriving at the best solution; and now their tune is 
simply that we should ignore the facts of history and 
leave them alone. 
It is possible that if they were told roundly how 
their attitude will look to posterity they might 
become more reasonable; and though they have 
unfortunately committed themselves publicly to a 
stupid and irresponsible line they might be persuaded 
to think again.25 
It is not known what exactly the Prime Minister and the 
delegation from the L.C.C. discussed, but the meeting produced 
no consensus. The meeting was followed by a formal exchange of 
letters between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the L.C.C. 
Neither letter expressed any change of attitude by the 
Government or the L.C.C.26 After this rebuff by the Government 
the L.C.C. continued its campaign for survival in exactly the 
same manner. The L.C.C. requested a further delegation be 
received by the Prime Minister, but this time their request was 
turned down. In its advice to the Prime Minister regarding this 
request, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government stated: 
The Minister feels sure that the Prime Minister can 
very reasonably refuse to receive another delegation. 
This is not a question where there is some small 
difference in outlook which might be bridged by 
further discussion. The London County Council wou1d 
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. , 
be content with nothing less than the abandonment of 
the Government's policy.27 
The above view from the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government proved correct. and the official view of the L.C.C. 
did not change. Yet the Prime Minister's refusal to meet the 
L.C.C. a second time added further evidence for the L.C.C., and 
anyone else interested, that the Government was going to press 
ahead wi th its plans. A short while later, in July 1962, the 
L.C.C. received a request from the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government that officers of the Council be allowed to 
provide the Ministry with information to aid the reorganization 
of local government in Greater London. 28 At the same time the 
Ministry invited the L.C.C.: 
... to be represented on a working party and in 
consultations between the Ministry and interested 
authorities on the general principles which should be 
adopted on a number of questions in forming 
legislation to bring about the proposed 
reorganization. 29 
In July 1962 the L.C.C. voted against taking up its place on 
the Ministry's working party.30 Thus, the L.C.C. refused its 
final chance to influence the details of the London Government 
Bill then in the process of being prepared for Parliament. 
However, as a concession to the growing awareness of the 
inevitability of radical change, the L.C.C. allowed its 
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officers to co-operate wi th the Ministry insofar as officers 
were given permission to supply the Ministry with limited 
facts. 31 The L.C.C., for the fist time, tacitly conceded the 
need to co-operate wi th the Government on local government 
reform. However, it was not a signal for the end of opposition, 
nor did the L.C.C. concede the reforms were inevitable. 
Following the introduction of the London Government Bill into 
Parliament. the L.C.C. further debated the likely effects of 
the proposals in the Bill and what attitude the L.C.C. should 
take towards the proposed changes in London government. As had 
happened before, this debate centred on a report produced by 
the Council's General Purposes Committee. This report 
recommended that the Council continue to oppose the Bill, and 
suggested that the proposals would not work and that the 
Counci l' s al terna t ive reforms were more pract ical. The report 
called the proposed G.L.C. a " ... vast unwieldy organization ... n 
that was n ••• contrary to the whole concept of local government 
and constituted a serious precedent for, and grievous threat 
to, local government throughout the country ... "32 The vote went 
in favour of accepting the report's recommendation, and the 
L.C.C.'s position remained much as before, even though the 
Parliamentary progress of the Bill was proceeding to the 
Government's satisfaction. 
During January 1963, as the Bill went through its Committee 
stage in the House of Commons, all the committees of the L.C.C. 
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produced reports for the Council which continued to criticise 
the Bill. 33 Nonetheless, these reports represented a change in 
L.C.C. policy, as for the first time they recognized the 
inevitability of the Government's changes going ahead. In 
general each report continued to oppose the proposed reforms, 
but they offered constructive advice aimed at improving various 
aspects of the London Government Bill. The reports all accepted 
that the L.C.C. would be succeeded by the G.L.C. and were 
primarily concerned to point out how to improve the efficiency 
of the G.L.C. For example, the Town Planning Committee report 
suggested that the Bill's provisions for Town Planning were at 
fault because both the G.L.C. and the new London boroughs would 
be planning authorities. 34 The G.L.C. was to prepare a general 
plan and the boroughs were to produce detailed plans, but the 
G.L.C. would have no powers to change or reject a borough plan 
unless it failed to fit the G.L.C. 's general plan. The 
Committee also pointed out that the Bill contained no provision 
for day-to-day co-operation between the planning authori ties. 
The L.C.C. 's Town Planning Committee recommended that the 
G.L.C. be made the only planning authority, but that it be 
obliged to delegate the detailed planning to the boroughs. The 
Children's Committee, the Education Committee, the Health 
Committee, the Housing Committee, the New and Expanding Towns 
Committee, the Parks Committee, the Public Control Committee, 
the Rivers and Drainage Committee, the Roads Committee, and the 
Welfare Committee all identified faults in the London 
Government Bill and suggested amendments to the Bill. 3 5 Only 
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the Fire Brigade Committee and Supplies Committee were 
relatively content with the Bil1. 36 It was far too late. The 
L.C.C. had missed its last chance to influence the nature of 
the London Government Bill. 
The L.C.C. did not change its formal position, and continued to 
espouse its view that the new local government system for 
Greater London was not needed. Nevertheless, following the 
recognition of the inevitability of changes the L.C.C. 
progressively involved itself in ensuring as smooth as possible 
transition in London government. In June 1964 none other than 
Sir Isaac Hayward, long-time leader of the L.C.C., one of the 
most intransigent opponents of change in the local government 
system, became the L.C.C. 's representative on the Greater 
London Council Joint Committee. This joint committee of the 
county and county borough councils in Greater London and the 
G.L.C. was to oversee a smooth transition. Sir Isaac and the 
L.C.C. were pledged to fully support this process. 37 
A few months later, in November 1964, within six months of its 
abolition, Hayward told a meeting of the L.C.C. majority 
party's policy committee that the old boroughs and the L.C.C. 
were no longer listened to. 38 He went on to point out that only 
the G.L.C. and the new boroughs had any influence with the 
Government or the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. It 
was pointed out at the same meeting that the only faint hope of 
a dramatic change, or a reprieve for the old system of local 
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government in Greater London, had vanished. For, as is 
discussed elsewhere, the national Labour Party had opposed the 
Government's reforms, but the Labour Government elected in 
October 1964 would not repeal the London Government Act because 
the L.C.C. was, by that time, the only local authority 
recommending that action. 39 
III 
Surrey County Council, at least initially, opposed the reforms 
as vigorously and as bitterly as the L.C.C. Surrey County 
Council was united in its opposition, and there was no split 
between the ruling and opposi tion groups. One man in 
particular, Alderman Sir Cyril Black, M.P., led Surrey County 
Council's opposition. He was chairman of the County Council's 
General Purposes Committee. He was also Conservative Member of 
Parliament for Wimbledon, a constituency in the south-west of 
Grea ter London, but a borough in Surrey at that time. Black 
was also a member of the Parliamentary and General Purposes 
Commi ttee of the County Councils Association, including the 
Local Government Reorganization Sub-Committee of that 
Commi ttee. An over-view of newspaper coverage suggests that 
Black was second only to Sir Isaac Hayward of the L.C.C. in his 
opposition to reform, and in his ability to publicize his 
views. Black's opposition went to the extent that he was one of 
only three Conservative Members of Parliament to vote against 
the Government over the reform of London government (the other 
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two being the M.P. for Croydon north-west and the M.P. for The 
Hartlepools) .40 
Black led the Surrey County Council campaign to avoid the loss 
of the metropolitan part of the county. As such he was prepared 
to work with other opponents of the Government's proposals for 
change. Black met Hayward of the L.C.C. on many occasions, but 
the two most vocal, and possibly influential, local government 
politicians fighting the Government's plans did not work 
closely together, and certainly did not create a joint campaign 
to save the existing local government system.41 The L.C.C. was 
not trusted. 42 This wish to avoid too much L.C.C. interference 
in Surrey affairs went deeper than Black and the County 
Council, since many district councils distrusted the L.C.C. The 
Royal Commission noticed this when Paul Cadbury, investigating 
Surrey, commented that everyone in Surrey feared incorporation 
in a Greater L.C.C.43 This feeling was particularly strong 
among the numerous Conservative Consti tuency Associations in 
Surrey which took the trouble to write to Conservative Central 
Office to complain. 44 In February 1962 Black's own Constituency 
Association voiced its opposition to Wimbledon being submerged 
in a new, larger borough, which in turn was to be within the 
area of the new Greater London Council. 45 Although the L.C.C. 
opposed the creation of the G.L.C. in Surrey it was often 
suspected of wishing to extend its own area. 4 6 Surrey County 
Council and the majority of Surrey district councils were 
dominated by the Conservatives or Conservative allies and 
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showed little sign of wishing too close a relationship with the 
Labour domina ted L. C. C. Perhaps a lack of whole-hearted co­
operation between the counties of London and Surrey damaged the 
individual campaigns of the county councils, although it is not 
possible to prove this. 
Nevertheless, Surrey County Counci 1 and the L. C. C. did share 
the belief that a joint planning board could provide regional 
co-ordination and leave the county councils in Greater London 
with a future. Black, when giving evidence to the Royal 
Commission, pointed out that the London Planning Administrative 
Committee, chaired by Clement Davies, which reported in 1949, 
recommended a joint advisory committee to facilitate major 
planning throughout Greater London. 47 Surrey supported such a 
join t planning commi t tee and recommended it should be 
responsible for: 
The distribution of employment and population, 
including overspill; the control of mineral working; 
the development of regional transport facilities, 
both road and rail; the distribution of open space; 
the assessment of the priori ty to be given to the 
proposals of local planning authori ties in relation 
to regional needs; and green belt.48 
Surrey pointed out that its suggestions for the joint 
committee were only provisional and could be changed. 49 Surrey 
had suggested such a committee in its written evidence to the 
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Royal Commission. 5o In its evidence Surrey had suggested that 
the Committee would draw its members from the county and county 
borough councils in the area covered by Abercrombie's Greater 
London plan of 1944. It would have been an indirectly elected 
forum for discussion, debate and co-ordination. Control and 
power would have remained with the local authorities sending 
members to the committee. By the time it came to present oral 
evidence Surrey supported the idea that such a joint planning 
board be given some executive power to impose its will upon the 
constituent authorities. 51 This seems to have been a 
recogni tion that a body wi thout executive power would not be 
considered viable by the Royal Commission or the Government. 
Because Surrey County Council had a good relationship with its 
district councils there was no demand for the abolition of the 
County Council. The majority of district authorities supported 
the 'Surrey Plan'. and. as the Royal Commiss ion noted, the 
local government system in Surrey worked efficiently, with the 
one exception that Surrey local authorities were prone to 
ignore the Greater London dimension of local problems. 52 In the 
same memorandum, the Royal Commission noted that a " ... body 
with super-county powers covering the whole area ... ", perhaps 
indirectly elected, could work. It pointed out that in a system 
which gave extra power to the districts and gave power to a new 
regional body, the existing counties would lose much of their 
power. Nonetheless, local people would be happy to see local 
town halls gain extra power and as long as the county council 
-264­
retained some power people would feel their links with the 
county had not been severed. 53 
Like the L.C.C., Surrey County Council was prepared to transfer 
some of its functions to the district authorities, and had in 
place a good system of delegating powers to the district 
authorities. 54 In London, Surrey and Kent the district and 
county counci 1 s were able to work well together, and so in 
these counties the majority of district councils wished to see 
the county councils survive intact. 55 In the county of London 
the M.B.S.J.C. supported the joint planning board, but wanted 
the Metropoli tan Boroughs to be represented on it. 5 6 There 
seems no reason why this cou Id not have been accommodated, 
perhaps in the same manner as district councils were 
represented on the M.W.B. In Essex and in Middlesex the 
situation was different: both county councils supported the 
'Surrey Plan', but both councjls had poorer relationships with 
their district councils. Many district councils in Middlesex 
and Essex saw their own best interests served by supporting the 
general principles of the Royal Commission's report and later 
the Government's white paper. 57 Thus. the case for a joint 
planning board was weakened by the lack of support for such a 
plan among district councils in Middlesex and Essex. The County 
Councils Association, however, added jts support for the idea 
of a joint planning board. Tn March 1961 it called for a: 
Master planning authority for a wider area than the 
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review area drawing its finance from local 
authorities and composed mainly of representatives of 
local authori ties, whose proposals to the Minister 
should be mandatory when approved by him.58 
Despi te this widespread backing from the county councils in 
the Greater London area, support was not unanimous among the 
upper-tier authorities. Hertfordshire did not subscribe to the 
plan. Under the Royal Commission's proposals Hertfordshire 
County Council was set to lose 9.7 per cent of its population, 
2.3 per cent of its area and 10 per cent of its rateable 
value. 59 Although Hertfordshire could not have known the exact 
findings of the Royal Commission in advance, the county council 
must have judged it would be less affected by the proposals of 
the Royal Commission's report than it would have been by the 
'Surrey Plan'. This would have imposed the joint planning 
board over the whole of Hertfordshire. The L.C.C. Labour Group 
Policy Committee claimed this accounted for Hertfordshire's 
opposition, and the same report noted that the proposed jOint 
planning board would affect Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire 
and that Buckinghamshire had already voiced its opposition to 
the plan. 5o 
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Al though Hertfordshire opposed the establishment of a joint 
planning board, it did not wholeheartedly support the Royal 
Commission's report or the Government's whi te paper In its0 
evidence to the Royal Commission Hertfordshire County Council 
argued that the areas on the south-west borders of the County 
(Cheshunt and Barnet) were not truly urban and that the people 
in that area agreed with the County Council. It also argued 
that Watford should not be allowed the county borough status it 
had long argued for because n •••we do not think it is the best 
solution for the local government administration of the 
area ... nSl Despite its opposition to the joint planning board 
Hertfordshire County Council persisted in its fight to keep the 
county intact after the publication of the whi te paper. The 
Times reported in February 1962 that Hertfordshire was 
continuing to make representations to have Cheshunt and Barnet 
removed from the proposed G.L.C. area. 52 The nature of 
Hertfordshire on the periphery of the review area allowed the 
County Council qui te a success in defending its own ves ted 
interests. It lost Barnet to the G.L.C., but Cheshunt retained 
its connections with Hert fordshi re County Council. Or iginally 
the Chairman of the Royal Commission had suggested that Watford 
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and some of the surrounding area should be excluded from 
Greater London, but be given county borough status.53 The Royal 
Commission's report simply recommended the exclusion of Watford 
from the Greater London Authority, but Watford never achieved 
county borough status. It is no part of this thesis to 
establish why that is so. Hertfordshire County Council, 
however, retained its right to a share of the rich rate 
resources of prosperous Watford. It became the only affected 
county council to successfully defend its position. 
Because only a small portion of Hertfordshire was within the 
original review area the removal of Watford and Cheshunt did 
not critically damage the Royal Commission's report or 
Government's whi te paper view of local government in Greater 
London. Hert fordshi re, however, was an integral part of the 
'Surrey Plan'. It was inconceivable without Hertfordshire. 
Given the lack of support for the 'Surrey Plan' by many 
district councils in Middlesex and Essex, such as that 
expressed to the Royal Commission by the Middlesex Excepted 
Districts Association and the South-West Essex Authorities,54 
it is unlikely that Hertfordshire' s lack of support was the 
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primary reason for the failure of the campaign to create a 
joint planning board. Nonetheless Hertfordshire's lack of 
support must have further damaged the credibility of a joint 
planning board in the view of the Royal Commission and the 
Gove rnmen t . 
The report of the Royal Commission dismissed the suggestions 
for a joint planning board claiming: 
._ .that we do not think consultation, whether in the 
form of a joint advisory committee or otherwise, 
between nine different authorities and many more 
housing authori ties can really produce a plan which 
takes account of the various factors in the review 
area as a whole. 65 
The 'Surrey Plan' was presented as a series of broad 
principles rather than as a detailed proposal with an in-depth 
analysis. It gave the plan flexibility, but it allowed the 
Royal Commission to dismiss it in rather brusque terms. The 
white paper was equally dismissive of the jOint planning board. 
It argued that such a joint board denied the vital premise of 
the Royal Commission that the built up areas of the Horne 
Counties were part of Greater London. 66 It also argued that 
such a board would be indirectly elected. thus democratically 
inferior to the proposed G.L.C., and it would be a third tier 
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of local government with the county councils sandwiched between 
it and the district councils. Furthermore the white paper 
argued that with such a joint board the district councils would 
not be given the powers they deserved. Dr Hill, as Minister of 
Housing and Local Government, criticized the 'Surrey Plan' in 
much the same terms, adding that any joint planning board would 
lack power. He pointed out that though it would be able to 
recommend new roads, a different authority would have to build 
them. 67 The Times added to the criticisms and argued that the 
'Surrey Plan' would not eradicate each member council's vested 
interests any more than the existing system. 58 
These criticisms did not amount to an insurmountable case 
against a joint planning board, but the lack of detail in the 
'Surrey Plan' made a detailed rebuttal of that plan difficult. 
The Royal Commission's report offered the Government a detailed 
plan, backed by detailed research from the London School of 
Economics' Greater London Group and by its own research 
undertaken by experts from the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. The 'Surrey Plan' had no such detailed research to 
back it. The evidence presented to the Royal Commission by 
Universi ty College London did not sugges t a joint planning 
board, but in suggesting social and economic planning was more 
important than the structure of local government it could have 
complemented the 'Surrey Plan. 69 The Centre for Urban Studies 
at the University College London felt the existing system of 
local government worked as well as was possible and fel t no 
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more than a few minor boundary changes were needed. 7o The Royal 
Commission made little of University College London's ideas. 
It is possible that any attempt to impose a joint planning 
board may have aroused more antagonism and damaged more vested 
interests than those aroused by the actual reforms. It is 
difficul t to judge. Wi th the backing of the Royal Commission 
and the resources of the government the 'Surrey Plan' may have 
been made to work. A review of the evidence presented to the 
Royal Commission demonstrates that support for such a plan was 
limited. The 'Surrey Plan' was an idea used by local 
government politicians, such as Sir Isaac Hayward, in the hope 
that it would gain support, and allow much of the status quo to 
be preserved. 
Despite the criticisms and the inherent problems, the idea as 
an alternative to the Royal Commission's report and white paper 
lingered for some time. Surrey County Council first called for 
a meeting of planning authorities in Greater London in December 
1959,71 and a first meeting of the county and county borough 
councils in the Greater London covered by the Abercrombie plan 
took place in April 1960. 72 This meeting did not lead to a 
joint planning board with executive powers. The majority of 
Planning Authorities may have wanted such a board as a viable 
alternative to the proposed Greater London Authority, but the 
other Planning Authorities beyond urban Greater London showed 
Ii ttle interest in such a board. These discussions, however, 
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led to the creation of the Joint Standing Conference on Greater 
London Planning in 1962. Apart from the L.C.C., the councils of 
Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, 
Kent, Middlesex, Croydon, East Ham and West Ham were all 
invited to join.73 The new Joint Council was expected to 
consult widely and recommend actions but it would have no 
powers of compulsion. It was no realistic alternative to the 
G.L.C. but it was never intended to be so. It is difficult to 
know whether the 'Surrey Plan' mutated into the Joint Standing 
Conference on Greater London Planning, or whether they were two 
separate ideas sharing a common original notion, which sprang 
from the Davies Committee of the late 1940s. Nonetheless, the 
'Surrey Plan' withered away and the Standing Joint Conference 
flourished even after the creation of the G.L.C. 
In February 1962 the County Councils wi thin the review area 
were invited to meet at County Hall in London. After the 
meeting they issued a simple request that the Government should 
think again on its plans for Greater London. 7 4 Hert fordshire 
did not attend the meeting. Kent also stayed away. Two weeks 
la ter, Kent announced it would no longer oppose the proposed 
reforms. 75 As opposition among the county councils died, so did 
the 'Surrey Plan'. 
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IV 
Having considered Surrey and Hertfordshire in conjunction with 
the ' Surrey Plan' in the previous section, this section will 
consider the remaining county councils Kent, Essex and 
Middlesex. 
Kent County Council stood to lose over one third of the 
county's rateable value (in 1957/58 the rateable value of Kent 
stood at £22,406,926 and the rateable value of that portion 
within the review area stood at £8,080,009)·76 Over a third of 
the population of Kent lived wi thin the review area (in 1957 
the population of Kent was 1,613,800 and the population within 
the revue area 533,615).77 Thus, the loss of rateable value was 
slightly greater than the loss of population. Under the Royal 
Commission's plans and those of the white paper, the truncated 
county of Kent would be smaller and poorer. This was ample 
reason for the Conservative dominated County Council to oppose 
the Conservative Government. In late 1960 Kent-based 
Conservatives accused the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, a 
Kent M.P. (Bromley), of abandoning them purely to create a 
Greater London Authority of which the Conservatives could win 
control. 78 
Majority and minority groups on Kent County Council were united 
in their opposition to the proposed reforms. Among the district 
councils, however, opinion was split, although the majority 
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favoured some continued association with Kent County Council. 
In its evidence to the Royal Commission Kent, pointed out that 
although several district authorities wished for county borough 
s ta tus , only one wished to sever all 1 inks wi th the County 
Council. Kent also argued that its metropolitan area was 
considerably different from London. North-west Kent had grown 
from a series of villages and these still remained the centre 
of each local community. Also, the entire area was less urban 
in character and lower in population density compared to London 
proper. 79 Sir John Wrigley in his general observations on the 
county of Kent for the Royal Commission, came to similar 
conclusions. Wrigley pointed out that only one district 
authority wished to sever all links with Kent County Council, 
and that if the Ministry of Transport took control of trunk 
roads the existing district authorities would be able to 
adequately cope with all local government matters. He even went 
on to point out that "The over-riding limitation on roads has 
been the restriction of expenditure imposed for many years by 
government policy.H8o 
Kent County Council expressed its opposi tion to the proposed 
reforms and associated itself with the 'Surrey Plan'. In March 
1962, however, despi te its earlier opposi tion, Kent was the 
first of the county councils supporting the 'Surrey plan' to 
abandon its opposi tion to the reforms. Kent County Council 
declared it would fight any proposal to extend the G.L.C. 
further into Kent.Ht Kent was probably the first county council 
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to abandon its opposition because, after Hertfordshire, it had 
the least to lose by the reforms. By early 1962 after the 
Government had set in motion its series of consultations 
regarding the white paper, pressure increased for politicians 
to take the pragmatic approach and acknowledge the 
inevi tabili ty of the reforms. For example, in March 1962 Dr 
Hill announced that the proposed reforms would go ahead, but 
with the possibility of some minor changes. 82 
Taken away from the problems of Greater London as a whole, 
Kent, like Surrey, was able to demonstrate that existing local 
government within the county worked reasonably efficiently and 
that there was little demand for radical change. It was the 
counties to the north of the River Thames which lacked a 
harmonious relationship between county councils and district 
councils. This added weight to the case for major reform. 
Under the reforms, Essex lost more than Kent. The Royal 
Commission calculated it would lose 8.5% of its area (81,541 
acres out of 959,403), over half its population (990,154 out of 
1,754,600 at 1957 figures), and nearly two thirds of its rate 
base (£13,553.689 out of £21,975,942 at 1957/58 figures).83 The 
County Council opposed the reforms, but unlike Kent and Surrey 
it could not rely on support from a majori ty of district 
authorities. 84 In his evidence to the Royal Commission, 
Councillor Bennet, on behalf of Essex County Council, said: 
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... I believe the fundamental basis of our local 
government in Essex is that the strong should help 
the poor, and by rich and poor I am not talking about 
money - money is incidental - but the richness of 
thought, varying cuI tures, the brilliance of mind ­
those are the things that make local government work. 
To combine the rich and poor areas today at the 
county hall as we have at the moment is very like 
having a very good car that has a very good brake and 
a very good accelerator. I would classify the South­
West Authorities as the accelerator. They have been 
responsible through their members for assisting in 
developing the county from what it was many years ago 
to a county today which has excellent services. And I 
quite believe that if you remove the brake they would 
probably travel a lot faster but the consequences of 
being without a brake can be very disastrous in the 
end. 85 
This long quote illustrates the major problems of local 
government in Essex. It was in many respects two different 
counties, rural Essex and urban Essex, both different in 
character. The urban area contained the largest population and 
contributed the highest percentage of the County's rates. The 
local authorities in metropolitan Essex had combined to give 
evidence to the Royal Commission (it included the two county 
boroughs of East Ham and West Ham but not Waltham Holy Cross 
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U.D.C.). They had recommended far greater independence from the 
County Council.a6 Despite the wealth that the metropolitan area 
brought to the county, the Royal Commission's report pointed 
out that some of the rural local authori ties in Essex also 
wished to see the urban section of the county removed to allow 
the truncated county to concentrate on rural issues. 87 Research 
undertaken by the Royal Commission noted this urban/rural split 
within the county: 
Essex County Council is now on the whole dominated 
by the inner Essex majority; but they seem to take no 
pleasure in ruling rural and sea-coast Essex, and 
doubtless the latter reciprocate. 88 
Speaking of the Royal Commission's report, Alderman C.E. 
Leatherland, Chairman of Essex County Council. said the 
Commission's "revolutionary" proposals would mean the creation 
of not merely a new county "but what appears virtually to be a 
new Country. "89 What Alderman Leatherland was probably 
suggesting was that Essex County Councillors from the 
metropolitan part of the county feared moving from a dominant 
position in one county to a position of relative impotence as a 
small group fragmented on party lines within the Greater London 
Council. 
Essex County Council was controlled by Labour, and followed the 
party 1 ine in giving no formal support to the Conserva ti ve 
-277­
Government's plans for Greater London government. Nonetheless, 
with support for reform from many district councils, the county 
council had to come to terms with the reforms, and in February 
1962, the County Council held a meeting with the district 
council's affected by the proposed reforms and decided to give 
maximum support to the district councils on the periphery who 
wished to avoid incorporation in Greater London and to ensure 
that if the reforms did go ahead the new Greater London and 
Essex boundary was at the inside edge of the Green Belt not the 
outside edge. 9o Thus, as early as February 1962 Essex County 
Council was forced into following a pragmatic policy which 
tacitly accepted the reforms. 
Middlesex County Council was in a very different posi tion to 
Essex. Like the L.C.C., it faced abolition. With a population 
of 2,234,543· 91 while not as large as that of the County of 
London, it was large enough to ensure that its representatives 
on a Greater London authority would have a sufficient presence 
not to be swamped. Like the county of London, Middlesex was 
almost completely urban in character and the historical county 
of Middlesex included virtually the whole of the L.C.C. to the 
north of the Thames. So, paradoxically in some respects, 
Middlesex County Council had less to lose than the other county 
councils. The local government structure in Middlesex, 
moreover, was suffering from greater strains than any other 
area in Greater London. 92 
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Nonetheless, Middlesex County Council opposed the Royal 
Commission's recommendations. At the 1961 County Council 
elections, political control of Middlesex County Council 
changed. Conservatives took power from Labour.93 The County 
Counc i 1 continued to oppose the sugges ted reforms. Middlesex 
Municipal Association had made plain its opposition to the 
Royal Commission's report to Conservative Party Central Office 
and had sent them details of how Middlesex Conservatives. at 
least those elected to the County Council, saw the 'Surrey 
Plan' working. 94 So it was the Labour Leader of Middlesex 
County Council, George Pargiter, who said of the Royal 
Commission's report: II I have yet to be convinced that these 
changes will make for better local government in Londonn95 and 
Conservative Leader of the Council, George Colson, who said of 
the white paper: 
[ It] seeks to needlessly des troy the character of 
all existing boroughs, county boroughs, and counties 
and to sweep away that which has been patiently built 
up and tested throughout seventy years. This might be 
forgiven if it was going to result in cheaper 
administration or a better standard of service to the 
ratepayers. But I believe it will be more costly and 
less efficient. 96 
Despite the tension within the local government system in the 
County, the County Council was able to build a creditable 
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defence around the points raised by Colson. When giving 
evidence to the Royal Commission, Leader of the Council 
Pargiter argued that the County Council worked well and claimed 
that "Middlesex is a recognized entity •... " and that it was the 
district authorities that lacked clear identities. The Chairman 
of the Royal Commission acknowledged that to be true and noted 
that he found. when visi ting Middlesex, people often did not 
know which district authority they were in. 97 The County 
Council argued that if any local authorities required reform it 
should be the district councils. not the County Council. The 
Royal Commission's own investigations in Middlesex came to the 
conclusion, however, that both upper and lower tier authorities 
were rather artificial and that neither level created a great 
deal of loyalty among their residents. 98 
Middlesex managed to devise a defence, but it could not 
demonstrate that the existing county council and district 
councils could work harmoniously and efficiently. The County 
Council could not demolish the belief there was a 'Middlesex 
Problem' requiring radical reform. 
v 
Although the L.C.C. sat in the middle of the review area, with 
the largest population and highest rateable value, it did not 
lead a uni ted campaign of the affected county councils. If 
indeed any county council took the lead, it was that of Surrey. 
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Even the 'Surrey Plan' failed, however, to unite all the County 
Councils because Hertfordshire rejected the idea. The 'Surrey 
Plan' was hardly a plan at all. I t lacked detail, it lacked 
proper research and each County Council supporting the idea had 
sligh t ly di f ferent views regarding its proposed funct ions and 
powers. 
The County Councils were uni ted in their opposi tion to the 
Royal Commission' s proposals to create a Council for Greater 
London, but had many other differences. Although County Hall in 
London attempted some co-ordination of the opposition to 
reform, the various county councils fought their own battles. 
Each had a slightly different perspective. The very fact that 
the defence of the status quo was so fragmented and often 
presented in parochial terms must have damaged that defence and 
encouraged all those who saw the need for greater co-ordination 
and co-operation in Greater London to support the Government's 
plans for reform. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Metropolitan Boroughs and other District Authorities 
I 
The role of the twenty-eight Metropoli tan Boroughs is given 
prominence in this chapter. Nonetheless district authorities in 
the res t of Greater London are not ignored, as they had an 
influence upon the process of local government reform. This 
chapter will show, however, that the influence of the 
Metropolitan Boroughs and other district authorities was very 
limited. It will explain that their small geographical area and 
wholly locally orientated functions poorly equipped the lower­
tier authorities to understand the needs of urban Greater 
London as a whole. This chapter will demonstrate that as a 
consequence their views were discounted by both the Royal 
Commission and the Government. 
District authorities reacted to the process of change very 
differently to the upper-tier authorities. This is hardly 
surprising as the two types of authorities had very different, 
often opposing, interests. There were 105 district authorities 
in the Royal Commission's review area. 1 They had widely 
divergent interests, which led to many differences of opinion 
among the authorities and a lack of uni ty among lower-tier 
authorities. 
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As discussed, the role of party politics in Greater London was 
of importance to the transition in London government. The 
majority of district councils were controlled by one of the two 
major political parties. 2 Many of the councils loyally followed 
the line taken by their controlling political party's regional 
or national organization. 3 Other matters, however, such as the 
economic and social structure of the district, the geographical 
size, population level and its rate of decline or increase, and 
many other factors influenced the stance taken by each district 
authority. In short, the views of such authorities were 
parochial in outlook and principally motivated by self­
interest. This was apparent to the Royal Commission, whose 
Chairman noted: "The view of the bottom tier authorities seemed 
to depend on the treatment they had received from the county 
council. 114 Local authorities reacted to the situation around 
them, and they did not, on the whole, contemplate how Greater 
London could best be governed. The Royal Commission's report 
acknowledged this parochial outlook and felt it was inevitable 
that the district authorities would concentrate on local 
affairs and would lack an understanding of Greater London-wide 
affairs. 5 
Thus, as discussed in chapter four, much of the evidence 
presented to the Royal Commission by the district authorities 
was of little use to the Commission when drawing up its plans 
for Greater London. Nonetheless the sheer number of authorities 
offering opinions to the Commission and the combined bulk of 
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tha t evidence probably influenced the process. As has been 
detailed the publication of the Royal Commission's report was 
by no means the end of debate concerning the fu ture shape of 
local government in Greater London. Thus, many district 
authorities, either singularly or in combination, continued to 
attempt to influence the final shape of any reform. 
II 
I t is not possible to detail the part played by each of the 
twenty-eight Metropolitan Boroughs. Thus, a limited range of 
examples has been used. Chelsea and Kensington, two 
Conservative controlled boroughs are used to demonstrate how 
the very small borough of Chelsea feared merger with Kensington 
while the much larger Kensington welcomed joining Chelsea in a 
new authority. The City of Westminster, St.Marylebone and 
Paddington's incorporation into a single new London Borough is 
used as an example of how three loyal Conservative controlled 
authorities merged despite the loss of identity by two of the 
old authorities. Holborn has been selected because it was the 
smallest of the Metropolitan Boroughs. Wandsworth receives much 
attention because it was the only Metropolitan Borough to be 
split between two of the new London Boroughs. Wandsworth's 
fight to avoid being split inevitably brings in Battersea's 
attempts to avoid merging with Wandsworth. Hackney is used to 
demonstrate how one medium-sized, Labour controlled, borough 
a ttempted to express divergent views to those of the L. L. P. 
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while attempting to support, as far as possible, the L.L.P./ 
L.C.C. position. 
Al though the views of no two boroughs were identical, it is 
possible to identify certain trends in the types of view held. 
Large Conservative controlled boroughs often had similar ideas 
regarding the reform of local government. Small Conservative 
controlled boroughs often shared a common attitude, which was a 
little different to that of the larger Tory boroughs. 
Similarly, large Labour controlled boroughs often held similar 
views, whi Ie smaller Labour controlled boroughs had much in 
common but varied from the general opinion of the larger 
Labour boroughs. All Metropolitan Boroughs were controlled by 
one or the other of the two main poli tical parties and most 
remained loyal to the same party at each municipal election. s 
At the May 1959 election, only St.Pancras Borough Council 
changed poli tical control from Labour to Conservative. 7 Three 
years later Labour won back St.Pancras and also won control of 
Wandsworth. 8 These were the only changes of political control 
in the metropolitan boroughs between the establishment of the 
Royal Commission in 1957 and the abolition of the old councils 
in 1965. 
Kensington was a fairly large borough of 2,290 acres and a 
population of 167,623 in 1957. Its populatIon had stood at 
175,859 in 1921,9 a limited fall, in contrast to the decline in 
several other of the Metropoli tan Boroughs. Between 1901 and 
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1952 the population had risen in just four of the Metropolitan 
Boroughs and had fallen by less than ten per cent in only five 
others. tO Kensington was among the group of five showing only a 
small decline. Kensington was a solid Conservative borough,11 
despite the fact that parts of the north of the borough 
consisted of poor quality rented accommodation. 12 The 
prosperous sou thern part of the borough made ita weal thy 
authority with adequate rate resources to maintain normal local 
authori ty services. Thus, Kensington had no reason to oppose 
the standard L.M.S. and L.C.C. Conservative Group view that 
the L.C.C. should be abolished and many of its functions taken 
over by the Metropolitan Boroughs with a strategic authority to 
control only regional functions. The Royal Commission's report 
acknowledged Kensington's support for such a reformed system. 13 
Kensington was of sufficient size to have gained extra powers 
from the Royal Commission's proposed reforms, without loss of 
status. The Royal Commission had recommended Kensington merge 
with its small neighbour Chelsea, but at three times the size 
of Chelsea, it must have seemed more like a take-over to 
Kensington Metropolitan Borough Council. Even after the 
Government's white paper had been published in late 1961, 
Kensington still stood to lose little. By merging with its 
smaller neighbour, Chelsea. the new borough would have a high 
enough population to meet the Government's suggested minimum of 
200,000. This was the solution suggested by the Town Clerks who 
had been set to recommend the best pattern of mergers. 14 
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Kensington was quite happy to merge with Chelsea, but Chelsea 
was opposed to the idea. 15 
Chelsea had been one of the Metropolitan Boroughs mentioned by 
the Royal Commission, along wi th Kensington, as supporting a 
reformed system of local government which would give more power 
to the district authorities. ls Chelsea was, however, the third 
smallest of the Metropolitan Boroughs, covering only 660 
acres. 17 It also had a modest population of 50,401 in 1957 
which had fallen from 63,697 in 1921.18 Thus, under the Royal 
Commission's plan of reform, Chelsea would be forced to merge, 
and with a population only one third of that of Kensington, it 
would lose much of its identity. When the new borough's wards 
were drawn up, the majority of Councillors were set to come 
from Kensington. 19 
Like Kensington, Chelsea was dominated by Conservatives. 20 
Unlike other Conservative controlled boroughs, such as 
Westminster and Holborn, the Chelsea Conservatives were 
unwilling to spend a high level of their resident's rates on 
expensive welfare services and consequently had a poor 
relationship with the L.C.C.21 Chelsea had a poor record of 
providing council housing,22 and throughout the late 1950s and 
early 1960s was in dispute with the L.C.C. over the borough's 
plans to build a large council housing estate on the World's 
End si te. 2 3 Chelsea wished to build the new es ta te in such a 
manner that it could accommodate a high number of residents per 
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acre, thus cutting the borough's housing list quite 
significantly. Chelsea's proposals would have broken the 
Government sanctioned population per acre level required in new 
housing developments as stated in the L.C.C. 's official 
Development Plan. Consequently the L.C.C. was refusing to co­
operate with Chelsea. 24 Chelsea wanted to see the L.C.C. 
abolished in order to stop it interfering with Chelsea Borough 
Council's policies. Chelsea told the Royal Commission that 
small boroughs would be quite capable of running the minimum 
required level of local government services; that they could be 
run quite efficiently by coming to joint arrangements with 
neighbouring boroughs.25 
Chelsea's brand of Conservatism saw no need for an expensive, 
interfering upper- tier authori ty. I t also saw no need for a 
series of larger boroughs. Like other Conservative controlled 
district authorities, Chelsea was prepared to support reform, 
bu t not to the extent of support ing its own demise. 26 Yet, 
ultimately it followed the party line, even though this meant 
merging with Kensington, without any formal dissent. 
The City of Westminster was also a large Conservative 
controlled borough. It covered 2,503 acres and had a population 
of 92,032 in 1957. 27 The population had declined by almost one 
third since 1921,28 but the borough remained very wealthy. Like 
Kensington and Chelsea, it had recommended to the Royal 
Commission that the majority of local government functions 
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should be undertaken by the lower-tier authority.29 Westminster 
had expressed itself happy with the Royal Commission's 
recommendations. It was particularly satisfied with the 
recommendation that the new London boroughs should be the 
primary unit of local government. Westminster's only criticism 
was that the report did not recommend that the boroughs should 
become Local Education Authorities. Westminster did not feel 
the Royal Commission's education plans would work. 3D The City 
of Westminster had little to fear from the Royal Commission's 
report, even if that led to a merger with a neighbouring 
borough, because they were all wealthy Conservative controlled 
authorities. There is no evidence that Westminster 
Conservatives had a prior commitment from the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government that the name of any new borough 
would be the City of Westminster, but the location of 
Parliament, Whitehall, Westminster Abbey, St. James' and 
Buckingham Palace's all within the old borough of Westminster 
must have made the chances of the name being continued very 
high. Hence the Conservative controlled borough of Westminster 
had little to lose by any change along the lines of the Royal 
Commission's recommendations. In early 1962 the City of 
Westminster was reported to be entirely happy with the 
Government's plans for reform. 31 
The Ci ty of Westminster was merged into a new borough wi th 
Padding ton and St. Marylebone. the new borough becoming the 
Ci ty of Westminster. Paddington and St. Marylebone were both 
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Conservative controlled boroughs, 32 both slightly smaller in 
area, al though at 120,042 in 1957. 33 Padding ton , s population 
was higher than Westminster's (St.Marylebone had a 1957 
population of 72,023).34 Both boroughs had sufficient rate base 
and were unlikely to increase the rate burden in the area of 
the old borough of Westminster. Although there was little 
reason for Westminster Conservatives to oppose the views of the 
Conservative Government, the Conservative opposition on the 
L.C.C., or the L.M.S., its neighbours did have some cause for 
complaint. Desmond Plummer, later to be leader of the G.L.C., 
was a member of Paddington Borough Council. He explained that 
ini tially the Conservative controlling group had wished 
Padding ton to retain its independence, but it had not been 
prepared to cri ticize the Conservative Government. 35 He felt 
that most Conservative groups in London were good Conservatives 
and followed the party line, even when it damaged their own 
vested interests. Nevertheless, as we have seen, there were 
some Conservatives, such as those in Chelsea, prepared to voice 
some opposi tion when their own vested interests were under 
threat. 
Plummer's view of Conservative borough groups certainly seems 
to have been the case in the Metropolitan Borough of Holborn, 
the smallest of the London boroughs and Conservative 
controlled. 36 Holborn covered 406 acres and had a population of 
22,186 in 1957. 37 The population had fallen by just under one 
half in thirty-six years,38 but its location in central London, 
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sandwiched between the Ci ties of London and Wes tmins ter, had 
allowed the borough to attract many offices and other forms of 
employment and about 100,000 commuters travelled into Holborn 
to work each day.39 Holborn Council did not believe it needed 
to be merged into a larger authority. However, in order to 
produce a credible argument in its defence, the borough had to 
abandon much of the Conservative view adopted by many of the 
larger Conservative controlled Metropolitan Boroughs. Holborn 
argued to the Royal Commiss ion that it was large enough to 
perform all the duties expected of it under the system as it 
existed. 40 Holborn suggested that it should regain control of 
personal health services, should be the sole housing authority 
wi thin the borough and should take control of Lincoln' sInn 
Field from the L.C.C. ,41 but it also argued for the retention 
of the L.C.C.42 Although Holborn suggested many L.C.C. 
functions should be transferred to the Metropolitan Boroughs, 
it wanted to preserve much of the status quo. Any wholesale 
reform was likely to sweep away such a small au thor i ty as 
Holborn. 
Holborn Conservatives were unsuccessful in defending their 
borough. I t must have been obvious that in any new borough 
their own area would be swamped by the rest of the new 
authority. Following the publication of the Royal Commission's 
report in late 1960, it was sugges ted that HoI born would be 
merged with Pinsbury and Shoreditch,43 both small authorities 
in area and population. Such a borough would have had a 
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population of 98,000. 44 Although Holborn had the smallest 
population of the three authorities, in such a borough the 
Conservatives from Holborn would not have been completely 
swamped by the other two areas. Both Pinsbury and Shoreditch, 
however, were Labour controlled and the Holborn Conservatives 
must have recognized that such a borough was highly likely to 
contain a comfortable Labour rnaj or i ty. 45 Despite its earlier 
opposition to the Conservative L.C.C. Group and L.M.S. stance, 
when giving evidence to the Royal Commission, it was only the 
Labour opposition group in Holborn which publicly argued 
against the acceptance of the Royal Commission's plans. 46 
Holborn Conservatives accepted the party line, even though it 
ran contrary to their own previous view, for the sake of party 
unity. 
Following the Town Clerks report it was announced that Holborn 
would merge wi th Hampstead and St. Pancras in a new borough. 4 7 
Holborn was by far the smallest of the three boroughs. 
Hampstead covered 2,265 acres and had a population 97,057 in 
1957,48 St.Pancras covered 2,694 acres and had a population of 
131,622,49 more than Holborn and Hampstead combined. Labour 
regained control of St .Pancras Council in the 1962 council 
election and the Conservatives lost council seats in all three 
boroughs. 5o The new borough, dominated by St.Pancras, was quite 
likely to be Labour controlled, yet the Holborn Conservatives 
refrained from criticizing the Government's reforms. The 
Conservative Mayors of Halborn and Hampstead both rejected 
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St.Pancras as a suitable name for the new borough,51 and this 
seems to have been the extent of local Conservative opposition 
to the reforms. 
The new borough was named Camden. When the new wards were 
arranged Holborn contained only two, each to return three 
Councillors to the new council. Thus Holborn was to send six 
Councillors while Hampstead was to send twenty-four and 
St. Pancras thirty. 5 2 Holborn would only have ten per cent of 
the new council, and thus little chance of developing into a 
powerful pressure group capable of looking after its interests. 
In the 1964 borough council elections the Conservatives won all 
six seats in Holborn, while Hampstead returned seventeen 
Conservatives and seven Labour, and St.Pancras three 
Conserva tives and twenty-seven Labour Councillors. 5 3 Holborn 
Conservatives formed a small part of the opposi tion group in 
Labour controlled Camden and still offered no criticism of the 
Government's reforms. I t seems Lord Plummer was correct. In 
Holborn at least, loyal Conservatives in London followed the 
party line even when their own vested interests were at stake. 
Conservative party discipline allowed regional and national 
party interests to sweep aside local interes ts wi thout major 
dissent. 
The majority of metropolitan boroughs were Labour controlled ­
nineteen of the twenty-eight after the May 1959 elections, 5 4 
and twenty-one after the May 1962 elections55 - and thus there 
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were more Conservative opposition groups than controlling 
groups within the Metropolitan Boroughs. No Metropolitan 
Borough opposition Conservative Group was invited to give oral 
evidence before the Royal Commission and few sent written 
evidence independently of their Borough Council's submission. 56 
Nonetheless, these groups were subject to the same pressures as 
controlling groups. They had a need to reconcile party loyalty 
with local attitudes. This did lead to some guarded opposition 
to the process of transition. 
Lewisham in South-East London was a very large borough, one of 
the few with a population larger in 1952 than 1901. 57 The 
borough covered 7,015 acres and a1 though the population had 
declined from a peak of 227, 000 in 1951 to 220,756,58 it was 
still large enough to meet the criteria for the new boroughs as 
set out in the Governrnen t 's whi te paper, that is, a minimum 
population of 200,000. 59 Thus, the borough's minority 
Conservative group were able to criticize the details without 
criticizing the Conservative Government's general plan. 
Lewisharn was a marginal Labour borough. 6o Although the 
Conservatives had failed to take control in both the 1959 and 
1962 borough elections, the plan to merge Lewisham wi th the 
much smaller, but solidly Labour, borough of Deptford would 
have damaged the Conservative's prospects of winning control of 
an enlarged Lewisham. 61 Thus, when such a merger was first 
suggested, the local Conservatives felt aggrieved. Their letter 
of complaint remains in the Conservative Party Central Office 
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files,62 yet like the majority of Conservatives in London there 
is no evidence that they took the i r complaint any further. If 
the reforms were to go ahead the small borough of Deptford 
needed to be merged into a neighbouring borough and Lewisham 
was a logical choice. 63 
Battersea Conservative minority group had a similar complaint 
which they took to Conservative Party Central Office. 64 South­
west London presented the Town Clerks and the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government wi th a serious problem, because 
there was no clear cut method of merging the existing 
authorities. At least one of the existing boroughs needed to be 
split between two of the new boroughs. Both the ruling Labour 
group and the opposition Conservative group in Battersea 
favoured their authority taking some of neighbouring 
Wandsworth's wards into an enlarged Bat tersea. This proposal 
was not accepted and Battersea was submerged into the new 
borough of Wandsworth. Battersea Conservatives appear to have 
accepted the loss of their borough without major complaint. 
While many Conservatives saw their own authorities gaining from 
the new system, such as those controlling Kensington and the 
City of Westminster, many others were set to lose by the 
reforms, such as those in Battersea, Chelsea, Paddington, and 
Lewisham, bu t they refrained from any concerted campaigns to 
damage the Conservative Government's plans. In some boroughs, 
such as, Is 1 ington, Hackney and Bethnal Green, local 
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Conservative's consistently held no council seats at all and 
the voice of local Conservatism is hard to identify in such 
areas. Consequently, it is hard to discern whether the majority 
of Conservatives were in favour of the new pattern of local 
government in London or not. However, if all Conservatives who 
expressed some doubts had fully opposed the new pattern of 
local government it would have made it more difficult for the 
L.C.C. Conservative group and the L.M.S. to wholeheartedly 
support the reforms. In turn, that would have made it more 
difficult for the Conservative Government to push through the 
London Government Bill. It is not possible to quantify whether 
Tory loyal ty saved the Government's reforms of London 
government, but it certainly made the process easier. 
Among the Labour controlled Metropoli tan Boroughs, much the 
same factors influenced the nature of each borough's stance. 
Al though the majori ty of such boroughs took account of the 
stance of the L.L.P., there were several boroughs prepared to 
voice their opposition. Although Chelsea and Holborn were 
Conservative controlled, all the other very small boroughs such 
as Pinsbury, Shoredi tch, Stoke Newington, Bethnal Green and 
Deptford were Labour controlled and had a vested interest in 
opposing the process of transition. Larger Labour boroughs such 
as Hackney, Islington, Lambeth and Lewisham had less to lose 
and more to gain from the new system. Yet the majori ty of 
Labour Councils took a fairly pragmatic approach. They defended 
their own best interests, while attempting to preserve party 
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uni ty. When faced wi th the new system of local government, 
however, there is no evidence that Labour Councillors worked 
any the less hard than Conservative Councillors to make the new 
system work. 
There were no Conservative Councillors on Hackney Borough 
Council. Thus, the views of the Borough were those of the 
controlling Labour Party alone (although we do not know what 
outside factors influenced these views). Hackney had a 
population of 164,927 in 1957,65 it covered 3,287 acres, and 
the population had declined by over one quarter since 1921. 66 
Nonetheless, it remained a large populous borough during the 
period leading up to the introduction of the new local 
government system. Hackney Council was confident of its own 
abilities to manage local government affairs. The local 
newspaper pointed out: 
Hackney points to the indisputable fact that the 
boroughs admixture of commercial, industrial and 
residential elements make it more comparable wi th a 
provincial town than some other parts of the 
county. 6 7 
Other Labour controlled boroughs of similar or even larger 
size, such as Islington, Lewisham and Woolwich, also consisted 
of similar mixes. 68 
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Fulham was the only Labour controlled borough to suggest the 
Labour controlled L.C.C. should be replaced by a Greater London 
authority.69 Even Woolwich, within which the ruling Labour 
Group had urged upon the L. L. P. the need for radical reform, 
put aside its private views in order to support the party 
line.70 Hackney went some way to oppose the L.L.P. view when it 
suggested to the Royal Commission changes to the existing 
system, but without a major restructuring. Hackney argued that, 
although the existing system was made to work by goodwill, it 
could be improved by transferring several L.C.C. functions to 
the Metropolitan Boroughs. 71 Hackney's written evidence to the 
Royal Commission explained: 
We consider that primary and secondary education 
constitute what we term a "personal service" in that 
it directly and intimately affects the family lives 
of the great majori ty of the ratepayers. National 
standards are largely guaranteed by the direction and 
advice of the Minister of Education and in our view 
such aspects of education as admi t of local 
initiative and interpretation should be administered 
at the lowest efficient level. The localization of 
control could not fail to strengthen local interest 
in the management and conduct of the schools. We 
consider therefore that the powers in relation to 
primary and secondary education (including nursery 
schools) should be transferred to the boroughs. 72 
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Hackney suggested that health and welfare, other personal 
services and planning should be transferred from the L.C.C. to 
the Metropolitan Boroughs. Conservative Wandsworth suggested to 
the Royal Commission that a similar range of services should be 
transferred to the boroughs. After Labour gained control in May 
1962, it made no attempt to abandon the borough's earlier 
stance. 73 
Hackney recognized that there had to be a balance between local 
accountability and efficiency brought about through the large 
scale provision of services, but its arguments undermined the 
L.L.P. stance: 
With these points in mind we wish to suggest that in 
the County of London the transfer of the major 
functions of personal heal th and education could be 
made to depend upon the voluntary amalgamation of 
boroughs to provide minimum areas of population which 
would in the Commission's view, justify the transfer. 
We express no opinion on what the specified areas and 
population should be but we think a limit should be 
placed on the period allowed for the voluntary 
amalgama t ions and this should not exceed 10 years. 
The Minister should have the powers subject to the 
usual safeguards to introduce compulsory 
amalgamations. 74 
Wi th the exception of Fulham, Hackney was the only Labour 
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controlled borough in London to suggest forced mergers between 
unwilling boroughs. Hackney offered no opinions as to whether 
the L.C.C. would be left with any useful functions after a 
series of amalgamations of boroughs which, in turn, would 
acquire many of the L.C.C. 's functions. Hackney refrained from 
directly attacking the L.C.C., but its stance can have little 
helped the L.L.P. and L.C.C. Labour Group efforts to defend the 
status quo. 
Once again the local newspaper in Hackney summed up the 
posi tion of the borough after the publication of the Royal 
Commission's report as "Shocks at Town Halls."75 It went on to 
explain that Hackney had little to fear, and was likely to 
gain, but many boroughs like "proud Ii ttle Stoke Newington" 
would lose. 7 6 Indeed the Royal Commission recommended Stoke 
Newington and Hackney be merged to form one of the new 
boroughs. After the Town Clerk's report, Shoredi tch was also 
merged into the new borough. The new borough adopted the name 
of Hackney and used the Metropolitan Borough of Hackney's Town 
Hall as its Town Hall. The combined populations of Stoke 
Newington and Shoredi tch was 94,242,77 considerably less than 
the population of old Hackney. Both Stoke Newington and 
Shoredi tch were Labour dominated. 78 which meant there was no 
realistic possibility of the new borough being anything other 
than Labour controlled. At the first meeting of the new borough 
in May 1964 one of the longest serving members from the old 
Shoreditch Borough Council became Chairman of the new Council, 
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while a long serving member of Stoke Newington Borough Council 
was appointed as the Deputy Chairman. 79 Thus, politicians from 
Stoke Newington and Shoreditch were not excluded from all 
power. Nonetheless, the majori ty of the members represented 
wards in the old borough of Hackney. They had the power to 
control all the policies of the new borough if they had wished 
to. It mus t have seemed very much like business as usual to 
them. 
Finsbury was submerged in its large neighbour Islington. 
Deptford became part of Lewisham. Battersea became part of the 
new Wandsworth. Faced with the London Government Bill's 
progress through Parliament, the large Labour controlled 
boroughs had little option but to merge with their smaller 
neighbours. These large boroughs, however, were not as 
vociferous as the smaller Labour boroughs in defending the 
status quo, and they certainly argued hard to make sure the new 
boroughs retained their old names and used their old town 
halls. so 
Many of the smaller Labour controlled boroughs adopted a 
position as dogmatically opposed to the reforms as the L.C.C. 
and the L.L.P. Many of these faced a complete loss of identity. 
Deptford took its case to the Privy Council in an attempt to 
save its historic name. wi th no success. 81 Bermondsey argued 
that it should not be merged with Camberwell and Southwark 
because the new town hall was outside Camberwell so it would be 
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too remote and services to local people would suffer. 82 The 
Leaders of Camberwell, Bermondsey, Bethnal Green and 
Hammersmith all wrote articles for the L.L.P.'s journal London 
News attacking the Government's white paper. 83 They attacked 
the then proposals in exactly the same manner as the L.C.C. 
This was hardly surprising, as their interests were so closely 
linked. The Leader of Hammersmith Borough Council argued that 
any enlarged borough in West London would be unable to run many 
welfare services because there was only one children's home in 
west London and 900 places in L.C.C. old peoples' homes were 
outside the county and would not be available for the new 
boroughs. 84 The Labour Leader of Stoke Newington attacked the 
white paper, drawing on Lord Morrison for support: nI echo the 
remark of Lord Morrison in the House of Lords when he said 'My 
Lords. The Government is mad.' I think the proposed 
amalgamation is absurd and would be disastrous to local 
government. n85 
Other Labour borough spokesmen tried to turn the Royal 
Commission's arguments against the proposed reforms by arguing 
that larger boroughs would be less democratic or less efficient 
than the existing system. Councillor Kathleen O'Connor, Mayor 
of Stepney, claimed: "I think the present boroughs are working 
extremely well and if these changes are made we will lose touch 
with the people. Local government is at its best when run in 
smaller units.ns6 The Labour M.P. for Finsbury and Shoreditch, 
Alderman Michael Cliffe, speaking on behalf of the two Labour 
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controlled boroughs he represented, argued that democracy 
worked better in small units rather than large. 85 
At the district council level the arguments for or against 
reform were all contained within the separate counties. :.Jo 
Labour boroughs in the County of London developed a joint 
campaign against the new system with neighbours across county 
boundaries, even if such authorities were as equally opposed to 
the Government's plans. Within London, the larger Labour 
controlled boroughs, wi th much to gain from enlargement and 
greater powers, were less vocal in their support for the old 
system. This must have damaged the L.L.P. and L.C.C. Labour 
Group campaign. The L.L.P. had hoped to counterbalance the lack 
of enthusiasm among some Labour boroughs wi th support from a 
few Conservative controlled boroughs faced with unwelcome 
mergers wi th larger neighbours. L. L. P. intelligence expected 
the Conservative boroughs of Holborn and Hampstead to oppose 
the new system. BB As shown above this did not happen. 
Conservative's retained a higher level of unity than Labour in 
London which helped tip the balance towards acceptance of the 
reforms. 
The majori ty of Labour controlled boroughs accepted the new 
pattern and set about making it work when it became evident the 
changes were unavoidable. At the first meeting of the new Tower 
Hamlets Borough Council, the Mayor of Poplar, Joseph Gillender 
said: "We will weld Tower Hamlets into one body working for the 
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betterment of the borough. "89 This was a typical positive 
Labour response to the changed si tua tion when reform became 
inevitable. 
One major problem wi thin the county of London unified Labour 
and Conservative opinion locally. This was the problem 
concerning Wandsworth and Battersea. The latter borough had a 
population of 111,709 in 1957,90 and was thus too small to 
stand alone under the white paper's recommendation of a minimum 
population of 200,000 for the new boroughs. Battersea's 
neighbour, Wandsworth had a population of 337,444,91 and thus 
was of adequate size. If the two boroughs had merged it would 
have created a borough with a population greater than that of 
many count ies in Britain, and would have been over twice the 
optimum size recommended by the whi te paper. Bat tersea was 
almost surrounded by Wandsworth and the River Thames. Its only 
connection to any other Metropolitan Borough was a small common 
boundary with Lambeth. The Royal Commission had proposed that 
Battersea merge with part of Wandsworth,92 and this had also 
been recommended by the Government following the publication of 
the white paper. 93 
Conservative and Labour councillors in Wandsworth consistently 
opposed their borough being split in two. Roland Freeman, 
Leader of the Council, said shortly after the publication of 
the whi te paper that: "We shall fight the plan to parti tion 
Wandsworth, it is absurd to cut a borough in two when the aim 
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of reform was to get large councils for London."94 In February 
1962, while still Conservative controlled, and before the Town 
Clerks had studied the issues, Wandsworth recommended changes 
to the new pattern of local government. Wandsworth argued that 
the section of the borough recommended to merge with Battersea 
contained the town hall and the central library, and such a 
split would leave the new Battersea with two town halls and two 
central libraries while the new, smaller Wandsworth would have 
no town hall or central library.95 Neither ruling Labour group 
nor the minori ty Conservative Group in Battersea showed any 
concern for the view of Wandsworth Borough Council. 9 6 
Wandsworth suggested that a minor boundary change between 
Battersea and themselves would allow Battersea to merge with 
Lambeth, but this required the pattern of mergers in the whole 
of South London to change. They recommended that Camberwell, 
Southwark and Bermondsey could merge, as could Deptford, 
Greenwich and Woolwich. Thus, with a barely changed Wandsworth 
and Lewisham, and the merged Battersea and Lambeth, there would 
be five boroughs south of the Thames in the old county of 
London.s7 Thus, faced with the possibility of the borough being 
spli t in two, Conservatives in Wandsworth were prepared to 
oppose the Government's plans and work wi th the borough's 
Labour group. 
The Town Clerks suggested that the eastern part of Wandsworth ­
the wards of Larkhall, Clapham North, Thornton (east of the 
railway) , Streatham Common, and Streatham South be 
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transferred to Lambeth, and the remaining bulk of Wandsworth be 
merged wi th Bat tersea. 98 This recommendation was accepted by 
the Minister of Housing and Local Government. The new borough, 
reflecting the larger of the two partners, adopted the name of 
Wandsworth. Battersea lost its separate identity. Consequently 
nei ther Conservative nor Labour groups in ei ther borough got 
their own way. The Conservative Government, with its recourse 
to a wide range of experts, greater resources and a certain 
flexibility won, while Battersea and Wandsworth lost. 
III 
Within Greater London, but outside the County of London, many 
similar views were expressed, such as a fear of being submerged 
into a large neighbour. Party poli tics played a role in the 
majori ty of areas. Many of the other vested interests which 
came to the fore during the development of the new system have 
been discussed elsewhere in this work, such as poor relations 
wi th county councils, or a fear of being swallowed by an 
expanding L.C.C. 
Some local authorities, such as Romford in Essex on the 
periphery, argued that they should be excluded from the Greater 
London area. Romford had initially supported the Royal 
Commission's recommendations, because the borough would gain 
more power under the G.L.C. than under Essex County Council, 
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but went on to change its mind, to no avail. It became merged 
into the new borough of Havering. 99 
District authorities beyond the L.C.C. boundary, but not quite 
on the outer edge of urban Greater London, could not argue that 
they should be excluded from the G.L.C. They had to be 
included, or the entire new system changed. The M.P. for 
Dagenham could not argue his area was outside of Greater 
London. Consequently, he argued that he could not support the 
new system because it reduced the influence of his area. 
Dagenham sent seven representatives out of 140 to Essex County 
Council, but would only send one out of 110 to the G.L.C.IOO 
Several local authorities argued over merging with neighbours. 
One of the most contentious was that of Willesden and Wembley. 
Nei ther was happy about the merger. Wembley approached Harrow 
about a possible union, but Harrow would not consider it, 
because it was of sufficient size to avoid the need to join 
with any other authority.lOl Willesden wished to retain its own 
identity. The local M.P. told the House of Commons that 
Willesden wished to avoid merging with a neighbour by 
increasing its population to a size which would allow it to 
become a new London borough without any amalgamation. It hoped 
to do this by taking a small part of five of its neighbouring 
authorities. 102 
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The three county boroughs in Greater London were unitary 
authorities and thus although close to district authorities in 
size, were closer to county councils in their powers. Croydon 
consistently opposed the reforms despite its Conservative 
controlled council. 1 03 Croydon saw its own best interest as 
maintaining its county borough status, ra ther than following 
the Conservative Party line. East Ham likewise opposed the 
reforms, but because of its Labour maj ori ty, did not have to 
abandon Party 10yalty.l04 West Ham was also Labour, but 
broadly supported the reforms. As early as the 1890s, shortly 
after it had gained county borough status, some members of the 
council had sought to become a Metropolitan Borough within the 
L.C.C. because supporting a full range of council services 
alone was expens i ve for the ratepayers of Wes t Ham. 1 0 5 The 
Royal Commission had come to the conclusion that East Ham was 
also too small in population and rateable value to remain an 
efficient County Borough. 106 The M.P. for East Ham South argued 
that West Ham could merge with the non-county borough of Ley ton 
and East Ham with the non-county Borough of Barking, thus 
increasing their populations to the level suitable for county 
boroughs. 107 There is no evidence as to whether the views of 
Leyton and Barking were sought; the county boroughs may have 
been more concerned with saving their own independence than the 
views of their neighbours. Whichever, the county boroughs 
exhibi ted the same parochial outlook, and pursual of vested 
interests, as the majority of other local authorities. 
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The new London boroughs were all to have fewer councillors than 
the total number from their constituent old authorities. This 
required all boroughs to draw up plans for new wards. The re­
warding of boroughs became a highly political issue because the 
position of ward boundaries dictated the likely outcome of the 
political colour of elected councillors. In Finsbury, the 
Conservatives, Liberals and Communists complained at the new 
wards drawn up by the Labour controlled boroughs of Islington 
and Finsbury, which were due to merge. 1 06 Conservatives were 
critical of the new wards drawn up by Hammersmith and Fulharn 
Councils. 109 In Holborn, the Conservative and Labour groups 
accepted the need to divide the borough into just two wards but 
could not decide on the boundary between the twO. 110 The Home 
Secretary, who had the final responsibility for such matters, 
accepted the Labour Group's plan. lll In Middlesex, in the area 
to become Hillingdon, Conservatives in Ruislip and Northwood 
argued that Labour members in Hayes and Harlington, and West 
Drayton and Yiewsley had introduced a plan which dismantled the 
strongest Conservative wards. 112 There were many such 
arguments; they probably increased party political antipathy 
but made no impact on the nature or the speed of the reforms 
themselves. 
IV 
With the exception of the three county boroughs, the new London 
boroughs had more powers and more duties than those they 
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replaced. They were the primary uni ts of local government in 
Greater London and were powerful enough to be invited to join 
the County Boroughs Association. ll3 The new boroughs did work, 
and there is little sign of crisis after they took control in 
1965. Analysing the first five years in detail, Rhodes 
concluded it worked. 11" Lord Plummer felt that some boroughs 
took up to a decade to become fully efficient, but the system 
did work at least as well as that it replaced,li5 
The old district authorities do not appear to have had a great 
deal of influence over the process. Their views were usually 
tainted by parochialism, by party poli tics and by a 
determination to look after their own vested interests, without 
reference to what was best for Greater London as a whole. With 
such a divergent range of district authori ties there was no 
consensus among them regarding the best system of local 
government. The Royal Commission took account of their 
views,116 as did the Government.l 17 Nonetheless, the Government 
was able to create a new sys tern which angered many dis t r ict 
councils, Conservative as well as Labour. The second-tier 
authorities were divided and marginalised. 
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Pressure Groups 

I 
This chapter will demonstrate the complexity of the reform 
process. I t will show the wide range of non-party poli tical 
organizations which attempted to influence the process and 
asses their impact. By the use of three case studies it is 
possible to illuminate several important aspects of the role 
played by pressure groups. We can judge whether these three 
groups had any great impact on the process or not. 
It is not possible to separate the role of party politics from 
the role of other pressure groups. In this chapter the term 
pressure group is used to cover the broad spectrum of 
organizations and individuals who had a point of view on London 
government, or who had a position to defend or to enhance 
during the process of transition. Under such a definition the 
political parties were pressure groups, but this chapter goes 
beyond the role of organized political parties. 
As has been discussed in chapter two. 1 during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries local government in Greater London, as 
with the rest of Britain, provided a growing range of services 
and employed an ever increasing workforce. By the late 1950s 
many local authority employees were highly skilled, highly 
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qualified and highly vociferous professionals. Many of these 
staff were members of professional organizations. Such bodies 
were among the numerous pressure groups involved in the process 
of transition. Some, such as the London Teachers' Association, 
part of the National Union of Teachers, were only concerned 
with London. Other organizations, such as the Residential Child 
Care Association, were nation wide, but concerned with one 
aspect of one local government service. Others such as the Town 
Planning Institute were concerned for the welfare of their 
members employed in local government. For example, it claimed 
in 1963 that neither the G.L.C. nor the new boroughs were 
planning to employ enough town planning staff.2 It was, 
however, also concerned with very broad issues. The Town 
Planning Insti tute, along wi th the Town and Country Planning 
Association and the Royal Institute of British Architects, 
claimed the G.L.C. covered too small an area for proper 
planning. 3 
There were many instances of pressure groups whose members or 
special interests were in central government-sponsored 
administration, yet had reasons to be concerned with the nature 
of local government in Greater London. Among these were the 
Metropolitan Police, who provided written evidence to the Royal 
Commission regarding certain aspects of traffic regulation and 
supervision, but who took no other part in the debate 
surrounding the transition in London government. Other state 
owned bodies such as British Rail were not directly involved in 
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the process, but were brought in by other groups. For example, 
the London and Home Counties Electric Traction Society argued 
that Bri tish Rail should take control of the London 
Underground. 4 A further example which will be deal t wi th in 
greater detail is that of medical provision in Greater London. 
Many services were provided by the National Heal th Service, 
responsible to the Government, yet many other functions, 
including the Ambulance services, were provided by the upper-
tier local authorities. Medical provision was further 
complicated by the semi-independent nature of general medical 
practitioners, who worked with the N.H.S. and local 
au thori ties. The complexi ty of medical provision in Greater 
London led to a multiplicity of pressure groups concerned with 
medicine and health, and to several differences of opinion 
within these pressure groups. 
Because this thesis is primarily concerned with the local 
government structure of Greater London, it is possible to 
forget that Greater London contained, and indeed still does 
contain, a highly complex mixture of private organizations. 
individuals and functions - that is non-government financed or 
controlled offices, shops, banks, manufacturers, small 
businesses, large businesses, the headquarters of multi­
national firms. It also contains very many private buildings 
and plots of private land, also private houses and council 
owned housing. There can be few that were not touched by local 
government. and thus many wished to influence the nature of the 
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transition in London government. As an example, the Association 
of Land and Property Owners and the Associated Owners of City 
Property both told the Royal Commission that the L.C.C. should 
be abolished and required no upper-tier replacement. 5 This 
advice was directly opposite that of the London Standing 
Conference of Housing Es tates Communi ty Groups who wanted to 
retain a London-wide strategic housing authority and passed a 
motion calling for the retention of the L.C.C. in May 1962.6 A 
further example will help illustrate the diversity of the 
pressure groups offering opinions. The Federation of Theatre 
Unions claimed that to split town planning functions between 
the G.L.C. and the new boroughs would "cause the Government's 
plans for the theatre to fall between two stools."' Some groups 
such as the co-operative societies, trade unions and some 
housing associations had an input into L.L.P. decision making, 
and their role is often recorded in party records. It is more 
di fficul t to know which organizations attempted to influence 
Conservative Party decisions on Greater London government, and 
party records do not help.\ 
I It is impossible to judge with any certainty how many 
I individuals or groups attempted to influence the process of 
transition in London government, particularly those whoI attempted to influence the process outside the fairly open 
procedures of the Royal Commission, or through the media. We do 
not know all the factors which influenced the Government's 
decisions. For example we may not know all the factors that led 
I 
iI 
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to the preservation of the status of the City of London and the 
Inns of Court, even though the Royal Commission acknowledged 
that logic suggested the City of London be merged with the City 
of Westminster.s 
Apart from the specific fears of individual pressure groups 
there were some concerns regarding the potential nature 0 f 
local government in Greater London which were shared by several 
such groups. For example, several bodies were worried that 
transferring services from the old county councils to the new 
borough councils could lead to the fragmentation of local 
government services. Al though this chapter is based on three 
case studies it will draw out such common themes. 
I 
,
I 
II 
The first pressure group to be considered is the Metropolitan 
Water Board (M.W.B.). As has been described earlier,9 the 
M.W.B. was responsible for the supply of water in most of the 
review area, but not all of it. Members of the Board were 
appointed by local authorities within its area. As the largest 
of these local authorities, the L.C.C. apPointed the most 
members, fourteen of the sixty-six,lO but did not have enough 
members to dominate the Board. Members tended to reflect the 
political 
were not 
I 
,
f 
I 
i 
complexion of their appointing local authority, but 
necessarily local government councillors. For example, 
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several of the L . C . C. 's appointees were senior trade 
unionists. II 
As described in chapter three the functions undertaken by the 
M.W.B. had been excluded from the Royal Commission's remit.12 
When asked their opinion, the M.W.B. had argued that although 
its constitution was based upon the representation of the local 
authori ties wi thin its area of supply. the function of water 
supply was one which was necessarily governed by special, 
particularly hydro-geological, factors, and thus should be 
excluded from the terms of reference of the Royal Commission. 13 
When the Minister decided, however, after the M.W.B.'s advice 
not to include the supply of water in the Royal Commission's 
remit, he made it clear in Parliament that the supply of water 
would be considered separately later.14 
The government's decision to exclude the M.W.B. may have been 
taken in order to ease the complexi ty of the review, or to 
reduce the work load of the Royal Commission, or perhaps to 
reduce the number of pressure groups demanding change in the 
early processes of transition in London government. After all, 
the M.W.B. had made it plain in 1957 that it would oppose any 
detrimental change to its status. Yet the government, through 
the Minister of Housing and Local Government, planned such a 
detrimental change without consulting the M.W.B. In April 1962, 
after the publication of the report of the Royal Commission and 
the Government's white paper, Dr Hill, Minister of Housing and 
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Local Government, told the M.W.B. that it was to be taken over 
by the proposed G.L.C. and he allowed the M.W.B. only one month 
in which to reply to his proposals.l 5 
Despite the lack of time, the Board tried to mobilize a defence 
of its position. It became one of many pressure groups 
attempting to defend their own vested interests. The M.W.B. was 
saved not by its own campaign. but because of the lack of time 
available to the Government to legislate for the change in the 
administration of Greater London's water supply. 
The M.W.B. was unable to devise a powerful argument in defence 
of its continued exis tence. In its reply to the Minis ter it 
pointed out that the G.L.C. would cover 747 square miles and 
the M.B.W. only covered 419 square miles, and that 121 square 
miles of the Board's area was outside the G.L.C. area. The 
M.W.B. also argued that the Board worked well, that it was 
bigger than the next six largest water undertakings in Britain 
put together. Also, that it had successfully maintained normal 
water supplies during the drought in the summer of 1959, was 
efficient and had kept the water rates down to seven per cent 
during the six year period 1956 to 1962, which no other water 
undertaking had managed to do. i6 
There is no reason to doubt these facts. However, the M.W.B. 
could not argue that the actual water supply to Greater London 
would necessarily be damaged by the abolition of the Board. The 
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technical supply system was not to be changed, neither was the 
administration of the supply of water to be changed, only the 
poli tical oversight of water provision was to change. In the 
Ministry's reply to the M.W.B. it pointed out that, of the 
M.W.B. 's six million customers, only 280,000 lived outside the 
G.L.C. 's area. The Ministry also felt that the fact that some 
people in the G.L.C. area would still be supplied by other 
water undertakings did not matter.17 The point was that an ad 
hoc body like the M.W.B. could not really be justified when a 
directly elected body like the G.L.C. could supervise the 
supply of water through a Water Committee. ls 
The M.W.B. was not without allies. One of these was the L.L.P .. 
which was closely tied up with the fight to save the L.C.C. and 
so had a vested interest in saving the M.W.B. which would help 
to insure the maintenance of the status quo. The L.L.P. argued 
that the Minister wished to abolish the M.W.B. out of "punitive 
pique"19 because the Labour controlled Board had recently 
offered its staff a high pay award, which broke the 
Government's pay pause. It is not possible to prove or disprove 
this claim. As a defence of the M.W.B .. however, it fails to 
tackle the Ministry's argument that the G.L.C. was a more 
appropriate body to supervise water supply than the Board. The 
L.L.P.'s journal London News argued that there was no 
operational reason to transfer the M.W.B. and that it would 
preclude participation in the Board's replacement by the London 
boroughs. 20 Yet once again this defence failed to tackle the 
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argument that, as a directly elected Greater London-wide 
authority, the G.L.C. was better suited to the supervision of 
regional services than indirectly elected ad hoc Boards. 
Shortly after the announcement of the M.W.B. '8 forthcoming 
abolition in April 1962 the Board asked the Prime Minister to 
receive a delegation. In June 1962 the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government wrote to the Prime Minister explaining why he 
should reject the M.W.B.'s request. This letter, quoted at 
length, explains exactly why logic suggested that if the Royal 
Commission and Government view on local government was to be 
accepted then the M.W.B. 's days were numbered. 
The real reasons for our actions is that the Board 
will be an unnecessary body when the Greater London 
Council is set up ....The Board has, successfully 
enough, supplied water to London for 60 years, but it 
is neither far sighted nor quick moving. It has far 
too many members on it - nearly 90 - and many of 
these are of poor quality; its procedures are 
extremely cumbersome. The Board has its problems 
because of its size and the need to treat raw river 
water, but every water undertaking has its 
problems., .. We are not impressed with its claims to 
economy; any water undertaking which supplies water 
to such a densely populated area with no long 
unproductive mains ought to be able to do so fairly 
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cheaply.21 
This echoes very many of the arguments used to support the 
creation of the G.L.C. and new boroughs. The M.W.B. and local 
authorities in Greater London were neither far-sighted nor 
quick moving, they were both extremely cumbersome. Thus, if the 
old system of local government was to be swept away the M.W.B., 
as a pressure group, had Ii ttle chance of preventing its own 
abolition. This is also the view of S.K. Ruck and Gerald 
Rhodes, who wrote after the creation of the new system that: 
"There was, however, an obvious case for water to be a G.L.C. 
function. 1V22 
However, the M.W.B. survived. If the London Government Bill had 
sanctioned the abolition of the M.W.B. and the transference of 
its functions to the G.L.C., the nature of the Bill would have 
been transformed. It would have become a Hybrid Bill, rather 
than a Public Bill. Because Hybrid Bills affected private or 
limited interests such interests were allowed to employ legal 
arguments, and legal counsel, in their defence during the 
Committee stage of the Bill's Parliamentary progress. If this 
had happened to the London Government Bill it would qui te 
likely have been significantly delayed in passing through 
Parliament. This would have dramatically decreased the chances 
of the new system of local government for Greater London being 
in place before the General Election due by October 1964. The 
Conservative Government was not prepared to take such a risk. 
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Consequently, the plans to abolish the M.W.B. were postponed 
and the London Government Bill remained a Public Bill. 23 
In November 1965 membership of the Board was reduced and 
adjusted to reflect the pattern of new authorities in Greater 
London.24 This was the only significant alteration within the 
time scale of this thesis. The M.W.B. survived because of legal 
arguments over the London Government Bill, not because it was a 
successful pressure group. As a pressure group, it failed to 
force the Government to change its plans, and it failed to 
develop a logical case to justify its own survival within a 
radically changing system of local government. 
The argument was not about the technicalities of water supply. 
The Government accepted that the M.W.B. was reasonably 
efficient. It was about the most appropriate form of political 
control over strategic regional-wide services, such as the 
water supply. The M.W.B. was able to build a defence around the 
argument that the G.L.C. did not cover the entire M.W.B. area, 
and that it would cut out the role of the London boroughs. The 
Government's argument that a change in the control and, or, 
administration of a local government function, rather than a 
change in the funding and, or, technicalities of such a 
function, would produce a more appropriate service was applied 
to more than just Greater London's water supply, as this 
chapter will show. 
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The second example is that of medical services. This covers a 
broad range of pressure groups and a wide variety of services, 
not all of them local government functions. The N.H.S. hospital 
service was little affected by the restructuring of local 
governmen t in Greater London, but the ambulance service was 
provided by the upper-tier authorities. There were many 
clinics, health centres and other medical services provided by 
local authori ties. These services employed a wide range of 
professionals doctors, nurses, midwives, health visitors, 
public health inspectors and many more. It was often possible 
to distinguish between public health and personal health 
services, but the two were linked and occasionally difficult to 
separate. Because of this complexity, and because of the large 
number of professional groups representing different aspects of 
London's medical profession, there were several different 
points of view and many differences of emphasis among these 
various pressure groups. I t would not have been possible for 
the Royal Commission, or the Government, to accommodate the 
views of all pressure groups, nor to create a new system of 
seamless medical provision. 
One group which spanned the divide between public heal th and 
personal health was the District Medical Officers of Heal th 
(Greater London) Committee. Members were qualified medical 
doctors, and also experts in public health. They were, however, 
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employed by the district authorities and their interpretation 
of what was best for Greater London reflected that. 25 This 
committee felt that the prevention of disease was undervalued, 
that it should be given a higher priority and in many ways was 
more important than the curing of disease. The Committee felt 
that the great majority of personal and public health matters 
should be the responsibility of the district authorities so 
they could be co-ordinated with services like drainage, 
sewerage and the removal of household waste. The Royal 
Commission accepted this point: 
You are making the point that has been made to us 
very frequently, that you cannot in effect divorce 
the environmental heal th services from the personal 
health services, that the environmental heal th 
services. it is convenient to put them in a separate 
category, are just as much health services with the 
accent on prevention as the other heal th services; 
tha t is really the point is it not? - Yes, I think 
that is 50. 26 
In arguing for the majori ty of medical services to be the 
responsibility of the district authorities, the District 
Medical Officers failed to agree among themselves. One of the 
representatives from a county borough in Essex felt the 
ambulance service was efficiently run by the county boroughs, 
and could remain a dis tr ict au thori ty service, while members 
from other district authorities felt ambulances were best 
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provided on a regional basis, that is by the county councils.27 
Because the system as it existed worked only reasonably well, 
differences of opinion could develop. It worked well enough to 
avoid an absolute need for change, but services were not so 
efficient that calls for change were avoided altogether. 
Flexibili ty and co-operation allowed the county boroughs in 
Greater London to provide reasonable services. Allover Greater 
London district councils and county councils had developed ways 
of co-operating wi th each other. Thus, the ambulance service 
could be, and indeed had been, provided reasonably efficiently 
by both county councils and county borough councils. District 
Medical Officers of Heal th offered advice on how to improve 
medical services, but only recommended changes that were not 
detrimental to their own status or that of their councils. 
Many personal health services had been provided by the district 
authorities until 1946, when the government of the day had 
imposed the provision of these services upon the county 
councils instead. 28 Several of the county councils in Greater 
London had negotiated with their district authorities to return 
these services, but this had not happened. 29 At the centre of 
Greater London, the L.C.C. had agreed to return these services 
to the Metropolitan Boroughs. 3o It had been argued within the 
ruling group of the L.C.C. that these services had only been 
transferred to the county councils by the Minister of Health in 
order to compensate the county councils for the loss of their 
hospitals, which had been transferred to the new N.H.S.31 Such 
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views, whether true or not, helped to move the argument away 
from the basic question of which type of local authority, 
regional or district, was best suited to provide a 
comprehensive range of related services. Many pressure groups 
used arguments based on historical precedent, or the 
preconception of what was fair, rather than what was most 
efficient. The medical services were highly inter-connected and 
difficult to allocate without additional arguments. 
The L.C.C. argued that although many personal health services 
could be transferred to the boroughs, health, welfare and 
children's services could not be treated as a whole. 
Domiciliary services could be transferred to the boroughs, but 
aspects, such as old people's homes, which had developed 
wi thout regard to borough boundaries needed to be left under 
the direction of the county councils. 32 The provision of old 
people's homes was not directly part of personal health 
provision, but clearly had a close connection to such services. 
The L.C.C. also argued that it needed to retain control of the 
ambulance service, mental health provision, the school health 
service and other specialist health services such as its three 
T.B. hospitals and two holiday homes. 33 
\ 	 The decision as to which medical services needed to be provided 
by the regional authority and which by the district authority. 
depended to a large degree on the population levels of the new 
district authorities. The District Medical Officers of Health 
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(Greater London) Committee suggested that a population level of 
60,000 to 200,000 would allow such authorities to efficiently 
provide virtually all services. 34 The Royal College of 
Midwives, however, felt a population level of 200,000 to 
400,000 would be more appropriate. 35 They felt that only 
authorities of such size would be able to fully support a 
proper midwifery service. The Royal College of Nursing was 
primarily concerned to keep all personal health services 
together - health visitors, district nurses, nursery matrons, 
school nurses and others. I t was part icularly concerned that 
the school medical service be administered by the same 
authority as the children's service and welfare service. 36 
Thus, quite large district authorities were recommended, unless 
all services were to be run by the regional authority, 
especially if the school medical service was to be provided by 
the same authority as the education service. The Association of 
Public Health Inspectors and Guild of Public Health Inspectors 
also felt strongly that all public health matters should be the 
responsibility of one type of authority. They felt a grievance 
because some aspects of public heal th were split between the 
L.C.C. and the metropolitan boroughs: 
The division of responsibili ty for the heal th and 
welfare of shop workers is indefensible and all this 
work should be placed in the hands of boroughs and 
district councils as recommended by the Gowers 
Commi ttee. 3 7 
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A great deal of the professional opinion regarding public and 
personal heal th argued for an integrated service, which, of 
necessi ty, required large district authori ties. As has been 
detailed in earlier chapters, the transition in London 
government led to such a development. However, because of the 
diverse nature of medical services, not all professional groups 
were happy with that situation. The Local Medical Committee for 
the County of London did not wish to see any major change. The 
Local Medical Committee was part of the British Medical 
Association and represented general practitioners in the County 
of London. They were not employed by local authorities in 
Greater London, but worked very closely with local authorities. 
Through the N.H.S.' London Executive Council, the Local Medical 
Committee appointed some of its members to serve on the 
L.C.C. 's Divisional Health Committee's,38 thus G.P.'s had a 
direct influence on the L.C.C. 's medical services. The Local 
Medical Comrni t tee argued that prior to the National Heal th 
Service Act 1946, medical services in London had been 
fragmented and as a consequence G.P. 's had little influence, 
but after that date they were able to influence the L.C.C. in 
order to benefit the whole of London. 39 The Committee cast 
doubt on the ability of even quite large boroughs to carry out 
health services as well as the L.C.C. One of the Committee's 
members giving evidence to the Royal Commission spoke of his 
experience of working in Leeds, suggesting the same would 
happen if large London boroughs were responsible for such 
services: 
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I t is a small uni t. thinking is much slower. the 
type of person who serves on a council, and a man who 
has a responsible job to do in a large way has a much 
wider view of things and usually is much more 
tolerant and much more able. 4o 
Thus, the larger the unit the better quality of staff. 
The Local Medical Committee did not get its way. By 
incorporating some solutions to its major concerns in the new 
system, however. the Government was able to keep the Local 
Medical Committee reasonably content. The London Executive 
Council, an N.H.S. body established to oversee the N.H.S. work 
of G.P. 's, became the Inner London Executive Council. The Local 
Medical Committee supplied eleven members from a total of 
thirty-nine and was thus able to influence the nature of G.P. 
services in the area of the old County of London. 4 J Al though 
the Committee lost its direct influence on L.C.C. health 
services, as these were transferred to the new boroughs it was 
able to retain some influence over the new system through its 
appointees on bodies such as the Central Council for District 
Nursing, which was involved in establishing some aspects of! 
I local government health services in the new boroughs. 42 Minor 
changes were sufficient to allay the fears of some pressure 
I groups like the Local Medical Committee. 
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The Royal Commission's report, the Government's white paper and 
the London Government Bill all took note of the cri ticisms 
mentioned above. Populous boroughs were created and were given 
responsibility for all personal and public health matters with 
the exception of the ambulance service, refuse disposal and 
main sewers. Even though local government public and personal 
health services were extremely complex, and even though a 
mul t ipl ici ty 0 f pressure groups held sl ight ly di ffer ing views 
the principles of the new system met with little opposition 
from the professionals expected to run such services. This had 
as much to do with the underlying compatibility of many of the 
views expressed by pressure groups as with the Government' s 
ability to listen and act upon their advice. 
In his review of the new local government system in Greater 
London, five years after its creation, Rhodes' research team 
detailed several faults in the provision of personal health and 
welfare services. 43 He also suggested that many services 
suffered because they were no longer provided on a larger scale 
by the L.C.C. Desmond Plummer, the first Conservative Leader of 
the G.L.C., pointed out that in many cases it took ten years 
for the new boroughs to become as efficient as the old 
system. 44 Thus, although much of the advice of the medical 
related pressure groups was accepted by the Royal Commission 
and by the Government, the new system was not capable of 
incorporating all the best aspects of the old system. The old 
sys tern of publ ic and personal heal th worked, and if the new 
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system was better, it was still not perfect. This was probably 
inevi table, but if blame is to be apportioned, the various 
pressure groups must take some of it. 
IV 
The third area to be looked at in depth is education, and in 
particular the L.C.C. 's education service. Education presented 
many of the same problems as local government health services. 
Education in the whole of Greater London was a function of the 
county councils and county borough councils. However, in 
Greater London outside the L.C.C. there was a statutory 
obligation upon county councils to delegate some of their 
educa t ional funct ions to the larger district authorities in 
their respective areas. Many district authorities both inside 
the L.C.C. and the rest of Greater London wanted greater powers 
over education. As with health services, the provision of 
educa t ion was wi thin the Royal Commiss ion' s remi t , and thus 
members of the Commission had the opportunity to recommend any 
change they felt desirable. 
In common with personal and public health services, the 
provision of education was a complex matter. The L.C.C. was 
responsible for primary and secondary education, for many 
aspects of further education, technical education and special 
education. In the County of London education had developed with 
little regard to borough boundaries. Education was closely 
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linked to other local government functions such as the school 
medical service and children' s service, it also relied on 
other county council departments such as finance, architects, 
and supplies. 
Even though the Royal Commission recommended larger boroughs in 
Greater London, it was still unable to design a simple 
education system for Greater London. 45 The Commission suggested 
that the Council for Greater London should be the local 
education authori ty for Greater London, but wi th a statutory 
obligation to delegate very many of its education functions to 
the new boroughs. The Royal Commission's review area contained 
1,150,000 school children. 3,500 schools and 43,000 teachers.46 
The County Councils Association was one of a number of 
organizations which fel t that the Council for Greater London 
was far too big to be an effective education authority and that 
having to share education with the new boroughs would make the 
situation even worse. 47 The L.L.P. came to much the same 
conclusion. It felt that the Royal Commission's proposals were 
much the same as the system as it existed in Middlesex, which 
had caused a great deal of tens ion. The Middlesex Excepted 
Districts Association told the Royal Commission that the County 
Council had not fully co-operated wi th the district councils 
over the issue of delegation. The Association wanted its 
members to be full education authorities. 48 The L.L.P. also 
claimed delegation did not work.49 It argued that the Royal 
Commission had designed the Council for Greater London to suit 
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traffic and planning and education had been grafted onto that 
system: "In plain words, education has been subordinated to 
traffic. "50 
The L.C.C. argued against the Royal Commission's proposals on 
education, as on most other matters. The L.C.C. did not feel 
the new London boroughs would be able to provide adequately for 
further education and special education. It pointed out that 
6,300 disabled children attended special day schools, and 2,400 
of these had to attend outside their home borough. 51 The L.C.C. 
had several useful allies in its fight to save the L.C.C. 's 
education service. The London Teachers Association represented 
a great many of London's school teachers, and several groups 
I 
such as the London Education Protection Committee represented 
t parents, school governors and parent/teacher associations who! 
wanted to save the L.C.C. 's education service. 
\ 
The Government's white paper offered a different plan for 
educa t ion in Greater London. As has been detailed in chapter 
four,52 both the Minister of Education at that time, Sir David 
Eccles, and his Ministry saw the need for local education 
authorities to cover large populations. The white paper's localI 
! 
I 
education authority for Central London became the I.L.E.A. 
which preserved the L.C.C. 's education service. 53 
At the time, many saw this as a victory for the pressure groups 
which had attempted to save the L.C.C. or at least its 
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education service. Some were spurred on to ask for more L.C.C. 
services to be saved in a similar manner. The Hackney Gazette 
certainly believed the various pressure groups had been central 
to the Government's decision to save the L.C.C. 's education 
service. It pointed out: 
Protests were so very spontaneous and widespread 
that the Government has declared that London's 
present educational system will not be disrupted - at 
any rate for the time being. 54 
It went on to point out:­
The Metropolitan Juvenile Courts have issued a joint 
let ter to the effect it would be a tragedy if the 
children's services of the L.C.C. were destroyed. 55 
The Association of Child Care Officers and the Residential 
Child Care Association both argued shortly after the 
publication of the Government's whi te paper that child care 
should remain a responsibility of county councils. 56 This claim 
was used by the L.C.C. and others to demand that the L.C.C.'s 
children's service be treated in the same way as its education 
service. 57 The L.C.C. went further and claimed other L.C.C. 
services should be saved in the same manner as education. 58 By 
allowing the L.C.C. education service to survive the Government 
allowed pressure to develop to save other county council 
services. Yet the Government had little choice. The Ministry of 
Education did not approve of the Royal Commission's educational 
-358­
proposals, but to create even larger boroughs in order to 
placate the Ministry of Education would have been a challenge 
to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government's position on 
London Government. It would have also have dramatically changed 
the pattern recommended by the Royal Commission, and as such 
would have given those opposing any reform a stronger case, and 
at the same time weakened the Government. The process of reform 
could have collapsed if the Government had failed to keep the 
authority of the Royal Commission's findings behind it. If the 
Government had announced the L.C.C.'s education service was to 
continue in its white paper, while clearly stating there were 
to be no further concessions, it is possible the Governmen t 
would have avoided appearing to have backed down. This may have 
dampened the calls for further concessions from various 
pressure groups. The Government, however, did not have such an 
option. Less than a month before the publication of the white 
paper the Minister of Education and the Minister of Housing and 
Local Government were still unable to agree on the issue of 
education. 59 
Many Conservative's were bitterly opposed to the L.C.C. 's 
policy of increasing the number of comprehensive schools in 
London. Both national and local Conservative politicians wanted 
an end to the L.C.C. 's education service, seeing this as the 
best way to preserve London's grammar schools. Sir David Eccles 
acknowledged this in 1962: 
\ 
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I am sorry to have to say this. but I am aware ­
because they have made me aware of it - that some of 
my hon. friends feel that the L.C.C. has shown itself 
so doctrinaire in its educational planning that it 
would be worth almost any price to hand its 
responsibility to the boroughs. 6o 
Many Conservative's wanted the new inner London boroughs to be 
education authorities. 61 Thus, the preservation of the L.C.C. 's 
education service was a major set-back to many Conservatives. 
The 1947 London Schools Plan projected a total of sixty-seven 
comprehensive schools in London, and at that time the 
Conservative opposition on the L.C.C. acquiesced. 62 It was not 
until the schools started to open and to threaten the continued 
existence of grammar schools that Conservatives began to oppose 
the spread of comprehensive schools. Sir David Eccles, while 
showing no opposition to grammar schools, was prepared to see 
more comprehensive schools than many of his Party colleagues 
would have liked; in 1955 Eccles declined to speak in 
Paddington during the L.C.C. elections because he did not agree 
with the Conservative group's education policies. 63 In July 
1962 Eccles was replaced as Minister of Education by Sir Edward 
Boyle. He was on the left of the Conservative Party and had 
even fewer reservations concerning comprehensive education than 
his predecessor, although once again he demonstrated no outward 
hostility to grammar schools. However, as his biographer points 
\ 
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I out, that would have been impossible for a Conservative 
I Minister of Education in the early 1960s. 64 
! In early 1962 the L.C.C. announced that it was to merge fifteen 
of its twenty grammar schools into comprehensive schools. 65 The 
following year it announced plans to abandon the eleven plus 
examination with the support of Boyle. 66 These were only the 
last of a long line of educational decisions that had won some 
support from Conservative Ministers of Education, but which 
caused great opposi tion among many other Conservatives. The 
L.L.P. recognized that a Conservative controlled G.L.C. with 
educational powers would attempt to end comprehensive 
education.67 
There is no evidence to suggest that the Royal Commission was 
influenced by the debate concerning the merits or demerits of 
I comprehensive or grammar education. The issue, however, did 
! affect the Government's decisions. Even though the two 
Ministers concerned were not opponents of comprehensive 
I schooling, party politics meant they had little choice but to 
attempt to find some alternative to saving the L.C.C. 's 
education service. Enoch Powell confirmed that education was 
the most divisive topic in cabinet and the I.L.E.A. was only an 
accep table compromise, because of the promise to review its 
future after five years. 58 Delays in accepting the necessity of 
the I.L.E.A. heightened the sense of victory among those 
pressure groups wishing to see the L.C.C.'s education service 
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preserved,69 and, in turn, increased the belief among some that 
other L.C.C. services could also be treated in a similar 
manner. 70 
The L.C.C. 's education service was saved mainly because the 
Government was unable to find an alternative solution. The 
various groups seeking to retain the L.C.C.·s education service 
were no more responsible for its retention than the M.W.B. had 
been for its continued independence. Nonetheless both cases 
were open to the misinterpretation that the interested pressure 
groups were responsible for the changes in the Government· s 
plans for local government in Greater London. 
v 
It can be seen that pressure groups were a vital part of the 
process of transition. The Royal Commission's report drew from 
the opinions and advice of pressure groups political, 
professional, academic. These were the people who made local 
government work, or had at least studied in-depth the problems 
of local government, and thus the process could not have worked 
without their co-operation. Not all opinions could be 
accommodated within the new system. 
Some pressure groups, such as the majority of those concerned 
with public and personal health, presented their cases with the 
minimum of publicity, yet must have influenced the shape of the 
\ 
\ 
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new London government. Others, such as those concerned to save 
the L.C.C.·s education service, claimed success for their 
campaigns, when it was not so much their campaigns that won the 
day, but the Government's inability to find an alternative 
plan. 
Other potential pressure groups were neutralized. There was no 
Governmental attempt to make the G.L.C. a police authority, 
thus the issue was kept from the agenda. The same principle and 
practice applied to London Transport. The issue of whether a 
Greater London Au thor! ty should control public transport was 
raised. but it was beyond the scope of the official review and 
failed to become a major issue which could have brought many 
pressure groups into the equation. Water supply was brought 
into the process in April 1962, but at a late date which 
limited the time available for pressure groups to organize any 
opposition to the Government's plans. It was the limited time 
span available which forced the Government to abandon it plans 
for the M.W.B. 
Pressure groups were an essential part of a complex process 
such as the transition in London government. The advice of many 
such groups was sought by the Royal Commission. 71 However, it 
is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of any unofficial 
and unrecorded pressure that may have been applied to the Royal 
Commission or the Government during the transi tion in London 
government. What this chapter does illustrate is that very few 
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local government fUnctions within Greater London were so 
clearly in need of reform that various pressure groups, often 
defending a vested interest, were not able to devise a defence 
for the status quo. It also demonstrates that on many occasions 
those defending the existing structure in individual services 
were introducing broader issues that concerned local 
government generally. Among such issues was whether 
transferring services to district councils away from county 
councils would fragment and damage services or whether it would 
lead to a greater responsiveness to local needs. 
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Chapter Ten 
Continuity and change 
the G.L.C. in Action 
I 
This final chapter is concerned not wi th the creation of the 
G.L.C., but with its operation. It will analyse the nature of 
local government in Greater London from the first C.L.C. 
election, in April 1964, to the end of 1967, eight months after 
the second G.L.C. election and the coming to power of the first 
G.L.C. Conservative administration. 
This chapter will examine whether there were any unexpected 
problems wi thin the new local government system for Greater 
London. It will also examine whether the G.L.C. developed into 
a different organization to that created by the London 
Government Act, 1963, and if so, who was responsible, and why. 
It also aims to examine how the G.L.C. was perceived by those 
elected to it, by the new London boroughs, by other local 
authorities, by the Government, by the media and by Londoners. 
II 
On the 9 April 1964 the first election for the G.L.C took 
place. Labour won a comfortable majori ty, winning sixty-four 
seats to the Conservative's thirty-six.l A month later the 
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first elections for the new London boroughs took place, and 
again Labour did well, taking control of twenty borough 
councils to the Conservatives twelve. 2 The national 
unpopulari ty of the Conservatives at the time seems to have 
played a part in the Labour victories. 3 The reason is of little 
consequence. For whatever reason, for the first three years of 
their existence, and the first two years of power, within the 
new local authorities in Greater London Labour was to have the 
greater share of power. 
Just under one year later on the 1 April 1965 the G.L.C. and 
the new boroughs took power as the old mixture of authorities 
passed into history. (With the exception of the Corporation of 
London and Harrow which continued to exist, but with the new 
powers and functions of London boroughs.) 
One two-tiered system had been replaced by another, but 
attempts had been made to create two levels of local government 
that could work together as co-equals, one regional and 
strategic in outlook and one serving the day-by-day needs of 
local communities. Much effort had been put into insuring good 
co-operation between the G.L.C. and the new boroughs, rather 
than the lack of understanding and even conflict which had 
often been the case between the old counties and their district 
councils. As a Conservative policy document expressed the local 
government system in London: 
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The key to success is a real, active and friendly 
partnership between the London Boroughs and the 
Greater London Council. Their roles are complimentary 
not conflicting. We will not allow to develop again a 
si tuation where a remote London County Council has 
dominated the Metropolitan Boroughs. 4 
Unfortunately the policy document did not make it clear just 
how such a harmonious relationship could be maintained at all 
times. There were many areas of conflict between the G.L.C. and 
the London boroughs. The very division of responsibility 
necessitated that the G.L.C. should have a strategic view of 
the whole of the Greater London and that the London boroughs 
should confine their functions to their own neighbourhoods. 
This created two very different modes of thought. and often 
concerning the same subject. Clashes were inevitable. 
The compromise over education had created two classes of London 
boroughs: those in outer London, which were Local Education 
Authorities, and those in inner London, that had no education 
functions. The Inner London Education Authori ty was not an 
ordinary G.L.C. committee. 5 All G.L.C. councillors from the 
twelve inner London boroughs were members of the I.L.E.A. and 
each of those twelve boroughs along with the Ci ty of London 
appointed one of their own councillors to the I.L.E.A., thus 
giving the boroughs some limited influence over inner London 
education. 
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The financial arrangements for inner London education allowed 
the I.L.E.A., not the full G.L.C., to set the level of the 
precept to be issued to the inner London boroughs and to set 
its own borrowing requirements. 6 The G.L.C. had no control over 
these finances, yet was responsible for issuing the rates 
precept to the inner London boroughs. So. although the I.L.E.A. 
was a special committee of the G.L.C. and was dominated by 
G.L.C. councillors, used the G.L.C.'s County Hall as its own 
headquarters, and used G.L.C. officers in its own 
administration, the G.L.C. lacked control over the I.L.E.A.7 
This created a huge potential for conflict because the inner 
London boroughs were to be told each year to raise. through 
their rate demand, a sum to be handed to the G.L.C. to pay for 
the education provisions over which each borough had Ii ttle 
control. This did cause some resentment within the inner London 
boroughs. The G. L. C. was blamed, because it was so closely 
connected to the control of the I.L.E.A.B 
Although there were wide differences in population levels among 
the London boroughs, the inner London boroughs did not, 
generally, have smaller populations than the outer London 
boroughs.9 Thus. they could have become as efficient education 
authorities as the outer London boroughs. 10 Initially the 
London Government Act, 1963, established the need for a review 
of the administration of educational facilities in inner London 
by not later than March 1970. This review could have abolished 
the I.L.E.A. and given the inner London boroughs the additional 
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role and status of Local Education Authorities on the same 
basis as the outer London boroughs. The need for this review 
was rescinded by the new Labour Government elected in October 
1964, which reduced the likelihood of the inner London boroughs 
gaining the same educational status as the outer London 
boroughs. 
In February 1965. even before the new authorities took power, 
the Camden, Holborn and Finsbury Guardian pointed out that the 
I.L.E.A. was set to cost inner London ratepayers £87,045,000 in 
the following year which was a seven-and-a-half per cent 
increase over the cost of the L.C.C.·s education service for 
the year ending 1965. 11 As the article pointed out such an 
increase in costs was likely to add to the tension between the 
G.L.C. and the boroughs. Because the I.L.E.A. took control of 
the L. C. C. 's education service and because poli tical control 
remained firmly in Labour's hands, many of the pre-existing 
tensions continued, particularly the politically sensitive 
issue of the future of grammar schools. If education had been 
in the hands of the boroughs. the issue would not have gone 
away, but it would have been an issue dividing central 
government and some of the London boroughs, not a cause of 
tension between the boroughs and the G.L.C. In the initial 
years following 1965 the new boroughs and the G.L.C. were too 
busy ensuring their own efficiency to worry overmuch about 
demanding a change in the division of powers but as early as 
May 1967 the G.L.C. and Greenwich were in dispute over the 
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I.L.E.A. 's determination to impose comprehensive schools on the 
schoolchildren of that borough. 12 
In April 1967 the Conservatives won control of the G.L.C. and 
I.L.E.A. with a massive G.L.C. majority. They won eighty-two 
seats to Labour's eighteen. 13 Yet. whatever the personal 
feelings of Conservative Councillors they had a statutory duty 
to continue the I.L.E.A. Thus. the new Conservative 
administration could do little to ease any tension between the 
inner London boroughs and the I.L.E.A. 
In late 1964 the new Labour Home Secretary considered amending 
the London Government Act. 1963, so that the L.C.C.'s 
children's service could be saved in much the same manner as 
the L.C.C. 's education service. This would have reduced the 
functions of the inner London boroughs. In consequence it would 
have further increased the differences between inner and outer 
London boroughs and added to the possible causes of tension 
between the G. L . C . and the boroughs. The G. L . C accep ted the 
Home Secretary's recommendations and was prepared to administer 
the L.C.C.'s children's service. 14 In early 1965, however, the 
Home Secretary decided not to amend the London Government Act. 
Consequently, the inner London boroughs took control of the 
L.C.C.'s children's service as originally intended. This move 
by the Labour Government demonstrated that the powers of the 
new London boroughs were not sacrosanct and that it was 
possible for a government to enhance the power of the G.L.C. at 
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the expense of the boroughs. There is no direct evidence that 
this incident increased the tension between the G.L.C. and the 
London boroughs, but it is possible. 
Education was not the only policy area that caused tension 
between the G.L.C. and the new boroughs. As a county council 
the L.C.C. had been unusual in having any housing powers at 
all. No other county council within Greater London had had such 
powers. The L.C.C., however, had had the right to purchase land 
outside the county of London and had developed large housing 
estates in very many parts of Greater London. The London 
Government Act. 1963, gave most of the L.C.C. 's housing 
functions to the G.L.C. for a period of transition, up to, but 
not exceding five years. Even after this period, the G.L.C. 
was to have extensive housing powers. although most of its 
building was to be outside Greater London. Nonetheless the 
G.L.C. was allowed to build within Greater London with the 
permission of the borough involved but without the borough' s 
permission in some limited cases. 15 This gave scope for 
disagreement over land use. 
Even before the G.L.C. had formally replaced the L.C.C., there 
arose a dispute over a newly vacant twenty acres of land in the 
Metropolitan Borough of St.Marylebone. Both the G.L.C. and the 
borough wanted to develop the site. The Chairman of the 
G.L.C. 's Housing Committee called St.Marylebone selfish for not 
handing the land to the G.L.C,IS Shortly after the new Labour 
-379­
I 
", 

J 

I Government announced that it was relying on the G.L.C. to meetI 
London's housing needs without reference to the role to be 
played by the boroughs. 17 In a further example, Illtyd 
Harrington, later to be Chairman of the G.L.C., recollected 
that the Government gave the G.L.C. large areas of land at the 
site of the old Hendon airport and at Thamesmead. 18 
In the early years of the G.L.C. there were cases of the 
authority not getting its own way regarding re-development of 
sites. In October 1966, Sutton Borough Council demolished a row 
of old dilapidated almshouses in order to build a new school. 
The G. L. C. had argued they should have been refurbished, but 
Sutton told it to mind its own business. 19 The same G.L.C. 
Housing Chairman, Evelyn Denington, who had called 
St.Marylebone selfish, also argued with Bexley over the 
G.L.C. 's wish to build houses in the borough. 20 
Sir Keith Joseph. the last Conservative Minister of Housing and 
Local Government before the Conservatives lost the October 1964 
general election, had announced that he envisaged a major 
housing function for the G.L.C. even after most of the 
inherited L.C.C. housing powers had ceased to function 
following the transitional five year period. 21 Nonetheless, it 
was clear from the provisions of the London Government Act that 
the majority of council housing stock in Greater London was to 
be owned by the individual boroughs after the five years of 
transition. The first Conservative administration to take 
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control of the G.L.C., in April 1967, made an effort to ease 
tension regarding housing and redevelopment through a plan to 
transfer the G.L.C.'s inherited housing stock to the boroughs. 
This was to be in three stages. the last to be in the mid­
1970s. 22 Sir Ashley Bramall. however, a senior Labour member of 
the G.L.C., pointed out the Conservative controlled G.L.C. 
found it difficult to transfer such large numbers of dwellings 
quickly, and it was not until 1985 that the last G.L.C. housing 
estate was handed over to the borough's control. (Tower Hamlets 
in that case.)2 3 
From the earliest days of the new system the building of new 
council housing, redevelopment of land and even the control of 
existing housing stock caused tensions between the G.L.C. and 
the boroughs. Other areas of local government service, such as 
education, also caused tension. The G.L.C. and the new London 
boroughs were not designed to be rivals, but in many fields 
they soon became so. According to Bramall, Newham and Croydon 
simply resented the G.L.C.: they disliked any interference 
because they had been county boroughs. 24 Thus, some inherent 
tension existed in the system even before the operation of the 
new system created yet more tension. 
III 
Much effort during the period of transition had been put into 
devising the optimum size for the new London boroughs. Many 
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functions undertaken by the previous upper-tier authorities 
were to be the responsibility of the new boroughs, yet they 
were to remain small enough to be sensitive to local needs and 
issues. There had been fears that they would prove too small to 
undertake some of the new tasks expected of them. The Local 
Government Sub-Committee of the Labour Party's National 
Executive Committee had expressed fears that many services, 
such as children's, education, and health, previously 
undertaken by county councils would be fragmented and less 
efficient. 25 As detailed above. the Labour Government elected 
in 1964 considered transferring some of the L.C.C. 's children's 
service to the G.L.C. rather than to the boroughs because of 
this. Under this plan, the G.L.C. was to be allowed to provide 
some residential accommodation, and it would have reviewed the 
amount of accommodation available in remand homes, children's 
homes and in hos tels. Also under the Labour Party proposals, 
several L.C.C. and Middlesex County Council remand and 
children's homes would have been transferred to the G. L. C.• 
rather than individual boroughs. 2 6 These changes to the new 
system were not introduced, but their mere consideration 
demonstrated that the new Labour Government had fears that the 
boroughs were not suitable for all the services they were 
expected to provide. 
Seven years after the introduction of the new system, Gerald 
Rhodes of the London School of Economics' Greater London Group 
edi ted a book, The New Government of London; The First Five 
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efficiency or otherwise of the new boroughs and the services 
they were providing. In summary, the findings of the study were 
that the worst fears of those who felt the boroughs would be 
incapable of coping had not been realized: the new boroughs 
were performing most of their functions to a reasonable 
standard. However, some of the earlier predictions of a drop in 
the qual i ty of some services had, to a certain extent, come 
true. The analysis of children's services in the new boroughs 
had found that they tended to employ less professional staff 
than the old counties, that staff had to deal with the broad 
range of children's issues rather than specializing, and that 
the small numbers employed could lead to staff shortages during 
times of sickness and holidays among the staff.27 The analysis 
of education services in Greater London found that, in the case 
of special schools and colleges, the boroughs were trying to 
tackle problems in isolation rather than co-operating with each 
other and the boroughs consequently did not have the facilities 
to offer a wide range of courses. 2S Rhode's book found similar 
faults in borough housing services, in transport and highways 
planning (responsibili ty was shared between the boroughs and 
the G.L.C.). and in some other aspects. 
Rhodes was certainly not arguing that the new system was a 
failure. and he was not arguing that it was beyond further 
improvement. What the closely argued and detailed analysis in 
his book does show is that not only were there many problems 
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associated with the newness of the London boroughs, but that 
the years of detailed research and debate leading up to the the 
introduction of the new system had failed to find a perfect 
size for the new district authorities or a perfect distribution 
of functions between district and regional authorities. The 
book also implici tly acknowledges that no perfect system was 
possible. Desmond Plummer, the first Conservative Leader of the 
G.L.C. was also of the opinion that the boroughs were far from 
perfect. He felt that it has only been since the 1980s that 
many of the complex services provided by the boroughs have 
began to work properly.29 
There had also been considerable debate concerning the size and 
functions of the regional authority for Greater London and the 
establishment of the G.L.C. did not stop such debate. Peter 
Hall in his book London 2000. published in 1963, just before 
the new local authori ties were elected. argued that the new 
system had produced a good balance between the new boroughs and 
the G.L.C. He also supported the creation of a regional 
authority, but felt the G.L.C. was too small to be a proper 
regional planning authority.3D Before the election of the 
Labour Government in October 1964, the Labour Party spokesman 
on local government, Michael Stewart M.P., also argued that the 
G.L.C was too small. He pointed out that the G.L.C. 's main 
functions were to be housing, education in inner London, and 
planning. Moreover, he argued the G.L.C. would be encouraged to 
work with the surrounding counties because: 
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... the commuters in Surrey, Hertfordshire, etc 
beyond the G.L.C. border are part of London's traffic 
problem. The Tory refusal when passing the London 
Government Act to establish a South-East Regional 
Authori ty shows their failure to grasp this 
problem. 31 
There had been other similar concerns expressed about the 
G.L.C. 's powers. The Royal Institute of British Architects had 
argued that the G.L.C. needed stronger planning powers. It used 
the example of the scheme to segregate vehicles and pedestrians 
in the City of London and Holborn and argued that the G.L.C. 
needed to be able to supervise the boroughs concerned. 3 2 The 
Town Planning Institute was similarly concerned and felt that 
neither the G.L.C. nor the boroughs were likely to employ 
enough town planners. 33 
The Conservative Party when in government and politically 
responsible for the nature of the G.L.C. had recognized that it 
was not an ideal size for all of its functions. In a research 
document. London's Government, produced by the Central Office's 
Research Department in October 1963. it was accepted that there 
would be a continuing need for all the county councils in the 
South-East of England to co-operate on many planning issues. 
The document goes on to claim, however, that the G.L.C. would 
have some worthwhile planning functions. 34 
I 
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Because the G.L.C. 's size and range of functions were not 
sufficient to tackle all Greater London or South-East England 
regional problems, other bodies, often the central government. 
had to fill such vacuums. Greater London Conservatives, in 
their fist G.L.C. manifesto for the 1964 G.L.C. election, 
demonstrated (probably inadvertently) that some aspects of 
planning and redevelopment were beyond the powers of the new 
regional authori ty. The London Conservatives promised London 
voters that if elected they would endeavour to persuade the 
Government to double expenditure on new roads and to invest in 
new underground and over-ground railway lines. 35 Thus, the 
Conservatives were admitting that the G.L.C. was powerless to 
tackle such issues: all it could do, like its predecessors, was 
attempt to persuade central government to tackle problems 
concerning roads and transport in Greater London. 
At the same election the Leader of the Labour group of 
candidates. and after the election first leader of the G.L.C., 
William Fiske, was able to be more explicit in his criticism of 
the G.L.C. His party had consistently opposed the creation of 
the council. Fiske told the electors of Greater London that if 
a Labour Government was elected at the forthcoming general 
election it would hope to introduce a truly regional system of 
government. He held out the prospect of a regional government 
for South-East England and the re-establishment of both the 
Middlesex and London County Councils. 36 
-386­
¢ 
I 
i
! 
t 
In 1963 Peter Hall had written: 
Today, in the early sixties, we stand on a critical 
watershed in the history of traffic planning in 
London. For the first time in decades, the money is 
being made available for major roads building: £10 
million a year over the next ten years in the L.C.C. 
area alone. In the late sixties, as the main network 
of inter-ci ty long- dis tance motorways is completed, 
the pace of urban construction is likely to increase 
even further. Al ready in 1963, work had began on 
London's first urban motorway: the M4, to join west 
London wi th London airport and the Great West Road 
beyond Maidenhead. The seeds of the American vicious 
circle are thus already sown: construction generates 
traffic, generates demand for more construction, 
generates votes, generates election promises, 
generates more construction. Unless we lay the 
foundation now of a coherent transport policy for the 
decades to come, the process bids to overwhelm us ­
and London. 37 
This was a prediction that London would be overwhelmed, but a 
prediction that the G.L.C. was virtually powerless to act upon. 
Most of the money and most of the direction came from central 
government. In July 1966, shortly after the G.L.C. had 
published the second part of its own London Traffic Survey 
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double by 1981, the Evening Standard called for: "More 
Motorways to stop the suburbs seizing up. "38 Yet the G.L.C .• 
responsible for urban Greater London alone, did not have the 
powers or the finance to undertake such a programme. In April 
1967, the Chairman of the Highways and Traffic Committee, Jane 
Phillips, argued that there was no room in London for two-car 
families. 39 Yet once again the G.L.C. had no power to implement 
any policy aimed at restricting the number of cars owned by 
Londoners. 
The related issues of planning, roads and traffic demonstrate 
that the G.L.C. was unable to solve some of Greater London's 
problems. The limited range of powers conferred upon the G.L.C. 
did restrict its ability to serve Londoners. It would be 
possible to find many other issues beyond the control of the 
G.L.C. - the N.H.S. was beyond G.L.C. control, as were most 
other aspects of Greater London's health services. The G.L.C. 
had no power over commuters and limited powers over their 
employers. The G.L.C. had to attempt to influence central 
government to aide the creation of work when employment began 
to become sparse. Even in London t s dock area the G. L. C. had 
Ii ttle influence over redevelopment when the docks closed in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Horace Cutler, the last Conservative 
Leader of the G.L.C., argued that the Secretary of State for 
the Environment, Peter Walker, refused to listen to the G.L.C. 
in 1971 when it recommended a local solution involving the 
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I G.L.C. and the relevant London boroughs to solve the growing problems faced by the increasingly derelict dock lands area. 40I 
As with the new London boroughs, there had been no claim that 
the G.L.C. would be faultless, and there had never been a 
suggestion that central government would cease to take an 
active interest in the affairs of Greater London. Nonetheless. 
the G.L.C. 's inherent limitations soon became apparent and 
loyal Conservatives such as Horace Cutler were able to argue it 
required dramatic reform to both its area and its functions. 41 
IV 
Unlike many other local authorities in Britain during the 
1960s, both the G.L.C. and the new London boroughs were subject 
to party political control.4 2 Before the introduction of the 
new system there had been 290 county councillors in Greater 
London and this had been reduced to 100 members of the G.L.C. 
The 2,995 borough or district councillors in Greater London had 
been reduced to 1,920. 43 All G.L.C. councillors belonged to 
either the Conservative or Labour groups. Within the boroughs 
only sixteen Liberals. three Communists and fifty-six 
ratepayers or Independents interrupted the Conservative and 
Labour pattern. 44 Initially, Conservative controlled boroughs 
had to work with a Labour controlled G.L.C. This was followed 
by a period when the Labour controlled boroughs had to work 
with a Conservative G.L.C. At periods in its history. a 
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Conservative controlled G.L.C. had to co-operate with a Labour 
national government and a Labour G.L.C. with a Conservative 
na tional government. By and large local government services 
continued unaffected by such issues, but such political 
complexities probably created tensions between the national 
government and the G.L.C. 
The deeply party political nature of local government in 
Greater London did heighten tensions in the system. It created 
more argument and a greater exploitation of weaknesses in the 
system by local politicians. For example, Jane Phillips' 
comments about Greater London not having room for two car 
families mentioned above caused political controversy. The 
Conservative opposition on the G.L.C. attacked the argument in 
the press not in the council chamber. There is no evidence in 
the G.L.C. minutes that the issue was ever discussed by the 
full council. The Evening Standard, described by one leading 
Labour Councillor as "Not Friendly"45 towards Labour. carried 
the Conservative Group Leaders arguments against Jane Phillips' 
case. 46 Unfriendly or not, the same newspaper also detailed 
William Fiske' s defence of his Chairman of the Highways and 
Traffic Committee. 47 After the Conservatives won control of the 
G.L.C. in April 1967, the council remained as politically 
divided as before. Conservative policies regarding education, 
housing, and many other areas were covered in the Evening 
Standard and elsewhere. Press coverage usually included the 
Labour opposition Group's view, often the reverse of that 
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proposed by the council. 48 Conflict between the political 
parties on the G.L.C. was common, as were conflicts between 
boroughs and the G.L.C. Horace Cutler identified a further case 
of tension that between G.L.C. Councillors from inner London 
and from outer London. He felt the Conservative Group, 
particularly when in opposition, was dominated by an outer 
London ethos and the Labour Group, particularly when in 
opposition, was dominated by an inner London ethos.49 Many of 
these differences of opinion received full coverage in local or 
regional newspapers. 
v 
The very large size of Greater London, and the resources of the 
G.L.C., caused many problems for the council. By the mid-1960s 
Greater London's half million acres had a population of just 
under 8,000,000 people. 5o The following quote from F.E. 
Hamilton, although it refers to the mid-1980s. gives a good 
impression of the wealth of Greater London . 
.. .Greater London's economic size by its gross 
regional product .... amounted to U.S. $78b in 1985. 
equal to 17.1% of the U.K. G.D.P. and 3.9% of the 
E.C. G.D.P. making the City the 25th largest 
economic unit among the world's 212 independent 
territories or nations. London created as much G.D.P. 
as all the last 108 smaller and least developed of 
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the sales turnover of all the mul tinationals 
excepting only G.M. and Exxon. 51 
Only a very small fraction of this wealth was at the disposal 
of the G.L.C. Consequently at no stage of its history did the 
G.L.C. have the resources to solve all of Greater London's 
social and economic problems. Nevertheless, such statistics 
helped to create an image of a wealthy region with the C.L.C. 
at the political pinnacle of that region. Although the G.L.C. 
received all its powers from Parliament, which retained the 
power to legislate the G. L. C. out of existence, there were 
signs of unease and perhaps jealousy among national politicians 
about the size, power and wealth of the G.L.C. 
The Ministry of Housing and Local Government treated the G.L.C. 
not as just one more local authori ty, but gave ita special 
status of its own, the equivalent of the six Local Government 
Associations. 52 This meant, at its crudest interpretation, the 
influence of the G.L.C. within Whitehall was as great as all 
Bri tain' s county councils in combination. Because London was 
the centre of national power, the seat of government and 
national administration. the G.L.C. was physically closer to 
the centre of power than any other local authority. Many 
politicians were able to make the move from County Hall to the 
House of Commons, and many national politicians were able to 
maintain close links between Parliament and G.L.C. This gave 
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the G.L.C. great influence, as Richard Crossman pointed out in 
his diary shortly after being appointed Minister of Housing and 
Local Government in the new Labour Government of October 1964: 
My God! The L.C.C. pressure group is a formidable 
thing in a Labour cabinet. There they all were, 
Gerald Gardiner, our Lord Chancellor, once an L.C.C. 
member; Barbara Castle her husband Ted on the 
G.L.C.; Michael Stewart, with his wife a member too; 
all there pressuring, levering. to try to help the 
G.L.C. to get its way against the Lord President and 
the Chief Whip and myself •...Well, we were pressured 
and pressured but we kept them at bay.53 
Crossman did not mention that Audrey Callaghan. wife of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, one of the most 
powerful men in the Cabinet, was also a member of the G.L.C. It 
is possible that James Callaghan chose not to try and influence 
the Cabinet in favour of the G.L.C. There were also a number of 
other Ministers and backbenchers who had connections with the 
G.L.C. As Crossman showed, the G.L.C. did not always persuade 
the government of the day of its view, but it had influence at 
the heart of power. When Edward Heath formed his Government in 
1970, one of his closest allies, Geoffrey Rippon, was a former 
leader of the Conservative Group on the L.C.C. and other 
Conservative M.P. 's had connections to the G.L.C. There is, 
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however. no evidence of the G.L.C. having influenced any 
particular government policy through informal cabinet links. 
Many members of the G.L.C. were quite aware of the power, 
influence and prestige of the G.L.C. Illtyd Harrington said of 
the first Labour administration at the G.L.C. that it had a 
civilizing mission that it had inherited from the L.C.C.: 
... it was under people who knew about relationships 
with government, and in fact this interface between 
politicians at Westminster and us was very good 
indeed .... The Labour Government wanted to help, ... it 
was like we had been given this Kingdom to work 
on ....We had a budget bigger, ...well. if we had gone 
into the United Nations we used to say we would have 
been the nineteenth nation. When I was responsible 
for the budget in the 1970s it was £5,OOOm so you had 
a sense of government, ... 54 
When Desmond Plummer became leader of the G. L. C., following 
Conserva t i ve success at the April 1967 G. L. C. elections, the 
Evening Standard referred to Plummer as London's new Prime 
Minis ter and referred to his new Cabinet. 55 Plummer does not 
seem to have ever used either term himself, but when speaking 
at a conference in Budapest in 1972 he referred to the G.L.C. 
as the first 'super' council, the first regional authority in 
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team of 120,000 permanent staff.56 
I t seems hardly surprising that the size, power, wealth and 
influence of the G.L.C. and the confidence and pride of leading 
G.L.C. Councillors were capable of causing fear, distrust and 
possibly jealousy among national politicians and others vying 
for power and influence. 
The G.L.C .• while sharing local government power with the 
boroughs, represented for the first time a regional authority 
capable of controlling and co-ordinating many more regional 
services than the old county councils. The G.L.C. 's area almost 
coincided with the Metropolitan Police's area, and it included 
almost all of the Metropolitan Water Board's area. It had been 
the Conservative Government's intention in 1962 that the G.L.C. 
should take control of the M.W.B., and it had been suggested, 
by Mr T. Iremonger, Conservative M.P. for Ilford, that the 
G.L.C. should become the Police Authority for the Metropolitan 
Police· 57 There were many other public services which could 
have been transferred to the G.L.C .• services which the old 
fragmented system of upper-tier authorities in Greater London 
would have found it difficult to control and co-ordinate. This 
could have included British Rail short distance commuter lines, 
or government N.H.S. and social security services. 
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One such service the G.L.C. did take control of was London's 
bus and underground railway systems. Barbara Castle, the 
Minister of Transport in the Labour Government, initiated the 
idea. She argued that in a climate of increasing road use there 
was a need for democratically accountable passenger transport 
authorities with a remit to expand public transport and 
integrate road and rail services. 58 Castle felt the G.L.C. was 
ideal for such a passenger transport authority, and at a 
meeting with William Fiske, leader of the G.L.C., Jane 
Phillips, Chairman of the Highways and Traffic Committee, and 
he rhusband (he was a member 0 f the G. L . C. 's Highways and 
Traffic Committee) in November 1966 got the G.L.C. 's support. 59 
Castle explained in her diary: 
...we must break through the vicious spiral of 
rising fares, falling use of public transport, 
declining services and so on. My aim is to make the 
G.L.C. sit up and do something radical about parking. 
It isn't their fault that it has taken them two years 
to build up the necessary staff for effective traffic 
management. Nor is it their fault they have to share 
their powers with the boroughs .... But nonetheless it 
is time the G. L. C. showed some fight. I left them 
absolutely scared by the thought of a massive fares 
increase and. I hope, ready to demand action. 50 
So. even when reluctant, the G.L.C. could be bullied into 
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accepting more powers and into plans of action it would not 
necessarily have adopted if left alone. Castle was offering to 
supply a government subsidy to keep public transport fares low 
if the G.L.C. would accept responsibility for London Transport 
and co-ordinate it with traffic management schemes. Fiske and 
his colleagues had only been a little concerned about the 
financial implications to the G.L.C., but the Conservative 
Group were opposed to the principle. Desmond Plummer argued for 
a Traffic 'overlord' for Greater London who would not be a 
G.L.C. officer and who would co-ordinate London transport, 
British Rail, traffic control and police enforcement. 61 
Castle, a long serving labour politician called the G.L.C. 
election of April 1967: "Catastrophic! Nothing less than a 
massacre. "62 She did not have such an easy relationship wi th 
Plummer as she had done with Fiske, but she set about forcing 
the Conservative controlled G.L.C. into accepting her plans. 63 
Castle pushed and the G.L.C. gave way. The Transport (London) 
Act, 1969 transferred London Transport to the G.L.C. In 1970 
the London Passenger Transport Board became the London 
Transport Executive and political control passed to the G.L.C. 
Ruck and Rhodes exp lained the magni tude 0 f the G. L. C. • s new 
powers: 
The fundamental purpose of the proposals in the 
whi te paper was to give the G.L.C. the powers to 
enable it to integrate planning, major highway 
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functions. traffic measures and the broad direction 
of passenger transport services. 64 
Even with doubts from the Labour controlled G.L.C. and 
outright opposition from the Conservative controlled G.L.C., 
the council had been given major new powers. With control of 
buses and the underground it was able to exercise functions 
that spilled out into neighbouring counties. It seems likely 
neighbours saw the G.L.C. as over-powerful and capable of 
further extensions to its powers, its area, and its influence. 
It is also possible that the G.L.C.'s ability to attract more 
powers and its latent potential to take control of other 
region-wide services from central government, or other bodies, 
caused the G.L.C. to be resented and feared. To individuals or 
groups fearing the power of the G.L.C. it may have made little 
difference whether the G.L.C. asked for extra functions or 
whether they were imposed upon the Council. 
VI 
As has been shown throughout this thesis the new system of 
local government was based on a long series of compromises. 
This blunted the radical nature of the new system the 
boroughs did not gain complete responsibili ty for housing or 
planning and in central London they were deprived of education. 
The G.L.C. also lacked powers that may have enhanced its 
chances of solving more of Greater London's problems. In 1981, 
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for example, the G.L.C. suffered a humiliating defeat when its 
policy of heavily suosidizing London Transport's bus and 
underground system was challenged in the courts and found to be 
illegal. The London Borough of Bromley was able to prove that 
the G.L.C. did not have the right to demand the ratepayers of 
Greater London pay the price of a heavily subsidized public 
transport system. The Labour controlled G.L.C. had no option 
but to abandon its scheme, and was hamstrung in its attempts to 
encourage the use of public transport. a key element of that 
administration's policy.55 
The new system was firmly based on dividing urban Greater 
London from the surrounding counties. It was also firmly based 
on a not entirely satisfactory division of powers oetween a 
regional authority and the district authorities. The G.L.C. 's 
Greater London Development Plan, for example, suffered because 
the Council shared its planning powers with the London boroughs 
and the Ci ty of London. The plan also suffered because the 
G.L.C. had no responsibility for British Railway's commuter 
lines leading out to London's hinterland. 56 It seems unlikely, 
however, that a more radical break from this traditional 
pattern would have survived the many pressures to abandon 
reform. The price of a change to the system was compromise 
between the Government sponsoring the reforms and the many 
powerful groups intent on protecting their own interests. As we 
have seen the Government was quite prepared to accept change to 
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its original plans in order to get the general pattern of 
reforms accepted. 
The transi t10n in London government was a poli tical process. 
and it had to take account of what was achievable. The 
Conservative Government through Henry Brooke and the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government set the agenda by establishing 
exactly what the Royal Commission's remit was. The Royal 
Commission did not have the power to suggest a reform so 
radical a Conservat1ve Government could not accept it. The 
Royal Commission's report did offer the sort of reforms 
favoured by Conservatives such as Enoch Powell, who had 
produced a plan for reform when Director of the London 
Municipal Society in the mid-1950s. 6 7 The Government's whi te 
paper took the Royal Commission's plan and developed it just 
enough to create a blueprint acceptable to most Conservatives. 
It created a new system that was acceptable to a majority of 
interes ted bodies. even if some had to be cajoled and others 
allowed a few more concessions. The London Government Bill 
followed the same process and incorporated a few modifications 
over the white paper in order to make it acceptable. 
There is no evidence that Henry Brooke was working for purely 
party poli tical purposes wi th no other motive but to destroy 
Labour hegemony over the L.C.C. In all probability Brooke, his 
civil servants and the Conservative Government, were primarily 
concerned to create a better system of local government for 
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Greater London, one which could efficiently tackle most of the 
tasks allotted to local government. What was created. however, 
was a new system tainted by a Conservative philosophy of what 
was good local government. Labour squandered much of its 
opportuni ty to influence the new system. As shown in chapter 
five the L.L.P. and the labour controlled L.C.C. have to share 
the majori ty of the blame for this. More important than the 
party poli tical influence was the impossibili ty of removing 
local government reform from the general political arena. The 
G.L.C. and the new boroughs were formed and shaped by what was 
poli tically possible rather than by an attempt to create as 
near as possible an ideal system. 
There were no more upper-tier and lower tier authori ties in 
Grea ter London. The boroughs were the primary uni ts of local 
government. Yet the new boroughs and the G.L.C. had to co-exist 
and co-operate. This allowed tensions to develop between 
boroughs and G.L.C. and many of the causes of such tension were 
the same as existed under the pre-reformed system. In 1979 the 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets served Public Health Notices on 
three houses owned by the G.L.C. because the borough objected 
to the quality of the houses. This is one small example of how 
the existence of G.L.C.housing within Greater London allowed 
conflicts of opinion to develop between the boroughs concerned 
and the G.L.C. 68 These were exploited by political parties as 
they had been under the old system. There was never any 
intention of ending the role of party politics in London 
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government, as this would probably have been impossible. Thus, 
party politics continued to exploit tensions and weaknesses in 
the new sys tern. Because the boroughs were more powerful than 
their predecessors poli tical parties wi thin the new boroughs 
had more scope for disagreements. The G.L.C. was born as a high 
profile body and remained so throughout its existence. 
Politicians within the council highlighted what they perceived 
to be the errors of their opponents, and very often such 
disagreements were detailed by the press. London based regional 
newspapers such as the Evening Standard and the Evening News 
always reported the affairs of the G.L.C. Thus, if the council 
failed to reach high levels of efficiency or failed to offer 
effective solutions to Greater London's problems, the G.L.C. 
could be. and often was, accused of failing Londoners. This 
high profile of the G.L.C. allowed the Council's Conservative 
opposition to highlight the grants that the Labour controlled 
G.L.C. gave to various bodies in the early to mid 1980s. 
Although the sums given by the G.L.C. formed only a small part 
of the Council's budget. the policy of giving grants was 
portrayed as a heavy expense on the ratepayers of Greater 
London. Of the voluntary organizations given G.L.C. funding 
those deemed to be most unpopular with the voters of London and 
with central government were given the most publicity.69 Such 
high profile political activity by both the Labour controlled 
G.L.C. of 1981 to 1986 and the Conservative opposition directly 
contributed to the abolition of the Council. 7o 
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Enoch Powell was among those who saw that the G.L.C. had failed 
to live up to expectations. I t had developed into a form of 
super-county council. even though that had never been intended. 
and it soon developed flaws. As an expert on London government. 
Powell felt both points were inevitable, and no better system 
could have been designed. 7 I Desmond Plummer thought much the 
same way as Powell. Plummer argued that when he left office as 
Leader of the G.L.C., in 1973, it was still far from working 
well. He acknowledged. however, that given it had had only 
eight years to develop it was the best that could be 
expected. 72 The academics S.K. Ruck and Gerald Rhodes came to 
much the same conclusion when they wrote in 1970: 
We have argued that the new structure of local 
government set up by the 1963 Act does by and large 
offer the means of dealing with London's local 
government problems. I t does not offer an ideal or 
complete answer; no system could. It raises doubts in 
some directions: and some of its potentialities may 
not be realized in practice. But on the whole the 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages. 73 
The new system of local government did work, but not 
perfectly, but then so did the system it replaced, and a Joint 
Planning Board could also have been made to work. The G.L.C. 
and new boroughs were probably the best workable system of 
local government for Greater London. The G.L.C. and the new 
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London boroughs were created through compromise. and bi tterly 
condemned by pol it ical opponents of the reforms before they 
took power. Their first few years of existence showed the new 
system to be open to criticism. From these early imperfections 
it can be seen that the seeds of the G.L.C.'s early demise in 
1986 developed. The G.L.C. lacked the ability to change itself 
or the intractable problems of Greater London and South-East 
England. Any reform to the London government system, however 
minor or however major in character, would have met with severe 
criticism and dogmatic opposition from some quarter or other. 
Compromise would have been as necessary with any other local 
government structure. It seems highly likely that any London 
government apperatus, whatever its nature. would have met with 
as much criticism as the G.L.C. 
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Chapter eleven 
Conclusion 
This thesis demonstrates that the search for administrative 
efficiency was intricately tied up with party politics. The 
transition in London government cannot simply be classified as 
a quest for a more effective form of local government. Nor can 
it be labelled as poli tical manipulation designed to bring 
electoral success in local government to the poli tical party 
forming the national government. Such an accusation was made by 
the Labour Party of the Conservative Government. l 
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the politicians 
involved in the transi tion. As this thesis demonstrates, the 
L.C.C. and the other local authorities in Greater London did 
work quite efficiently. Sir Issac Hayward and his allies were 
right in many of their claims in defence of the status quo. The 
L.C,C. was able to demonstrate to the Royal Commission that 
function by function the local authorities in the 
Administrative County of London were serving the people of 
London adequately.2 Nonetheless. this view is shown to be true 
in a certain contexts only. I t took no account of tensions 
between district authorities and County Hall, for example. 
Equally the L.M.S. and L.C.C. Conservative view can be seen to 
reflect an element of reality. As has been shown some functions 
of local government, such as town planning, lacked co­
ordination throughout urban Greater London while other 
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services, such as children's and personal health services, 
could be efficiently provided by large district authorities. 3 
Both Labour's belief in centralized. comprehensive service 
provision and the Conservative belief in localized, carefully 
targeted local government services could be, and were, argued 
to be the most effective means of administering central 
government sponsored functions. Both methods worked in Greater 
London. Political ideology allowed each approach to be 
defended. 
This thesis went on to demonstrate that in a complex urban area 
such as Greater London basic party ideologies could mani fest 
themselves in quite different attitudes in various parts of the 
region. An example is that of the Conservative county 
councillors in Surrey who wished to preserve the county and 
county borough councils of Greater London, while their 
political allies elected to the L.C.C. were happy to see the 
nine such authori ties replaced by a single regional council. 
These divergent Conservative views do not reflect a fundamental 
difference of opinion, but a reflection that in Conservative 
dominated Surrey Conservative local government ideologies 
prevailed. Local Tories saw no need for change, especially if 
such change could risk being subsumed in a long feared 
expanded, but still Socialist dominated, L.C.C.4 At the same 
time L.C.C. Conservatives saw the creation of a single regional 
authori ty as the best way of bringing electoral success to 
their party, and thus, introducing Conservative ideologies 
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which, in turn, would lead to a higher level of administrative 
efficiency.5 There were differences of opinion between Labour 
members in different parts of Greater London, which also 
reflected local circumstances. rather than a difference in 
basic ideology. One such example, explained in the text, is the 
difference of opinion between Labour borough councillors in 
London and Essex.s 
As is demonstrated in this work, population density often 
dictated the area of district authorities. The centrifugal 
force of population from the inner areas of urban Greater 
London to the outer areas of the metropolis had created small 
inner-area boroughs. once densely populated, but by the 1950s 
with declining populations, and larger authorities, with stable 
populations. in the outer area. Such factors as these, which 
were beyond the control of local authority politicians, shaped 
local opinions. The small authorities, such as Halborn, 
Chelsea, Finsbury and Shoreditch,7 wished to avoid merging with 
larger neighbours. This did reflect a defence of vested 
interests, but only because the elected councillors felt their 
council better served the local populace than would a larger 
authority. This belief among elected councillors that they knew 
best seems to have also existed among the various pressure 
groups involved in process of transition in London government. 
Consequently. as is shown throughout this work, the defence of 
self interest was often also an altruistic belief that change 
\ 
i 
I 
I 
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would be detrimental to the individual Londoners effected by 
any such change. 
It is shown throughout this work that there was among all 
participants in the process of change a commitment to a 
democratic system. This can be seen in that all parties were 
committed to, either all directly elected authorities, or, a 
mixture of directly and indirectly elected authorities. More 
importantly, the procedure of designing and introducing a new 
local government system was open to all interested bodies to 
offer constructive advice and criticism. Nonetheless, there 
were areas not so open. The freedom of the Royal Commission was 
limited by its remit. The roles played by theConservative 
Government and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in 
the process of designing an improved local government system of 
Greater London were not public. Thus. this thesis shows that 
openness had its limitations. As is shown, the Government 
decided which of the bodies opposing its own views it wished to 
meet. The Government, for example. was able to initially ignore 
the wishes of the M. W. B., which only survived because of a 
technicality. This thesis shows that even a populous and rich 
local authority, such as the L.C.C., was no match for the 
central government. Central power in Britain was able to impose 
its will on the biggest local authority in the country. This 
shows that in the 1960s Britain remained a highly centralized 
state. 
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This thesis shows how the need to create a reasonable level of 
consensus actually weakened the new local government system in 
Greater London. The very large number of organizations and 
individuals who provided evidence to the Royal Commission, and 
the Government's wide-ranging consultations, brought many 
bodies, such as local authorities, trade unions and 
professional associations. into partial engagement with the 
decision making process. This meant the opinions of these 
groups were taken seriously. The process itself created 
partial agreement. This, however, left other views beyond that 
consensus wi th the legitimacy and s tusus of being evidence, 
based on research and experience, produced as part of the 
process of transition and able to damage the new settlement. We 
can see how this worked in the case of the M.W.B. which, when 
asked its views, based its claim for continued existence on the 
well argued case that it worked effectively. The Government 
countered this argument by suggesting that a directly elected 
G.L.C. was more appropriate to oversee Greater London's water 
supply than the indirectly elected M. W.B. Nevertheless. once 
both sides of the argument were in the public domain, the 
Government's view was damaged by the opposite view why 
abolish the M.W.B. when its range of functions were adequate 
for Greater London's needs and it was efficient in its 
oporations?8 
As is shown in this work the complexity of local government in 
Greater London was such that no perfect system was possible. 
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This was recognized by all those involved in creating a new 
system, or in defending the old. The G.L.C. and the new London 
boroughs were, thus, incapable of solving many of the problems 
of Greater London, such as commuters from outside urban Greater 
London overcrowding public transport and roads. The very 
process that had created the new authori ties also allowed to 
develop many criticisms of the new structure. The local 
government structure in Greater London was subject to many of 
the criticisms that had been levelled at the old. As is shown, 
there were claims that the G.L.C. was both too large and too 
small and that it was both too powerful and too weak. as had 
been the L.C.C. before it. As had happened to the L.C.C., the 
G.L.C. was constantly under attack from some quarter or 
other. The system that had created the G.L.C. was incapable of 
creating a local government structure that would satisfy all 
interested bodies or individuals. 
I t is evident, therefore, that no Royal Commission, nor any 
appara tus of governmental consul ta tions could have created a 
system less open to criticism. The complexities of Greater 
London and its relationship to South-East England made that so. 
The abolition of the G.L.C. has not altered this situation, and 
the present lack of a regional authority for Greater London is 
as heavily criticized as was the G.L.C. The pressures for 
change. the forces for conservation. and the compromises and 
conflicts engendered by this, developed wi thin a democratic 
framework which allowed all concerns to be made public. This 
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system did not. however, provide a comprehensive resolution to 
all concerns. The impossibility of a political synthesis which 
could be reflected in a consensual system of metropolitan local 
government has, it is hoped, been demonstrated in this thesis. 
The Victorian M.B.W., the L.C.C. from 1889 to 1965, and the 
G. L. C. after twenty-one years of life, succumbed to simi lar 
processes. 
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Appendix A 
Comparison of Proposals in the Herbert Commission Report 
and Provision of the London Government 
Act, 1963 
THE GREATER LONDON COUNCIL 
Royal Commission 
1. 	AREA 
Review area less Watford 
MB, Bushey UD, Chorleywood 
UD t Rickmansworth UD. 
Elstree RD, Watford RD 
(Aldenham and Watford Rural 
Parishes), Hatfield RD 
(Northaw Parish) (Hertford­
shire): Potters Bar UD 
(Middlesex): Waltham Holy 
Cross UD (Essex): Dartford 
MB (Kent). 
1963 Act 
As in Royal Commis­
sion report but 
excluding in addition 
most of Chigwell UD 
(Essex): Cheshunt UD 
(Herts); Staines UD, 
Sunbury on Thames UD, 
(Middlesex): Banstead 
UD, Caterham and War­
lingham UD, Epsom and 
Ewell MB, Walton and 
Weybrdge UD (Surrey). 
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2. FUNCTIONS 
(i) 	Education 
Responsibility for maintain­ Education authority 
ing standard of education for inner London (old 
in Greater London. Formula­ L.C.C. area) acting 
tion of the education devel­ through special com­
opment plan. financial mittee known as Inner 
responsibility for educa­ London Education Com­
tional service. Ownership mittee. I.L.E.A. con­
of all schools and colleges. sists of (a) all G.L.C. 
Promotion of parental free­ councillors for inner 
dom in choice of schools. London; (b) one member 
Training of teachers and of each inner London 
maintenance of a single Borough Council and of 
service for Greater London. the Common Council. 
Colleges of advanced tech- Review of I.L.E.A. not 
nology and regional colleges. later than 31 March 
1970 (subsequently 
repealed). I.L.E.A. and 
inner London Boroughs 
to prepare joint 
schemes for school 
health service. 
(ii) 	Planning 
Greater London Development Local planning auth­
Plan. Applications to be ority for Greater 
referred by boroughs: (a) London as a whole; 
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departure from plan; (b) 
extraction of minerals. 
Certain applications 
relating to the 'central 
area' (to be defined by 
Minister). 
(iii) 	Highways and Traffic Management 
Responsibility for traffic 
management throughout 
Greater London. Planning, 
construction, improvement, 
maintenance and lighting 
'main roads' (to be defined 
by Minister, may include 
trunk roads). Close 
contact with L.T.E .. B.T.C. 
to prepare and sub­
sequently amend 
G.L.D.P. Applications 
to be referred by 
boroughs: as prescribed 
by Minister. Minister 
may also prescribe 
that other classes of 
application shall be 
referred by boroughs 
for G.L.C. to give 
directions. 
Responsibility for 
traffic management 
(subject to Ministers 
consent on trunk 
roads). Provision of 
parking places (subject 
to boroughs consent). 
Highway authority for 
'metropolitan roads' 
(specified). Licensing 
of motor vehicles and 
drivers 
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(iv) 	Housing 
Powers to make provision 
for housing outside Greater 
London under Town Development 
Act 1952. Powers to build 
within Greater London (a) 
large redevelopment schemes; 
(b) boroughs unable to meet 
own needs. Houses built 
within Greater London to be 
transferred ultimately to 
boroughs. Power to 
co-ordinate borough housing 
lists. 
(v) Personal Health 
Ambulance service. 
Powers to make 
provision for housing 
outside Greater London 
under Town Development 
Act, 1952. Powers to 
build within Greater 
London but require 
borough consent except: 
(a) comprehensive 
development; (b) 
re-housing persons 
displaced by G.L.C. 
activities. Temporary 
inheritance of L.C.C. 
housing powers and 
accommodation. Record 
of housing needs and 
facilities for 
exchanging housing 
accommodation. 
Ambulance 	service. 
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(vi) 	Environmental Health 
Refuse disposal. L.C.C. 
and M.C.C. main sewers 
Certain large open spaces 
(e.g. Crystal Palace; 
Hampstead Heath.) 
Land drainage where more 
than one borough involved. 
(vii) Research and intelligence 
Intelligence department to 
be set up for research into 
problems of Greater London. 
Refuse disposal. Main 
sewers in large part of 
Greater London; G.L.C. 
may propose extension 
of area. 
Parks and open spaces 
of L.C.C. and M.C.C., 
but G.L.C. to submit 
scheme to Minister 
specifying which to be 
transferred to 
boroughs. 
Land drainage authority 
for major 	part of 
Greater London. 
Research and informa­
tion organization to be 
set up. Publicity for 
Greater London 
amenities. 
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(viii) 	Other functions 
Fire service. Cost of 
administration of justice. 
Appointment of coroners. 
Possibly some aspects of 
civil defence. Provision 
of art galleries; museums 
and entertainments 
(concurrently with boroughs). 
Public control measures, as 
determined by the Minister. 
Building 	regulations 
Fire service. Cost of 
administration of 
justice. Appointment 
of coroners. Certain 
civil defence functions 
Provision of entertain­
ments (concurrently 
with boroughs); L.C.C. 
powers and property in 
relation 	to concert 
halls, museums etc. 
(e.g. Royal Festival 
Hall, Geffrye museum). 
Licensing of theatres 
and other places of 
public entertainment; 
licensing of greyhound 
racing tracks for 
betting; licensing of 
premises for storing 
petrol. Provision of 
smallholdings. 
Building control (inner 
London). Power to 
supply boroughs, 
voluntary organizations 
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3. 	FINANCE 
Implicit view that council 
should precept on boroughs. 
Clearing house for new type 
rate equalization scheme. 
Special procedure for 
raising loans similar to 
that of L.C.C. 
4. 	CONSTITUTION 
One member for the area 
of each parliamentary 
constituency in Greater 
London. 
hospitals etc. with 
goods. 
Power to precept on 
boroughs. Minister may 
make scheme for rate 
equalization involving 
G.L.C. Power to promote 
annual Money Bills for 
raising capital. Power 
to establish insurance 
fund. Power to 
establish 
superannuation fund. 
Transitional payments 
to Essex. Herts. Kent 
and Surrey. 
Two, three or four 
members for each 
borough area (total 
100) as an interim 
measure; ultimately 
one member for each 
Parliamentary 
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triennial 	elections at 
same time 	as borough 
elections. Aldermen a 
national 	issue. 
THE LONDON BOROUGHS 
1. 	AREAS 
52 Greater London 
Boroughs. 
2. FUNCTIONS 
{i) 	Education 
Management and 
maintenance of schools. 
Appoint managers and 
governors. Administration 
of youth service and youth 
employment service. 
Appointment of teachers. 
School health service 
constituency. 
Triennial elections, 
ultimately on same 
day as borough 
elections. 16 Aldermen 
(one sixth of 
councillors) . 
32 London 	Boroughs 
20 outer London 
boroughs to be local 
education authorities. 
12 inner London 
boroughs (and City) to 
be 'minor authorities' 
e.g. for purpose of 
appointing managers of 
primary schools. Joint 
schemes by I.L.E.A. and 
inner London boroughs 
(and City) for 
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(i i) Planning 
Primary authorities for 
considering and deciding 
applications, except for 
those to be referred to 
G.L.C. 
(iii) 	Highways and traffic management 
Construction, improvement, 
maintenance and lighting of 
all except main roads. 
(iv) 	Housing 
Housing authorities, 
including ancillary 
functions, e.g. improvement 
grants. 
provision of school 
health service. 
Local planning 
authority for 
preparation of 
borough development 
plans. Reception of 
planning applications 
and decisions on all 
except those referred 
to G.L.C. 
Highway authorities for 
all except trunk and 
metropolitan roads. 
Provision of parking 
places. 
Housing authorities for 
all purposes. No 
provision of housing 
outside Greater London 
without Ministers 
agreement. 
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(v) Personal health, welfare and children's service 
All services except All services except 
ambulances. ambulances. 
(vi) 	Environmental health 
All services except those All services except 
listed under G.L.C. City to those listed under 
remain Port Health Authority. G.L.C. City to remain 
Port Health Authority. 
(vii) 	Other functions 
Art galleries and museums, Provision of 
entertainments, libraries. entertainments etc. 
Food and Drugs Act. Weights Libraries. Food and 
and measures. Fertilizers Drugs Act. Weights 
and feedingstuffs. Shops Act. and Measures. 
Public control powers as Slaughterhouses. 
determined by Minister. diseases of animals 
Possibly some aspects of etc. Offices, Shops 
civil defence. Remaining Railway Premises Act. 
functions wherever possible. Certain civil defence 
functions. Licensing of 
riding establishments 
etc. Any residual 
powers of a county 
borough. 
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3. 	FINANCE 
Rating authorities. 
Boroughs to make 
transitional payments to 
affected counties. 
4 CONSTITUTION 
As for Municipal boroughs 
outside Greater London. 
Source: Rhodes, G. The Government of 
Reform 	 (London, London School of 
Science and Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
253. 
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Rating authorities. 
Authorities to whom 
general grants payable. 
Also rate-deficiency 
grants. Provision for 
rate equalization 
scheme. Power to 
establish 
superannuation fund. 
As for municipal 
boroughs outside 
Greater London, 
except (i) triennial 
elections; (ii) number 
of Aldermen to be one 
sixth of number of 
councillors; (iii) 
maximum number of 
councillors to be 60. 
London: The Struggle for 
Economics and Political 
1970) Appendix two, p 247­
iZES _c .. _a: ............... 

Appendix B 
Chronological Table of Main Events, 1957-1965 
1957 
18 January Mr Brooke replaces Mr Sandys as Minister of Housing 
and Local Government. 
29 July Announcement of proposal to set up a Royal Commission. 
10 December Appointment of Royal Commission (Chairman: Sir 
Edwin Herbert). 
1958 

17 February Commission invite evidence from local authorities. 

1959 

5 March Commission begin oral hearings. 

1960 
2 February Commission end oral hearings. 
19 October Publication of Commission's report. 
28 November Ministry of Housing and Local Government invi te 
comments on the report from local authorities. 
21 December House of Lords debate on the Report. 
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1961 

April County Council elections. 

29 November Publication of white paper London Government: 

Government proposals for reorganization. 

16 December Ministry of Housing and Local Government Circular 

56/61 issued. showing proposed borough groupings. 

1962 

January First borough joint committee set up in Bromley. 

19/20 February House of Commons debate on the white paper. 

12/13 March L.C.C. debate on the white paper. 

14 March House of Lords debate on the white paper. 

23 March Dr Hill announces the names of the four Town Clerks to 

investigate borough groupings and their terms of reference. 

31 March Deadline for local authori ty comments on proposed 

borough groupings. 

4 April Dr Hill tells the Metropolitan Water Board that they 

are to be taken over by the proposed Greater London Council. 

S April L.C.C. Deputation to the Prime Minister. 

30 April Dr Hill announces the exclusion of Banstead, Caterham 

and Warlingham, and Walton and Weybridge from Greater London. 

3 May Dr Hill announces the decision to retain the L.C.C. 
education service intact. 
18 May Dr Hill announces decisions on other areas seeking 
exclusion from Greater London. 
5 June Final conference on borough groupings. 
15 June Ministry of Housing and Local Government invite local 
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authorities to discussions on the problems of the change-over. 

25 June Formation of Committee for London Government. 

13 July Government changes: Sir Keith Joseph replaces Dr Hill 

as Minister of Housing and Local Government; Sir Edward Boyle 

replaces Sir David Eccles as Minister of Education. 

2 August Sir Keith Joseph announces acceptance of the proposals 

on borough groupings made by the four Town Clerks. 

20 November First reading of London Government Bill. 

10/11 December Second reading of London Government Bill (House 

of Commons). 

1963 

23 January Beginning of committee stage on the Bill (Committee 

of Whole House). 

29 January Government move 'Guillotine' motion. 

5 February Bill in Standing Committee. 

21 March Completion of Committee stage (House of Commons). 

1/2 April Re-committal, report and third reading (House of 

Commons. 

23/4 April Second reading of the Bill (House of Lords). 

2 May Membership of London Government Staff Commission 

announced. 

9 May Beginning of Committee stage on the Bill (House of 

Lords) . 

30 May Completion of Committee stage (House of Lords). 

24 June Beginning of report stage (House of Lords), 

2 July Completion of report stage (House of Lords). 
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8 July Third reading of the Bill (House of Lords). 

25 July Commons consider Lords amendments on the Bill. 

31 July Sir Keith Joseph addresses L.C.C. Staff Association. 

23 August London Government Staff Commission issues first 

circular. 

23 September Sir Keith Joseph addresses N.A.L.G.O. 

November Metropoli tan Boroughs' J. C. circulate memorandum of 

proposals for transfer of L.C.C. services to inner London 

boroughs. 

1964 

13 February Ministry of Housing and Local Government circular 

on method of appointment of borough town clerks etc. 

9 April First election for Greater London council. , 

" 
7 May First election for London boroughs. 

15 October Labour victory in General Election. 

1965 
2 February Government announce that they do not propose to make 
changes in the London Government Act except to repeal the 
provision for a review of the Inner London Education Authority. 
1 April London Government Act 1963 comes into operation. 
Source: Rhodes, G. The Government of London: The Struggle for 
Reform (London, London School of Economics & Political Science 
and Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1970) pp.244-6. 
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Maps 
Map A (p. 421) taken from Robson, W.A. The Government and 
~tL~.gQv~rnment of London (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1939). 
... 
-
Map B (p.422) taken from Ruck, S.K. &Rhodes, G. The Government 
Qi.,_Greater London (London, George Allen & Unwin. 1970). p.190. 
No te: the sewerage area marked on the map does not correspond 
to that of the M.W.B. 
. tAl 
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